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ANALYTICAL COMPENDIUM TO A CUMULATIVE 
DISSERTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In terms of traffic fatalities per million inhabitants, Estonia has had a rather poor 
track record over the years.1 Even though considerable progress has been made, 
a lot of room for improvement still remains. 2  The vast majority of traffic 
accidents can be attributed to human error3 and, as demonstrated by statistics, 
Estonia is no exception in that regard. 
To reduce human errors through providing road users with a safer traffic 
environment, Estonia has adopted a Road Safety Programme which seeks to 
implement, among other things, intelligent transport systems.4 With the same aim 
in mind, Estonia also keeps an eye on ways of increasing road vehicle safety 
through driving automation.5 While intelligent transport systems are expected to 
improve urban traffic management and control and as well as alleviate parking 
problems6, fully automated vehicles are expected to allow for increasing traffic 
safety owing to the elimination of human errors. 7  Furthermore, self-driving 
                                                                                                 
1  Recent statistics on traffic fatalities and injuries is available in Estonian at <www.mnt.ee/ 
et/ametist/statistika/inimkannatanutega-liiklusonnetuste-statistika> accessed 8 October 2020. 
2  See, for example, the Estonian Road Safety Programme 2016–2025 approved by Order 
No 54, 16 February 2017, of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic, p 6 ff <www.mnt.ee/ 
sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/liikusohutusprogramm_2016-2025_en.docx> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
3  Commission, ‘Road safety: Commission welcomes agreement on new EU rules to help 
save lives’ (Presscorner, 26 March 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ 
detail/en/IP_19_1793> accessed 8 October 2020; see also point 2 in Commission, ‘Report to 
the European Parliament and the Council. Saving Lives: Boosting Car Safety in the EU. 
Reporting on the monitoring and assessment of advanced vehicle safety features, their cost 
effectiveness and feasibility for the review of the regulations on general vehicle safety and on 
the protection of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users’ COM (2016) 787 final. 
4  Estonian Road Safety Programme 2016–2025 approved by Order No 54, 16 February 2017, 
of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic, p 25 <www.mnt.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/ 
article_files/liikusohutusprogramm_2016-2025_en.docx> accessed 8 October 2020. 
5  ibid, p 26. 
6  On urban mobility issues see, for instance, Marco Pavone ‘Autonomous Mobility-on-
Demand Systems for Future Urban Mobility’ in Markus Maurer and others (eds), Autonomes 
Fahren (Springer Vieweg, Berlin, Heidelberg 2015), p 401 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
978-3-662-45854-9_19>. 
7  See, for instance, U.S. Department of Transportation, ‘Preparing for the future of trans-
portation: Automated vehicles 3.0’ (October 2018) <www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/ 
files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/320711/preparing-future-transportation-
automated-vehicle-30.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020; Nayeem Syed, ‘Regulating autonomous 
vehicles’ (2017) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 23/1, p 11; Oliver Jeffcott 
and Rose Inglis, ‘Driverless cars: ethical and legal dilemmas’ (2017) 1 Journal of Personal 
Injury Law, p 21. 
9 
vehicles are also expected to increase traffic efficiency and access to trans-
portation.8 This has sparked intense development of self-driving vehicles across 
the world, including in Estonia.9 Researchers of automated driving systems are 
optimistic that full automation can and will be reached in the near future.10 For 
instance, Estonian taxi service provider Bolt is planning on integrating self-
driving cars into its platform by 2026.11 
Self-driving road vehicles are essentially motor vehicles equipped with a 
combination of hardware and software, which enables them to cope with the 
complexity of traffic on their own, without any input from a driver.12 A truly self-
driving vehicle is aware of and able to properly respond to the highly complex 
and dynamic environment in which it is performing its driving task.13  Such 
awareness and responsiveness is attained through computing.14 In other words, it 
is achieved through the ability to coordinate data obtained with the help of the 
                                                                                                 
8  Christoph Grote, ‘Connected vehicles will enhance traffic safety and efficiency’ (The 
European Files, 18 February 2019) <www.europeanfiles.eu/digital/connected-vehicles-will-
enhance-traffic-safety-efficiency> accessed 8 October 2020. 
9  For an indicative list of piloting and preparing cities across the world, see the Bloomberg 
Aspen Initiative on Cities and Autonomous Vehicles, ‘Global Atlas of AVs in Cities’ 
<https://avsincities.bloomberg.org/global-atlas> accessed 8 October 2020. On Estonian 
projects, see Raivo Sell and Krister Kalda, ‘Self-driving shuttle ISEAUTO’ (26th ITS World 
Congress, Singapore, 21–25 October 2019) <www.researchgate.net/publication/337720410_ 
Self-driving_shuttle_ISEAUTO> accessed 8 October 2020; Epp Joala, ‘Isejuhtiv buss alustas 
Kadriorus regulaarset opereerimist’ [Self-driving shuttle begins regular operation in 
Kadriorg] (TalTech, 29 August 2019) <https://ttu.ee/isejuhtiv-buss-alustas-kadriorus-regu-
laarset-opereerimist> accessed 8 October 2020; University of Tartu, ‘University of Tartu and 
Bolt presented autonomous driving lab’s test car’ (29 January 2020) <www.ut.ee/en/news/ 
university-tartu-and-bolt-presented-autonomous-driving-labs-test-car> accessed 8 October 
2020; Janno Riispapp, ‘Cleveron arendab uut isejuhtivat kullerrobotit’ [Cleveron is developing 
a new self-driving robot courier] (Postimees, 29 March 2019) <https://tehnika.postimees.ee/ 
6557088/cleveron-arendab-uut-isejuhtivat-kullerrobotit> accessed 8 October 2020. 
10  Ekim Yurtsever and others, ‘A Survey of Autonomous Driving: Common Practices and 
Emerging Technologies’ (2020) 8 IEEE Access, p 58462 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1109/ 
ACCESS.2020.2983149> (hereinafter Yurtsever and others). 
11  University of Tartu, ‘Tartu Ülikool ja Bolt töötavad välja isejuhtivate autode tehnoloogiat’ 
[University of Tartu and Bolt are Developing Driving Automation Technology] (29 August 
2019) <https://www.ut.ee/et/uudised/tartu-ulikool-bolt-tootavad-valja-isejuhtivate-autode-
tehnoloogiat> accessed 8 October 2020. 
12  For further information on the technology behind self-driving vehicles, see Yurtsever and 
others (n 10); for further information on complexity, see Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A 
Guided Tour (OUP 2009). 
13  For further information on the characteristics of self-driving vehicles, see SAE Inter-
national, ‘Standard J3016. (R) Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road 
Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems’ (issued in January 2014, revised in June 2018), 
pp 1–35. 
14  For a brief overview of computing, see Douglas E Comer and others, ‘Computing as a 
discipline’ (1989) Communications of the ACM 32/1, pp 9–23 DOI: <https://doi.org/ 
10.1145/63238.63239>. 
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vehicle’s sensors, recognise patterns in data, turn these patterns into viable 
models and process and learn from large amounts of data, etc. 15  Self-driving 
vehicles can be considered, in essence, ‘computers on wheels’ and computers 
tend to compute far better than humans. 16  However, some situations are so 
complex that it is very hard to compute them.17 
While self-driving vehicles appear to have many advantages, they will remain 
a source of greater danger for road users in the foreseeable future. Given their 
possible mass and speed of movement, the laws of physics simply do not allow 
for stopping them in an instant, quite like a conventional vehicle cannot be 
stopped in the blink of an eye. Moreover, self-driving vehicles are a combination 
of hardware and software but, arguably, completely flawless software does not 
exist.18 No software developer can guarantee that their software is completely 
bug-free or intrusion-proof. Thus, the software of a self-driving vehicle might 
have an unintended bug or vulnerability. It has been pointed out that the scale of 
damage in such a situation could be broader than in the case of a conventional 
vehicle.19 
In the light of the threats and weaknesses stemming from or related to self-
driving vehicles, appropriate rules are needed to ensure the safety and the safe-
guarding of the rights and interests of road users. Thereby technology is not the 
only obstacle to the introduction of self-driving vehicles. Since the existing 
international and domestic legal rules have been formulated with the driver in 
mind, they will need to be adjusted accordingly.20 For instance, under Article 8.1 
of the Vienna Convention, every moving vehicle must have a driver. Under 
                                                                                                 
15  For further information on data and sensor fusion, see Özer Çiftçioğlu and Sevil Sariyildiz, 
‘Data Sensor Fusion for Autonomous Robotics’ in Serdar Küçük (ed), Serial and Parallel 
Robot Manipulators – Kinematics, Dynamics, Control and Optimization (IntechOpen 2012), 
p 373 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5772/33139>. 
16  Sam Francis, ‘Computers on wheels: An insight into how computers are making cars in 
their own image’ (Robotics&Automation News, 12 July 2018) <https://roboticsandauto-
mationnews.com/2018/06/12/computers-on-wheels-an-insight-into-how-computers-are-
making-cars-in-their-own-image/17622/> accessed 8 October 2020. 
17  On hard problems, see fn 18 in Article III. 
18  Mark Butje, Product Marketing for Technology Companies (Elsevier Butterworth-Heine-
mann: Oxford 2005), p 10. 
19  Rob Corbet and Ciara Anderson, ‘Autonomous vehicles – a driver for legal change’ 
(6 February 2018) Engineers Journal <www.engineersireland.ie/Engineers-Journal/Technology/ 
autonomous-vehicles-a-driver-for-legal-change> accessed 8 October 2020. 
20  At the international level, road traffic is regulated by two core instruments: the 1949 
Geneva Convention on Road Traffic (Convention on Road Traffic, Geneva, 19.9.1949, entry 
into force 26.3.1952 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1952/03/19520326%2003-36%20PM/ 
Ch_XI_B_1_2_3.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020) and the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic (Convention on Road Traffic, Vienna, 8.11.1968, entry into force 21.5.1977 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/Conv_road_traffic_EN.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2020). While the Geneva Convention takes a minimalist approach, the 
Vienna Convention sets out more detailed rules for traffic-related matters than the Geneva 
Convention. 
11 
Article 8.5 of the same, every driver must at all times be able to control their 
vehicle and under Article 13.1, every driver of a vehicle must in all circumstances 
have their vehicle under control so as to be able to exercise due and proper care 
and to be at all times in a position to perform all manoeuvres required of them. 
These provisions of the Vienna Convention will need to be amended before fully 
self-driving vehicles can be lawfully put into circulation in Estonia.21 
 
This compendium is based on the author’s four publications: 
• ‘Delictual Liability for Damage Caused by Fully Autonomous Vehicles: the 
Estonian Perspective.’22 The authors of the article are Taivo Liivak and Janno 
Lahe. Taivo Liivak contributed to formulating the research question and 
structuring the research results, carried out the analysis and drew up the results; 
• ‘Liability of a Manufacturer of Fully Autonomous and Connected Vehicles 
under the Product Liability Directive’23; 
• ‘What Safety Are We Entitled to Expect of Self-driving Vehicles?’24; 
• ‘Strict Liability for Damage Caused by Self-driving Vehicles: the Estonian 
Perspective.’25 The authors of the article are Taivo Liivak and Janno Lahe. 
Taivo Liivak contributed to formulating the research question and structuring 
the research results, carried out the analysis and drew up the results. 
 
With the exception of ‘Liability of a Manufacturer of Fully Autonomous and 
Connected Vehicles under the Product Liability Directive,’ which examines 
primarily EU law, the articles focus on Estonian law with the aim of covering the 
entire span of relevant tort law. The article ‘Delictual Liability for Damage 
                                                                                                 
21  It has been argued that the difficulty in reaching a related agreement may stem from 
different approaches to attaining full driving automation because some stakeholders are 
focusing on improving driver-assistance systems and gradually shift driving tasks from drivers 
to automated driving systems, while others attempt to operate self-driving vehicles in a limited 
geographical area and progressively expand it to other areas – see World Economic Forum, 
‘White Paper. Filling Legislative Gaps in Automated Vehicles’ (April 2019) pp 8–9 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Filling_Legislative_Gaps_in_Automated_Vehicles.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2020. The developers of self-driving vehicles and delivery robots in 
Estonia and the Estonian state seem to have taken the latter approach. 
22  Taivo Liivak and Janno Lahe, ‘Delictual Liability for Damage Caused by Fully Auto-
nomous Vehicles: the Estonian Perspective’ (2018) 12/1 Masaryk University Journal of Law 
and Technology, pp 49–73 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5817/MUJLT2018-1-3> (hereinafter 
Article I). 
23  Taivo Liivak, ‘Liability of a Manufacturer of Fully Autonomous and Connected Vehicles 
under the Product Liability Directive’ (2018) 4/2 International Comparative Jurisprudence, 
pp 178–189 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.13165/j.icj.2018.12.008> (hereinafter Article II). 
24  Taivo Liivak, ‘What Safety Are We Entitled to Expect of Self-driving Vehicles?’ (2019) 28 
Juridica International, pp 95–102 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.12697/JI.2019.28.11> (hereinafter 
Article III). 
25  Taivo Liivak and Janno Lahe, ‘Strict Liability for Damage Caused by Self-driving Vehicles: 
the Estonian Perspective’ (2019) 12/2 Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, pp 1–18 DOI: 
<https://doi.org/10.2478/bjlp-2019-0009> (hereinafter Article IV). 
12 
Caused by Fully Autonomous Vehicles: the Estonian Perspective’ (Article I) 
provides an introduction into the basics of fault-based tortious liability, strict 
liability and product liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles, thereby 
also discussing the division of liability in the event of mutual damage involving 
self-driving vehicles. 
The second article titled ‘Liability of a Manufacturer of Fully Autonomous 
and Connected Vehicles under the Product Liability Directive’ (Article II) pre-
sents the Directive’s prerequisites for manufacturer liability, examines legal gaps 
arising from the definition of ‘product’ in the light of the characteristics of self-
driving vehicles, looks into the defectiveness considerations of self-driving 
vehicles under the Directive, analyses the circle of persons who can be treated as 
manufacturers and the development risk defence which is often associated with 
the decision-making process of self-driving vehicles. 
The third article ‘What Safety Are We Entitled to Expect of Self-driving 
Vehicles?’ (Article III) lays groundwork for assessing the defectiveness of self-
driving vehicles by considering their capabilities, the role and, in the light of the 
defectiveness criteria laid down in the Product Liability Directive and respective 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, also the expectations of 
human beings as well as legislation aimed at ensuring safety and preventing 
damage. 
The fourth article ‘Strict Liability for Damage Caused by Self-driving Vehicles: 
the Estonian Perspective’ (Article IV) attempts to identify possible differences 
between damage caused by a conventional vehicle as opposed to that caused by 
a self-driving vehicle to answer the question of whether the introduction of self-
driving vehicles calls for, among other things, a revision of the rules on strict 
liability. 
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2. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND TOPIC 
2.1. Relationship between tort law and liability insurance 
and the main functions of tort law 
The complex relationship between tort law and liability insurance continues to 
provide legal scholars and legislators with plenty of food for thought. While such 
analyses26 often tend to focus on combining of tort law and liability insurance in 
order to attain a proper balance within the given legal system, liability insurance 
is not the subject matter of research of this dissertation. Nevertheless, since every 
now and then someone makes a suggestion to replace liability for accidents 
(including traffic accidents) with some insurance solution27 and since the insurance 
industry is also preparing for the introduction of self-driving vehicles,28 it is 
necessary to shed some light on the relationship between tort law and liability 
insurance for the purposes of the conclusions drawn and establishment of a 
broader context. 
Some argue that the issue of insurance should be kept separate from and 
independent of the issue of liability due to problems of containment of moral 
hazards stemming from being insured.29 The liability insurance approach would 
constitute a shift from the traditional paradigm of everyone having to bear their 
own damage (unless there is a special justification for shifting such damage to 
someone else) to the premise whereby every injured person must be compensated 
for their loss regardless of how it occurred.30 
A similar tug of war is also programmed into the very functions of modern 
tort law. The Commentary on the LOA explains that the function of tort law is to 
                                                                                                 
26  See, for example, Gerhard Wagner, ‘Tort Law and Liability Insurance’ (2006) 31 The 
Geneva Papers, pp 277–292 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510074>; Helmut 
Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag, 
2012). 
27  See, for instance, Kenneth S. Abraham, ‘Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: the 
Evolution of an Idea’ (2005) 64/1 Maryland Law Review, p 573. 
28  See, for instance, Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, ‘Pathway to Driverless 
Cars: Insurance for Automated Vehicles,’ Impact Assessment No DfT00366 <https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589800/
pathway-driverless-cars-impact-assessment.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. 
29  Gerhard Wagner, ‘Tort Law and Liability Insurance’ (2006) 31 The Geneva Papers, p 278 
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510074>. 
30  The approach does entail various advantages for the injured person who gets compensated 
without prior verification of all of the prerequisites for tortious liability, the process is shorter 
and faster and less expensive. The down side is that, once the reasons for damage become 
irrelevant, the injured person gets compensated for damage caused by chance or their own 
lack of care and this might encourage carelessness. See Helmut Koziol, Basic Questions of 
Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Wien: Jan Sramek Verlag, 2012), p 5; Tambet Tampuu, 
Lepinguvälised võlasuhted [Non-contractual Debt Relationships] (Juura 2017) (hereinafter 
Tampuu), p 172. 
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make good the damage tortiously caused to the injured persons and to preclude 
future cases of unlawful damage (special and general prevention).31 It has also 
been noted that the obligation to compensate for damage under civil law serves, 
above all, a compensatory function.32 
Regarding the deterrence (preventive) function of tort law,33 Koziol explains 
that the threat of a duty to compensate for damage does entail a general incentive 
to avoid inflicting damage as well as refrain therefrom in the future and points 
out that Continental European tort law systems are aimed, first and foremost, at 
compensation, while deterrence is merely a secondary function and is alone 
insufficient to justify the imposition of pecuniary obligations that do not serve 
the purpose of compensation.34 
In finding answers to the questions asked about the functioning of the various 
forms of liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles, the author has taken 
into account, among other things, the considerations of fairness, legal certainty, 
consumer protection and innovation. 
It has been argued that the only issue of risk distribution that ultimately matters 
is whether tort rules distribute risk in the manner required by the governing 
distributive norms of fairness or justice.35 Fairness can be looked at from the point 
of view of the choice of a tort regime, reciprocity of risk, distribution of harm, 
risks, costs of harm and burden of proof.36 
It has been noted that legal certainty calls for a balance between stability and 
flexibility – more specifically, formal legal certainty calls for predictability, so 
that persons concerned can assess the legal consequences of their actions, while 
                                                                                                 
31  Paul Varul and others, Võlaõigusseadus III. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [Law of Obli-
gations Act III. Commented version] (Juura 2009) (hereinafter Varul and others), p 622. See 
also Janno Lahe, ‘Punitive Damages in Estonian Tort Law?’ (2011) 3 Journal of European Tort 
Law, pp 280–293. 
32  Karin Sein, ’Kas Eesti õiguses tuleks lubada karistuslikke kahjuhüvitisi?’ [Should punitive 
damages be allowed in Estonian law?] (2008) 2 Juridica, p 93. 
33  Tampuu (n 30), p 172. 
34  Koziol, pp 78–79. He adds that the deterrent function of tort law is at least greatly reduced 
(if not eliminated) by the widespread availability of third party liability insurance. He 
considers this kind of insurance highly desirable but notes that respective policies should be 
designed (with the help of, for instance, appropriate deductibles) so that they do not undermine 
the deterrent function of tort law. See also Helmut Koziol, ‘Harmonising Tort Law in the 
European Union: Advantages and Difficulties’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal, pp 80–83 
<https://eltelawjournal.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ELJ_Separatum_koziol.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
35  Mark A. Geistfeld, ‘Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: Carrying Calabresi Further’ 
(2014) 77 Law and Contemporary Problems, p 166. 
36  Gregory C. Keating, ‘Tort, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents’ 
(2004) 72/5 Fordham Law Review, pp 1857–1921; Tampuu (n 30), p 172; Varul and others 
(n 31), p 622. 
15 
substantive legal certainty can be associated with the acceptability of laws and 
adjudication by the legal community.37 
The goal of a high level of consumer protection is established in Article 38 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.38 Under Article 12 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), consumer pro-
tection requirements must be taken into account in defining and implementing 
other Union policies and activities.39 Article 169(1) of the TFEU lists the Union’s 
efforts aimed at promoting the interests of consumers and ensuring a high level 
of consumer protection: contribution to protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers as well as to promoting their right to information, edu-
cation and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests. 
To supplement tort law in dealing with adverse consequences of road traffic 
and in safeguarding road users’ rights, Member States of the European Union, 
among them Estonia, have made it compulsory for motor vehicles to have a 
liability insurance contract. 40  Liability insurance is supposed to ensure that 
damage caused to the injured person is indemnified by the insurer, while the 
possessor, operator or driver of the motor vehicle is usually not the one to 
ultimately compensate for the damage caused. The motor insurance obligation 
will presumably also apply to self-driving vehicles.41 However, as noted on p 4 
in Article IV, even where the insurer indemnifies the damage, it is still important 
whether and on what ground the driver, operator or possessor of the damage-
                                                                                                 
37  Elina Paunio, ‘Beyond Predictability – Reflections on Legal Certainty and the Discourse 
Theory of Law in the EU Legal Order’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal, pp 1469–1493 DOI: 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200018332>. 
38  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
39  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326/47. 
40  Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] 
OJ L263/11. 
41  The same has also been noted on p 26 of the report prepared by Karmen Turk, Maarja Pild 
and Ergo Blumfeldt, ‘Analüüs SAE tase 4 ja 5 sõidukite kasutusele võtmiseks koos 
seaduseelnõu väljatöötamiskavatsuse kirjeldustega, Vaheraport’ [An analysis for the intro-
duction of vehicles of SAE Levels 4 and 5 along with descriptions of a letter of intent of a bill. 
Interim report] (24 August 2017) <www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/analuus_sae_tase_4_ 
ja_5_soidukite_kasutusele_votmiseks_riigikantselei_2017_08_23_ver_6.docx> accessed 
8 October 2020. Making references mainly to US law, the authors of the report raise the issues 
of whether a new type of insurance is needed for self-driving vehicles in the light of the fact 
that the current insurance system is dependent on the driver, how to provide insurance services 
in a situation where information from prior accidents involving self-driving vehicles is not 
usable owing to the fact that the vehicle is controlled by a self-learning algorithm that 
improves the system after an accident and takes the circumstances into account. The authors 
of the report find the compulsory insurance regime sufficient for self-driving vehicles in 
Estonia but note that it could be considered whether manufacturers (dealers, distributors) of 
self-driving vehicles should have some additional insurance to effectively ensure product-
related liability. 
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inflicting vehicle is liable towards the injured person, because the insurer’s 
obligation to indemnify is based on the tortfeasor’s liability.42 It has been pointed 
out that, where the tortfeasor is indeed liable for the damage caused, the 
indemnification obligation rests with the tortfeasor’s motor insurance under-
taking to the extent that the tortfeasor is liable towards the injured person.43 
Such liability is mostly tortious (see clauses 1 and 2 of subsection 1 of § 23 of 
the Motor Insurance Act (MIA)) but in certain circumstances it may be contrac-
tual, more specifically, stem from a passenger carrier contract, which is regulated 
in § 824 et seq of the LOA. It has been pointed out that clause 3 of subsection 1 
of § 23 of the MIA limits the insurer’s indemnification obligation in such a 
manner that liability under a passenger carriage contract is the only type of 
contractual liability that can result in the insurer’s obligation to perform.44 It has 
also been explained that, while the liability of the policyholder may be based on 
breaches of other types of contracts, these cannot result in the insurer’s liability 
in situations where risks characteristic of engaging in traffic have not mate-
rialised.45 It follows from subsection 3 of § 1044 of the LOA that in the event of 
the injured person’s death or bodily injury or harm to the injured person’s health, 
the injured person can always choose whether to bring a claim based on contract 
law or tort law. 
It has been noted regarding international enforcement as a means of increasing 
trust in the digital market of the EU that the ultimate solutions should reflect the 
                                                                                                 
42  For instance, subsection 1 of § 23 of the Motor Insurance Act specifies the extent to which 
the insured person must bear liability towards the injured person in order to trigger the motor 
insurance undertaking’s obligation to indemnify the damage: Where an insured event occurs, 
the injured party may file a claim for damages against the insurer if the insured person is liable 
towards the injured party: 1) on the basis of § 1057 of the Law of Obligations Act; 2) on the 
basis of the provisions of the Law of Obligations Act regarding unlawfully and culpably caused 
damage, or 3) on the basis of a contract for the carriage of passengers. See the Motor Insurance 
Act [liikluskindlustuse seadus] – RT I, 11.04.2014, 1; RT I, 13.03.2019, 2. English translation: 
<www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/526032019008/consolide> accessed 8 October 2020. On the 
prerequisites and scope of the liability of the motor insurer see Janno Lahe, ‘Estland,’ pp 233–
235 in Werner Bachmeier (ed) Regulierung von Auslandsunfällen (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2017); Janno Lahe, Olavi-Jüri Luik and Martti Merila, Liikluskindlustuse 
seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [Motor Insurance Act. Commented version] (Juura 2017), 
pp 98–100. 
43  Janno Lahe, ‘Estland,’ pp 233–235 in Werner Bachmeier (ed) Regulierung von Ausland-
sunfällen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2017); Lahe, Luik and Merila (n 42), 
pp 98–100. 
44  Lahe, Luik and Merila (n 42), p 91. The damage that the carrier is required to compensate 
under § 830 of the LOA: 1) the death or bodily injury or harm to the health of the passenger 
during carriage or due to a circumstance related to carriage; 2) partial or total loss of or damage 
to baggage during carriage or due to a circumstance related to carriage and 3) damage arising 
from the exceeding of the carriage time limit. 
45  ibid. For further information on the prerequisites for a claim for damages arising from a 
breach of contract see, for instance, Supreme Court Civil Chamber (hereinafter SCCC) judg-
ment, 8 January 2013, case 3-2-1-173-12, paras 15–19. 
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pan-national character of the market and be coordinated at EU level.46 In the 
context of motor insurance, this understanding is reflected in §§ 48–51 of the MIA. 
Under subsection 1 of § 51 of the MIA, the insurer is required to appoint a settler 
of cross-border claims for each contracting state in order to compensate the 
injured person domiciled in the respective state for damage suffered as a result of 
an insured event, provided that the damage has been caused in a contracting state 
and the particular state is not the domicile of the injured person. This means that, 
for instance, in a situation where the vehicle of an individual from Estonia is 
involved in a traffic accident in Finland and suffers damage, they can, for the 
purpose of the ease and familiarity of the process, return to Estonia after the 
accident and file a claim for damages to the representative of the Finnish 
insurance company in Estonia.47 
 
 
2.2. Research problem 
Tort law (also called the law of delict) is part of the law of non-contractual obliga-
tions, which governs the making good of unlawfully caused damage. Tort (delict) 
essentially means a civil wrong (a violation of the law).48 It has been pointed out 
that the underlying purpose of tort law is not the sanctioning of the tortfeasor or 
the deprivation of the tortfeasor of the proceeds obtained from the violation of 
the law but making the damage good towards the injured person (victim) and 
preventing further non-contractual damage (special prevention and general pre-
vention).49 In the Commentary50 on the Estonian Law of Obligations Act (LOA),51 
attention is drawn to the fact that since the general preventive effect of tort law is 
associated with, above all, the desire of the potential tortfeasor to avoid tortious 
liability and the obligation to make the damage good, tort law has no general 
preventive effect in a situation where the number of potential instances of damage 
                                                                                                 
46  Hans Schulte-Nölke and others, ‘The legal framework for e-commerce in the Internal 
Market,’ Study for the committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (Luxem-
bourg 2020) Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 
European Parliament, p 38 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/ 
652707/IPOL_STU(2020)652707_EN.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. 
47  For further information, see Lahe, Luik and Merila (n 42), pp 166–174. 
48  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition for the iPhone and iPad. Version: 1.4, Thomson 
Reuters 2014). 
49  Tampuu (n 30), p 115. See also SCCC judgment, 26 June 2013, case 3-2-1-18-13, para 29. 
50  Varul and others (n 31), p 622. 
51  Law of Obligations Act [võlaõigusseadus] – RT I 2001, 81, 487; RT I, 08.01.2020, 1. 
English translation: <www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515012020004/consolide> accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2020. Please note that the English translations of the Acts of Parliament (the Riigikogu) 
given in this compendium are provided by the author and, for the purposes of greater accuracy, 
may somewhat differ from those published in the Estonian State Gazette (Riigi Teataja). The 
English translations published in the Riigi Teataja are merely unofficial versions of the 
statutes and do not have any legal force. 
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is not high and the costs of prevention of damage would, in the event of damage, 
exceed the costs of preventing the respective damage. It also is noted in the 
Commentary on the LOA that, according to the principle of fairness, tort law 
should allow for holding the person who caused damage and can be blamed for 
it liable – in other words, this is the principle of individual fault-based liability 
which applies, above all, to fault-based tortious liability.52 Likewise, it is noted 
that tort law is supposed to hold liable a person who is required to make good the 
harmful consequences due to the fact that damage was caused as a result of the 
manifestation of a risk arising from a dangerous thing or activity controlled by 
the person (justifies tortious liability on the basis of the provisions regulating 
strict liability).53 
The tort law provisions of the LOA distinguish between fault-based tortious 
liability (§§ 1043–1055) which stands apart from heightened liability which is 
manifested in strict liability (§§ 1056–1060) and product liability (§§ 1061–
1067). The first of the three is fault-based, the second is no-fault liability and the 
third is to a large extent, albeit not fully, no-fault liability as well. It follows from 
the second sentence of subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA that strict liability 
applies only where either the life, health or ownership of a person is harmed. The 
same interests are protected under the product liability provisions set out in 
subsections 1 and 2 of § 1061 of the LOA. The list of protected legal interests is 
longer in the case of fault-based tortious liability, but these three are covered as 
well (see clauses 1, 2 and 5 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA). 
This dissertation examines, within the confines of Estonian law, tortious 
liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles. While both contract law and 
insurance law also have an important role to play in terms of liability associated 
with self-driving vehicles, this dissertation focuses on tort law. More specifically, 
the focus is on the entire range of tortious liability that is of relevance for Estonia 
in the context of self-driving vehicles: fault-based tortious liability, strict liability 
and product liability. Since the latter liability regime is the only one of the three 
harmonised at EU level, the discussion thereof is respectively broader as well. 
The field of self-driving vehicles and intelligent transport systems (ITS) is 
developing rapidly worldwide. 54  The respective technologies, the industry’s 
standards and safety requirements are still taking shape. 55  Nevertheless, the 
underlying idea of the self-driving vehicle is to, figuratively speaking, eliminate 
                                                                                                 
52  Varul and others (n 31), p 622. 
53  ibid. 
54 See the initiatives and research indicated in nn 9 and 10 above. On the development of ITS 
in Estonia, see ‘Intelligent Transportation Systems’ (e-Estonia, Mobility services) <https://e-
estonia.com/solutions/location-based-services/intelligent-transportation-system/> and the web-
site of the ITS Estonia network <https://its-estonia.com/en/its-estonia-en/> accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2020. 
55  For a discussion on the industry’s standards and requirements, see Rick Salay, Rodrigo 
Queiroz and Krzysztof Czarnecki, ‘An analysis of ISO 26262: Using machine learning safely 
in automotive software’ (2017), arXiv: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02435.pdf> accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2020. 
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the human from the equation.56 In other words, to cope without a human at the 
wheel or even eliminate the driving wheel altogether. Such vehicles need special 
infrastructure (eg ITS) which helps them to be aware of their surroundings so that 
they could cope with all roadway and weather conditions safely.57 These vehicles 
may need various third-party services as well.58 
In order to actually put a motor vehicle into circulation, certain standards and 
rules59 under public law need to be complied with. The regulatory authorities 
need to be certain that the vehicle is indeed safe. Self-driving vehicles are no 
exception in this regard and will need to comply with all the applicable public 
requirements before they can be put into circulation. Therefore, instead of 
resorting to technical guessing or speculations over how the true driving auto-
mation might ultimately be achieved, what the legal implications thereof might 
be and what will happen or will need to happen in the realm of public law in order 
to make self-driving vehicles possible, this dissertation is focuses on the type of 
vehicle that does not have a human driver at the wheel and is not otherwise under 
any other kind of direct human control and, where necessary, makes use of third 
party services in order to be able to cope with driving on its own. This premise 
seems sufficient to venture an analysis into tortious liability currently designed 
solely with human drivers in mind. Although self-driving vehicles have not yet 
been put into circulation in Estonia, they are being tested on Estonian roads and 
can be placed in the existing legal space in order to assess what issues it raises 
from the point of view of tort liability and whether the law in force needs any 
rethinking or revision in the light of their upcoming introduction. 
The overall purpose of the dissertation is to establish whether and to what 
an extent the application of tortious liability is affected by the automation of 
the vehicle and whether and to what an extent this calls for revision of the 
                                                                                                 
56  See, for instance, SAE International. ‘Summary of SAE International’s levels of driving 
automation for on-road vehicles’ (2014) <https://web.archive.org/web/20170903105244/ 
https://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. 
57  On the priority areas regarding ITS, see Annex I to Directive 2010/40/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the framework for the deployment of Intelli-
gent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of 
transport [2010] OJ L207/1. 
58  On third-party digital services see, for instance, Martin Ebers, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte 
Daten beim autonomen Fahren’ in Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, Nikola Werry and 
Susanne Werry (eds), Datenrecht in der Digitalisierung (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag 2019), 
pp 896–936. 
59  Eg Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 
2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of 
systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles (Framework 
Directive) [2007] OJ L263/1; Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety [2002] OJ L11/4. In Estonia, the key 
statute is the Product Conformity Act [toote nõuetele vastavuse seadus] – RT I 2010, 31, 157; 
RT I, 12.12.2018, 3. English translation: <www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/518012019009/consolide> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
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relevant legal rules. To attain this purpose, the author seeks answers to the fol-
lowing research questions: 
• Whether and on what grounds can the injured person bring a claim for damages 
under fault-based tortious liability in a situation where damage has been 
caused by a self-driving vehicle? 
• Whether and based on what considerations should the Estonian legislature 
establish in the Traffic Act a separate safeguarding tort law provision aimed 
at self-driving vehicles following the example of the German Road Traffic 
Act? 
• How are the prerequisites for the application of strict liability and the circle of 
obligated persons affected by the fact that damage has been caused by a self-
driving vehicle? 
• In which situations should a bug or error in the software of a self-driving 
vehicle or in digital services used be deemed a defect of the vehicle? 
• Whether and to what an extent is it justified to discharge manufacturers of 
self-driving vehicles from liability based on the so-called development risk 
defence? 
• How to assess the size of the risk of operation of self-driving vehicles? 
• How to divide liability in a situation where mutual damage has been caused 
with the involvement of a self-driving vehicle, given that the driver’s conduct 
cannot be taken into account in the case of a self-driving vehicle? 
 
 
2.3. Defining the topic 
2.3.1. Characteristics of self-driving vehicles 
Self-driving vehicles can be divided into six levels of automation (Levels 0–5), 
ranging from no automation to full automation.60 The levels are described in 
greater detail on pp 96–97 in Article III. Vehicles of Level 5 constitute the subject 
matter of this dissertation. 
To be able to drive on its own, the vehicle needs to be aware of the surrounding 
environment, including of the weather, the road conditions, non-moving and 
moving objects, traffic signs, other road users, birds and animals, etc as well as of 
events and occurrences that are relevant from the point of view of the passengers 
(traffic signals and other road users’ behaviour). For that purpose, it has to take 
into account not only internally obtained data and information but also external 
data and information, such as, for example, maps, traffic rules, etc. In order to 
                                                                                                 
60  SAE International, SAE International, ‘Standard J3016. (R) Taxonomy and Definitions for 
Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems’ (issued in January 
2014, revised in June 2018), pp 1–35; SAE International. ‘Summary of SAE International’s 
levels of driving automation for on-road vehicles’ (2014) <https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170903105244/https://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf> accessed 8 October 
2020. This classification has been picked up by numerous countries and the car industry, 
which has effectively made it the global standard for stakeholders. 
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drive on its own, the vehicle needs to perceive what is happening around it – in 
particular, what is moving and what is not. To perceive the surroundings, self-
driving vehicles need various sensors (eg radar, LIDAR, global positioning system 
and local positioning system components, an odometer system, vision, and an 
inertial measurement unit).61 However, having internal and external data and 
information is not enough. It has been pointed out that accurate and reliable 
perception of the surroundings also calls for coordinating the data obtained via 
these sensors (in other words, data fusion and sensor fusion).62 
Self-driving motor vehicles have not been explicitly regulated in the Traffic 
Act (hereinafter TA) yet.63  However, the TA contains provisions specifically 
aimed at self-driving delivery robots. These entered into force on 14 July 2017. 
Under clause 681 of § 2 of the TA, a self-driving delivery robot is a partially or 
fully automated or remotely controlled vehicle which moves on wheels or another 
chassis that is in contact with the ground, uses sensors, cameras or other 
equipment for obtaining information on the surrounding environment and, based 
on the obtained information, is able to move partially or fully without being 
controlled by a driver.64 However, it follows from clause 40 of § 2 of the TA that 
                                                                                                 
61  On various sensors and other hardware used see, for instance, Yurtsever and others (n 10); 
Khuram Shahzad, ‘Cloud robotics and autonomous vehicles’ in Andrzej Zak (ed), Auto-
nomous Vehicle (IntechOpen 2016) DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5772/64064>; Yassen Dobrev 
and others, ‘Steady Delivery: Wireless Local Positioning Systems for Tracking and Auto-
nomous Navigation of Transport Vehicles and Mobile Robots’ (IEEE Microwave Magazine, 
2017) 18/6, pp 26–37 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1109/MMM.2017.2711941>. 
62  Özer Çiftçioğlu and Sevil Sariyildiz, ‘Data Sensor Fusion for Autonomous Robotics’ in 
Serdar Küçük (ed), Serial and Parallel Robot Manipulators – Kinematics, Dynamics, Control 
and Optimization (IntechOpen 2012), p 373 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5772/33139>. 
63  Traffic Act [liiklusseadus] – RT I 2010, 44, 261; RT I, 30.06.2020, 8. English translation: 
<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511082020004/consolide> accessed 8 October 2020. 
However, the Estonian state is planning on introducing algorithmic-liability rules that would 
cover, among other things, self-driving vehicles. For further information see Cabinet 
Communication Unit, ‘Self-driving vehicles waiting for a new law’ (15 October 2019) 
<www.valitsus.ee/en/news/self-driving-vehicles-waiting-new-law> accessed 8 October 2020. 
64  Clause 682 of the same section gives the legal definition of the user of a self-driving 
delivery robot: ‘a natural or legal person who is the direct possessor of a self-driving delivery 
robot and uses the self-driving delivery robot in traffic. A person who is provided with a 
service using a self-driving delivery robot under a contract or on another ground and who 
does not have substantive control over the maintenance, operation the self-driving delivery 
robot or over allowing the self-driving delivery robot to engage in traffic is not considered a 
self-driving delivery robot user.’ In clause 683 of § 2, the TA also defines the controlling of a 
self-driving delivery robot: ‘the adjustment of the moving speed or direction of a self-driving 
delivery robot by a natural person directly or by way of remote control using electronic, 
manual or other control equipment. The controlling of a self-driving delivery robot also means 
the setting of the path of movement for a self-driving delivery robot and the giving for the 
related movement and stopping instructions for the time during which the self-driving delivery 
robot participates in traffic partially or fully without the controller’s control, but only to the 
extent that the self-driving delivery robot follows such instructions.’ 
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self-driving delivery robots are not considered motor vehicles, which precludes 
them from among the subject-matter of this dissertation. 
While both the TA and the LOA use the term mootorsõiduk, the meaning of 
the term in these two different Acts of Parliament is different. Under clause 40 of 
§ 2 of the TA, mootorsõiduk65 means a vehicle powered by an engine, except for 
engine-powered vehicles designated for use solely by a person with reduced 
mobility, electric cycles, self-balancing vehicles, mini mopeds, self-driving 
delivery robots, off-road vehicles, trams and vehicles with a manufacturer speed 
of no more than six kilometres per hour. Section 1057 of the LOA provides for 
the liability of the possessor of a mootorsõiduk 66 , listing the grounds which 
preclude the possessor’s liability. Thereby clause 3 of § 1057 of the LOA 
explicitly also mentions the operation of an aircraft. Thus, mootorsõiduk seems 
to have a broader meaning in the LOA as compared to the use of the same Esto-
nian term in the TA. This interpretation seems to be supported by the authors of 
the commentary on the Estonian MIA.67 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that 
the exclusion of the tram from among motor vehicles in the TA definition also 
raises questions in the light of § 1057 of the LOA.68 This supports the assumption 
that the term ‘motor vehicle’ indeed is broader in the LOA than in the TA. 
In view of the above, it can be argued that a self-driving vehicle should be 
considered a motor vehicle for the purposes of § 1057 of the LOA. The quali-
fication of a self-driving vehicle as a motor vehicle for the purpose of the LOA 
is of relevance, above all, in the context of strict liability.69 
 
 
                                                                                                 
65  In the English translation of the TA, it is called ‘power-driven vehicle’ in line with the 
terminology used in the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic of 8 November 1968. 
66  In the English translation of the LOA, it is called ‘motor vehicle’. For the purposes of this 
compendium, the term ‘motor vehicle’ is used in English for both the TA and LOA terms. 
67  Lahe, Luik and Merila (n 42), p 88. 
68  Tampuu (n 30), p 285. 
69  As for terms used to describe motor vehicles that are able to cope with the driving task 
without the help of a driver, there is an ample selection of options (eg self-driving, automated, 
autonomous, driverless, etc) and no perceivable consensus on their use. For instance, the terms 
‘automation’ and ‘autonomy’ represent different concepts that often get mixed up (for further 
information see Article III, p 96). Owing to its neutrality and descriptiveness as well as its 
substantive similarity to its Estonian equivalent (isejuhtiv sõiduk), the author of this disser-
tation has come to prefer the term ‘self-driving vehicle’ in legal English as opposed to, for 
instance, the term ‘driverless vehicle.’ Estonian journalists often tend to refer to self-driving 
vehicles using the term isesõitev sõiduk which literally translates as ‘self-riding vehicle.’ 
Given that the driver (juht), not the rider (sõitja), has been replaced by the vehicle’s sensors 
and hardware and that ‘driving’ carries a more active connotation than ‘riding,’ preference 
should be given to isejuhtiv sõiduk in Estonian. 
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2.3.2. Fault-based tortious liability for damage caused  
by self-driving vehicles 
2.3.2.1. Prerequisites for fault-based tortious liability 
Fault-based tortious liability (also called fault-based liability, general tortious/ 
delictual liability or fault-based tortious/delictual liability) is regulated in §§ 1043–
1055 of the LOA. Under § 1043 of the LOA, a person who unlawfully causes 
damage to another (the injured person/victim) must compensate for the damage 
where the person who caused damage (the tortfeasor/injuring person) is at fault 
of the damage or bears statutory liability for causing the damage. The Supreme 
Court has explained that fault-based tortious liability consists of three components 
that are assessed in three stages:70 the objective elements of the act (this element is 
divided into the following three sub-elements: the tortfeasor’s act, damage to the 
rights of the injured person and a causal link between them); unlawfulness; and the 
tortfeasor’s fault. It follows from the case-law of the Supreme Court that these 
stages are examined cumulatively.71 Where, for instance, there is no causal link 
between the tortfeasor’s act and the harm caused to the injured person’s legally 
safeguarded interests (ie damage), the unlawfulness of the act is not examined. 
Likewise, where the act proves lawful, the issue of fault is not dealt with. 
As explained in Article I,72 engaging in traffic using a self-driving vehicle may 
be deemed to be the tortfeasor’s act. The legally safeguarded interests (rights) 
include, above all, life, health and ownership, which are set out in clauses 1, 2 
and 5 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA, respectively. 
It follows from subsection 4 of § 127 of the LOA that a person must com-
pensate for damage only where the circumstances that serve as the basis for the 
person’s liability and the damage caused are related in such a manner that the 
damage is a consequence of the circumstances (causal link). The Commentary on 
the LOA points out that causality can be divided into liability-creating causality 
and liability-fulfilling causality.73 The Commentary on the LOA also explains that 
the former is necessary for establishing unlawfulness, while the latter is necessary 
for determining the extent of the obligation to compensate for damage.74 
A causal link between the act and the damage is established in the same way 
regardless of whether the vehicle is self-driving or conventional. It is done in two 
stages. It follows from the case-law of the Supreme Court that, first, the natural 
cause for damage is assessed using the conditio sine qua non test whereby the 
preceding event is deemed as the cause of the following event where the 
following event had not occurred without the preceding event.75 The Supreme 
                                                                                                 
70  See, for instance, SCCC judgment, 25 April 2007, case 3-2-1-30-07, para 10. 
71  See, for instance, SCCC judgment, 28 May 2008, case 3-2-1-43-08, para 12. 
72  Article I, p 54. 
73  Varul and others (n 31), p 631. 
74  ibid. 
75  SCCC judgment, 26 September 2006, case 3-2-1-53-06, para 11. 
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Court has explained that the alleged act or omission is set aside for that purpose 
and it is examined whether the negative consequence had resulted even without 
the tortfeasor’s act or omission: if the negative consequence would have been 
brought about also without the alleged act or omission, the act or omission is not 
the cause of the damage.76 The Supreme Court has also noted that, under sub-
section 4 of § 127 of the LOA, the causal link does not necessarily need to be the 
direct consequence of a breach of a duty.77 The Supreme Court has pointed out 
that there is a causal link where the damage would not have been suffered but for 
the act that the person is accused of.78 
Second, an assessment of the legal cause for damage is carried out by 
examining whether the purpose of the breached rule was to obligate the tortfeasor 
and protect the injured person against the specific kind of damage. The need for 
such assessment stems, on the one hand, from subsection 2 of § 127 of the LOA 
according to which damage is not subject to compensation to the extent that the 
prevention of damage was not the purpose of the duty or provision a breach of 
which gave rise to the obligation to compensate for damage.79 On the other hand, 
it arises from the principle set out in subsection 3 of § 1045 of the LOA according 
to which damage caused by the breach of a statutory duty is not unlawful where 
the purpose of the provision violated by the tortfeasor was other than to protect 
the injured person from such damage. For instance, if a self-driving car, dis-
regarding a prohibiting sign, parks itself in a no-parking zone next to a tree and a 
branch of the tree breaks and falls onto the self-driving car, the owner/possessor/ 
user/operator/manufacturer of the car cannot be criticised for the wrong parking 
from the point of view of enabling the damage because the primary purpose of 
the parking prohibition is related to the management of traffic, not the safe-
guarding of persons or property in the no-parking zone. 
Once the tortfeasor’s act, the damage and a causal link between these have 
been identified, the unlawfulness of causing damage is examined. Clauses 1–4 of 
subsection 2 of § 1045 of the LOA set out the circumstances that preclude the 
unlawfulness of damage. These include situations where the right to cause 
damage arises from law, the injured person has consented to being caused damage 
without acting in conflict with the law or good morals, the tortfeasor acts in self-
defence or out of necessity or the tortfeasor engages in self-help for the purpose 
of exercising their right or protecting themselves. 
                                                                                                 
76  SCCC judgment, 18 June 2008, case 3-2-1-45-08, para 17. 
77  SCCC judgment, 7 December 2005, case 3-2-1-149-05, para 13. 
78  ibid. 
79  The Supreme Court has explained (see SCCC judgment, 26 September 2006, case 3-2-1-
53-06, para 13) that subsection 2 of § 127 of the LOA must be applied to cases of non-
contractual damage and, while subsection 3 of the same section does not apply to tortious 
liability, the foreseeability of a harmful consequence at the time of committing an unlawful 
act may still be of relevance in the context of fault-based tortious liability because sub-
sections 1 and 2 of § 1050 of the LOA give the tortfeasor the opportunity to prove that they 
could not have reasonably foreseen the link between their act and the damage. 
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Where damage is caused by the driver of a conventional motor vehicle, the 
unlawfulness can alternatively arise from a violation of a safeguarding provision80 
or be based on the general catalogue of unlawful damage81. 
As pointed out in Article I,82 where such legally safeguarded absolute interests83 
as human life, health or ownership are infringed upon, unlawfulness stems from 
the harmful effect. Thereby a breach of an obligation by the tortfeasor is irrel-
evant – unlawfulness arises from the wrongfulness of the outcome specified in 
clauses 1, 2 and 5 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA. However, there may be 
still be exceptions to the establishment of unlawfulness based on the harmful 
effect even where the legally safeguarded absolute interests have been infringed 
upon. Where such an interest has been infringed upon by failure to act (omission) 
or where the harmful effect is a more remote outcome of the conduct of the tort-
feasor, a duty which the latter has breached should be identified.84 It may be a 
statutory duty or the general duty to maintain safety. An example of a breach of 
the general duty to maintain safety might be a situation where a self-driving car 
alerts the possessor that the software of the vehicle needs to be updated before 
commencing use of the vehicle and indicates that the update contains critical bug 
fixes, warning the possessor not to engage the vehicle in traffic before down-
loading and installing critical updates. However, the possessor is in a hurry and 
does not want to do it right away because it would take too much time. The 
possessor engages in traffic using the non-updated self-driving vehicle and the 
vehicle causes damage. 
It follows from the case-law of the Supreme Court that the general duty to 
maintain safety means a duty to act in a manner that does not harm other persons.85 
The Supreme Court has explained that it means one’s duty to make every 
                                                                                                 
80  Clause 7 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA in combination with a safeguarding rule set 
out in the Traffic Act. 
81  Clause 1 of subsection 1 (death), clause 2 of subsection 1 (bodily injury or health damage) 
and clause 5 of subsection 1 (infringement of ownership) of § 1045 of the LOA. 
82  Article I, p 55. 
83  Varul and others (n 31), p 641 ff; Janno Lahe and Tambet Tampuu, ‘Essential Cases on 
Misconduct’ in Bénédict Winiger, Ernst Karner and Ken Oliphant (eds) Digest of European 
Tort Law (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018), p 67. 
84  See, for instance, Varul and others (n 31), pp 627 and 642. 
85  SCCC judgment, 17 December 2012, case 3-2-1-161-12, para 10. The Supreme Court 
explains that the general duty to maintain safety can be derived from subsection 2 of § 138 of 
the General Part of the Civil Code Act (GPCCA) [tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus] – RT 
I 2002, 35, 216; RT I, 23.05.2020, 2. English translation: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ 
528052020001/consolide>. Under subsection 2 of § 138 of the GPCCA, rights should not be 
exercised in an unlawful manner or with the aim of causing damage to another person. See 
also SCCC judgment, 29 November 2017, case 2-14-56641/69, para 18.2; SCCC judgment, 
20 June 2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. For a detailed analysis of the duty to maintain safety, 
see Iko Nõmm, ‘Käibekohustuse rikkumisel põhinev deliktiõiguslik vastutus’ [Delictual 
liability based on the violation of the duty to maintain safety] (PhD thesis, University of Tartu 
2012) <https://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/29910/n6mm_iko.pdf?sequence=1&is 
Allowed=y> accessed 8 October 2020. 
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reasonable effort to ensure that other persons are not harmed as a result of one’s 
actions.86 The Supreme Court has further explained that, in essence, the general 
duty to maintain safety means that a person who has given rise to a danger or 
controls a danger situation has a duty to take any and all reasonable and appro-
priate measures to ensure that other persons and their legally safeguarded interests 
are not harmed.87 The Supreme Court has given the following non-exhaustive list 
of criteria for establishing whether the tortfeasor had the duty to maintain safety: 
1) the manifested threat was in the tortfeasor’s sphere of influence; 2) the tort-
feasor’s actions made the other person trust the tortfeasor and left the other person 
the impression that the activity was safe or, alternatively, that the other person 
was fully in control of the threat; 3) the tortfeasor engaged in a dangerous activity 
for the purposes of economic gain.88 
Regarding the substance and scope of the duty to maintain safety, the Supreme 
Court has pointed out that it can be derived from the measures which the tort-
feasor should have reasonably taken to prevent the materialisation of a manifested 
threat. Thereby the Supreme Court considers the severity of potential damage, 
the likelihood of damage and the level of costs and effort necessary for averting 
or eliminating the threat to be always of relevance when it comes to efforts of 
preventing the manifestation of threats. In the court’s view, the higher the severity 
and likelihood of the potential damage and the lower the cost and the smaller 
effort, the higher the likelihood that a duty to maintain safety exists.89 
As noted on p 55 in Article I, although the unlawfulness of causing damage 
can usually be derived from harming the injured person’s legally safeguarded 
interest (or, alternatively, from a violation of the provisions of the TA provisions) 
in the case of damage caused by a conventional motor vehicle, it becomes question-
able in the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle. One could argue 
that, for instance, in a situation where a person travelling inside a self-driving 
vehicle that causes a traffic accident, the person has not harmed the injured person’s 
legal interest by their active conduct. In such an event, the damage caused by the 
person travelling inside the vehicle cannot be deemed to be unlawful owing to 
the mere harming of the injured person’s legally safeguarded interest. In order to 
hold such person liable, a duty which the person has breached should be estab-
lished. Presumably, it cannot be a statutory duty (eg under the Traffic Act). Thus, 
the tortfeasor’s liability could be based, above all, on a breach of the general duty 
to maintain safety. 
It follows from the case-law of the Supreme Court that the general duty to 
maintain safety and the element of fault are entwined.90 Therefore, when examining 
whether the general duty to maintain safety has been breached, one must sub-
stantively assess whether the tortfeasor has been externally (ie objectively) 
                                                                                                 
86  SCCC judgment, 20 June 2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. 
87  SCCC judgment, 10 June 2015, case 3-2-1-48-15, para 24. 
88  ibid. 
89  ibid. 
90  SCCC judgment, 20 June 2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. 
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negligent.91 For instance, it has been argued in the context of German law that 
putting blind trust in the automated vehicle technology over a long period may 
constitute a breach of the duty to maintain safety.92 
Under Estonian law, one could partly agree with such opinion. The owner or 
possessor of a self-driving vehicle could be hypothetically criticised for a breach 
of the general duty to maintain safety where the vehicle is not properly serviced 
(eg software updates have not been made in a timely manner) or where detected 
errors are not attended to. Maintaining safety should not usually require more of 
the owner or possessor. Likewise, where the owner or possessor of a self-driving 
vehicle disregards related warnings and engages in traffic in a situation where the 
safety of a self-driving vehicle depends on an external service which happens to 
be unavailable, the owner or possessor could be hypothetically criticised for a 
breach of the general duty to maintain safety. In a situation where an external 
service provider transmits to a self-driving vehicle misleading data, the service 
provider could be hypothetically criticised for a breach of the general duty to 
maintain safety as well. In the light of such hypothetical situations one cannot but 
agree with the authors of the Report from the Expert Group on Liability and New 
Technologies (New Technologies Formation)93 in that the application of fault-
based rules is complicated due to the absence of well-established models of proper 
functioning of these technologies. The NTF Report points to various duties of 
care of operators94 of emerging digital technologies: the duty to pick the right 
system for a task, the duty to possess skills required for operating the systems, 
the duty to monitor and maintain the systems (including carry out safety checks 
and repairs).95 
                                                                                                 
91  ibid. 
92  Volker M Jänich, Paul T Schrader and Vivian Reck, ‘Rechtsprobleme des autonomen 
Fahrens’ (2015) 28/7 Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, p 316. 
93  Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, Liability 
for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies (2019), p 23 (hereinafter 
NTF Report) <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.group 
MeetingDoc&docid=36608> accessed 8 October 2020. 
94  Thereby the NTF has divided the concept of ‘operator’ into two: the frontend operator and 
the backend operator. The former is the one who primarily decides on and benefits from the 
use of the technology and the latter is the one who continuously defines the features of the 
technology as well as provides essential and ongoing backend support. See ibid, p 39. 
95  ibid, p 44. Similar observations have also been made by other legal scholars. See Martin 
Ebers, ‘Außervertragliche Haftung für Künstliche Intelligenz – Grundfragen’ (2019) 16 
Rechtsbrücke / Hukuk Köprüsü, pp 58−59; Susanne Horner and Markus Kaulartz, ‘Haftung 
4.0. Verschiebung des Sorgfaltsmaßstabs bei Herstellung und Nutzung autonomer Systeme’ 
(2016) 32/1 Computer und Recht, pp 7 and 9 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.9785/cr-2016-0104>; 
Ruth Janal, ‘Extracontractual liability for Wrongs Committed by Autonomous Systems’ in 
Martin Ebers and Susana Navas (eds), Algorithms and Law (Cambridge University Press 
2020), Chapter 6, pp 174–206 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108347846>; Volker M 
Jänich, Paul T Schrader and Vivian Reck, ‘Rechtsprobleme des autonomen Fahrens’ (2015) 
28/7 Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, pp 313 and 316. 
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The tortfeasor’s fault is the third main precondition for fault-based tortious 
liability.96 It follows from subsection 2 of § 104 of the LOA that the types of fault 
are negligence, gross negligence and intent. Negligence means failure to exercise 
necessary care (subsection 3 of § 104 of the LOA). Gross negligence means failure 
to exercise necessary care to a material extent (subsection 4 of § 104 of the LOA). 
Intent means the will to bring about an unlawful consequence upon creation, 
performance or termination of an obligation (subsection 5 of § 104 of the LOA). 
Thereby the tortfeasor’s fault (including negligence) must also be assessed based 
on the tortfeasor’s characteristics. Under subsection 2 of § 1050 of the LOA, the 
situation, age, education, knowledge, abilities and other personal characteristics 
of a person must be taken into consideration upon assessment of the fault of the 
person. Under subsection 1 of § 1050 of the LOA, the tortfeasor’s negligence is 
presumed, ie the tortfeasor who wishes to avoid liability must prove the absence 
of their fault. 
In the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle, the absence of fault 
or the absence of a breach of the duty to maintain safety may be the reason why 
fault-based tortious liability is not applicable to the owner or possessor of the 
vehicle or a person who simply travelled in the self-driving vehicle at the time of 
the traffic accident. For instance, should a self-driving vehicle happen to cause 
damage to a third party due to an error or bug in its software, one cannot usually 
argue that the owner or possessor failed to exercise due care or to perform the 
general duty to maintain safety. However, where the vehicle was not properly 
maintained or serviced, the liability situation may prove different. In any event it 
is not reasonable or practical to bring a claim against the owner or possessor of 
the vehicle based on fault-based tortious liability rules. 
 
 
2.3.2.2. Burden of proof 
Usually, it is the claimant (often the injured person/victim) who has to prove the 
existence of the objective elements (ie the defendant’s act and a causal link 
between the defendant’s act and the claimant’s damage) as well as unlawfulness 
of the act.97 In a situation where the claimant has proven the existence of these 
two components, the defendant’s (the tortfeasor’s) fault is presumed and the 
defendant is discharged from liability only where the defendant proves the 
absence of their fault or the existence of unlawfulness-precluding circumstances 
(subsection 1 of § 1050 of the LOA). 
                                                                                                 
96  For a comparative discussion of the tortfeasor’s fault see Janno Lahe, ‘The Concept of 
Fault of the Tortfeasor in Estonian Tort Law: A Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 38/2 Review 
of Central and East European Law, pp 141−170 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1163/092598812X 
13274154887420>. 
97  SCCC judgment, 26 September 2006, case 3-2-1-53-06, para 12; SCCC judgment, 31 May 
2007, case 3-2-1-54-07, paras 12 and 14; SCCC judgment, 12 January 2009, case 3-2-1-127-08, 
para 15; SCCC judgment, 20 April 2011, case 3-2-1-19-11, para 12. 
29 
However, as noted above, in the case of self-driving cars damage presumably 
cannot typically be caused by a direct behavioural act since a human being is not 
directly controlling the vehicle. Therefore, the claimant needs to demonstrate the 
existence of the defendant’s statutory duty as well as a breach thereof. It could be 
a safeguarding rule established in the TA but there are currently no such rules in 
the TA regarding self-driving vehicles. Examples of safeguarding rules can be 
brought from other countries or in relation to other automated technologies. For 
instance, the German legislature expects the driver to stay alert and take over the 
control of a self-driving vehicle in a danger situation.98 
Presumably, the Estonian legislature will eventually introduce TA provisions 
(including safeguarding provisions) aimed specifically at self-driving vehicles.99 
In the light of such possible developments the relevant case-law of the Supreme 
Court instructs that, in order to trigger the defendant’s tortious liability under 
clause 7 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA,100 the claimant bears the burden of 
proving that the unlawfulness stems from a breach of a statutory duty (safe-
guarding rule) by the defendant.101 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has pointed 
out that the claimant should, in addition to proving the breach of a safeguarding 
rule under the law of tort by the defendant, also prove that the prevention of 
damage to the claimant was at least one of the purposes of the statutory duty 
under subsection 3 of § 1045 of the LOA.102 
In view of the absence of both a direct behavioural act on the part of the tort-
feasor and a statutory duty aimed at preventing damage, the claimant can claim 
damages based on the general duty to maintain safety. The Supreme Court has 
noted that the general duty to maintain safety and a breach of thereof need to be 
                                                                                                 
98  It follows from subsection (4) of §1a of the StVG that the driver is the one to switch on the 
highly or fully automated driving function and apply it for controlling the vehicle. Such an 
approach to automated driving means that even a vehicle with a fully automated driving 
function is required to have a steering wheel and a licensed driver behind it at all times. This 
also means that even a vehicle equipped with fully automated driving functionality must not 
drive ‘empty’ – even when there are no passengers, there must be at least one occupant (the 
driver) while it is driving. In addition, it follows from subsection (4) of §1a of the StVG that 
the driver must be prepared to take over control of the vehicle at all times. See the Road Traffic 
Act [Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG)] 5.3.2003 | 310, 919; 10.7.2020 | 1653 <www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/stvg/StVG.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. The Estonian legislature, for instance, 
expects a person controlling a self-driving delivery robot to be careful, cautious and alert, 
avoid endangering other road users and causing damage, follow requirements established to 
self-driving delivery robots and their traffic, and be familiar with the legislation pertaining to 
the use of self-driving delivery robots (subsection 3 of § 1512 of the TA). 
99  For further information see Cabinet Communication Unit, ‘Self-driving vehicles waiting 
for a new law’ (15 October 2019) <www.valitsus.ee/en/news/self-driving-vehicles-waiting-
new-law> accessed 8 October 2020. 
100  SCCC judgment, 10 November 2010, case 3-2-1-88-10, para 10; SCCC judgment, 25 April 
2007, case 3-2-1-30-07, para 10. 
101  ibid. 
102  SCCC judgment, 17 December 2009, case 3-2-1-150-09, para 12; SCCC judgment, 
17 December 2012, case 3-2-1-161-12, para 11. 
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established for the purpose of holding the tortfeasor liable based on the general 
composition of tort (ie fault-based liability rules) in a situation where the cause 
of damage lies in an insufficient action and the injured person does not accuse 
the tortfeasor of a violation of a statutory duty under clause 7 of subsection 1 of 
§ 1045 of the LOA.103 Thus, as explained above, when verifying if a person has 
breached the general duty to maintain safety, the person’s objective negligence 
has to be assessed.104 The Supreme Court has explained that since the general 
duty to maintain safety means, according to the generally recognised view, a duty 
of care for the purposes of the legal theory, since negligence is one of the forms 
of fault under subsection 2 of § 104 of the LOA and since under subsection 1 of 
§ 1050 of the LOA a person who unlawfully caused damage is presumed to be at 
fault, the defendant has the burden to prove that it did not breach the general duty 
to maintain safety.105 
The latter view taken by the Supreme Court appears to coincide with the NTF 
Report’s suggestion that where damage is of a kind that safety rules were 
supposed to avoid, failure to comply with the safety rules should result in a 
reversal of the burden of proof regarding fault.106 However, the NTF Report goes 
further and recommends reversing the burden of proof not only regarding fault, 
but also regarding causation.107 The suggestions of the NTF regarding the burden 
of proving causation and fault call for a closer look in the context of the fault-
based tortious liability regime in place in Estonia. Although the NTF admit that, 
as a general rule, the injured person should be required to prove what caused them 
harm, they support the idea of alleviating the burden of proof in the light of the 
challenges of emerging digital technologies where a balancing of certain factors 
warrants doing so.108 
The NTF Report points out that due to the complexity and opacity of emerging 
digital technologies injured persons may be at a disadvantage in establishing a 
causal link.109 While recognising various judicial ways of alleviating the more 
weakly-positioned claimant’s burden of proving causation, the NTF Report sug-
gests an additional method of helping the claimant prove the cause of harm: 
placing the burden of proof on the party who is in control of key evidence (eg 
                                                                                                 
103  SCCC judgment, 17 December 2012, case 3-2-1-161-12, para 10; SCCC judgment, 20 June 
2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. 
104  SCCC judgment, 20 June 2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. 
105  ibid; see also fn 22 in Article I. 
106  NTF Report (n 93), pp 48–49. 
107  ibid, pp 49–55. 
108  ibid, pp 49–50. These factors include the likelihood that the technology at least contributed 
to the harm; the likelihood that the harm was caused either by the technology or by some other 
cause within the same sphere; the risk of a known defect within the technology, even though 
its actual causal impact is not self-evident; the degree of ex-post traceability and intelligibility 
of processes within the technology that may have contributed to the cause (informational 
asymmetry); the degree of ex-post accessibility and comprehensibility of data collected and 
generated by the technology; the kind and degree of harm potentially and actually caused. 
109  ibid, p 50. 
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design blueprints, log files, recordings, internal expertise) but fails to produce it 
in court.110 The experts of the NTF find that, where the following factors exist, it 
may be advisable to lower the bar for proving causation: the technology may be 
deemed to have potentially harmful features which could be taken into account 
even though it is not proven that the respective risks have materialised; where 
there are multiple causes and it is unclear what exactly caused the harm but the 
likelihood of the combination of all possible causes attributable to one party 
exceeds a certain threshold (eg 50% or more), this may support placing the burden 
of rebutting such impression onto such party; the information asymmetry, ie the 
manufacturer/developer possesses far more information than the injured party 
and is best positioned to gather evidence by recording or logging the operation of 
the technology; the type and extent of harm.111 
In addition to the burden of proving causation, the NTF Report also advises 
reversing the burden of proving fault in a situation where ‘it is proven that an 
emerging digital technology caused harm, and liability therefor is conditional 
upon a person’s intent or negligence,’ provided that ‘disproportionate difficulties 
and costs of establishing the relevant standard of care and of proving their viola-
tion justify it.’ Again, the reasons for the reversal are largely the same as in the case 
of causation (ie opacity, autonomy, limited predictability, asymmetry of infor-
mation).112 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, under Estonian law, the 
burden of proof does not need to be reversed because it already is reversed – the 
defendant bears the burden of proving the absence of fault and the performance 
of the duty to maintain safety. 
Regarding causation, examples of alleviation of the burden of proof can be 
brought from the LOA and related case-law. In the context of, for instance, the 
(contractual) liability of health service providers (see the first sentence of sub-
section 4 of § 770 of the LOA), the legislature has partially reversed the burden 
of proof: ‘Where there is an error in diagnosis or treatment and the patient 
develops a health disorder which could probably have been avoided by ordinary 
treatment, the damage is presumed to have resulted from the error.’ Against this 
background attention should be drawn to the case-law of the Estonian Supreme 
Court regarding the burden of proof. The first sentence of subsection 1 of § 230 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)113 obligates parties to prove the circum-
stances that serve as the basis for their claims and counter-arguments, unless 
otherwise provided by a statute. The Supreme Court has explained that, never-
theless, where one needs to prove a circumstance the occurrence of which was 
under the control of the opposing party and the party relying on the circumstance 
cannot objectively furnish proof and where the opposing party refuses to aid the 
                                                                                                 
110  ibid, p 51. 
111  ibid, pp 51–52. 
112  ibid, pp 52–55. 
113  Code of Civil Procedure [tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik] – RT I 2005, 26, 197; RT I, 
20.06.2020, 1. English translation: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/522062020001/consolide> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
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proving of the circumstance, the burden of proof may be reversed on the basis of 
the principle of good faith.114 This means that where the party relying on the 
circumstance has managed to demonstrate the likelihood of the circumstance, the 
opposing party should prove that the circumstance does not exist.115 
Thus, it can be argued that Estonian civil procedure rules are already at least 
to some extent prepared for the attainment of a balanced solution in the event of 
a civil dispute concerning damage caused by self-driving vehicles along the lines 
recommended by the NTF 116 . Nevertheless, the legislature should consider 
whether, analogously to subsection 4 of § 770 of the LOA, to introduce a special 
rule that would eliminate the need to resort to the reversal of the burden of proof 
based on the principle of good faith. 
 
 
2.3.3. Strict liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles 
2.3.3.1. Prerequisites for strict liability 
It follows from case-law that the difference between strict liability and fault-based 
tortious liability lies, above all, in the fact that in the case of strict liability the 
person controlling the dangerous thing or activity is liable for damage caused to 
third parties by the thing or activity (source of greater danger) and thereby the 
prerequisite for the emergence of such liability is a causal link between the 
controlling of the source of greater danger and the damage caused to the third 
party as a result of a heightened risk emanating from the source of greater danger.117 
Strict liability broadens the possibilities of compensation for damage118 because, 
unlike fault-based tortious liability, strict liability does not call for the tortfeasor’s 
act that causes damage to the injured person and, even if the tortfeasor’s act can 
be identified, it does not need to be unlawful and the tortfeasor does not need to 
be at fault. 119  As Koziol notes, strict liability essentially means liability for 
dangerousness.120 
                                                                                                 
114  SCCC judgment, 6 June 2018, case 2-15-4981/106, para 17. See also SCCC judgment, 
26 January 2017, case 3-2-1-82-16, para 24; SCCC judgment, 8 January 2013, case 3-2-1-
173-12, para 17; SCCC judgment, 25 January 2017, case 3-2-1-68-16, para 31. 
115  SCCC judgment, 6 June 2018, case 2-15-4981/106, para 17. 
116  NTF Report (n 93), p 51. 
117  SCCC judgment, 2 March 2011, case 3-2-1-161-10, para 11. 
118  It has been noted in the light of emerging technologies such as self-driving cars that, while 
the advantages of strict liability are obvious for the injured person, it may have a cooling effect 
on technological research but the absence of legal rules or legal uncertainty is even worse. For 
further information see the NTF Report (n 93), pp 26–27. 
119  SCCC judgment, 10 February 1997, case 3-2-1-17-97; SCCC judgment, 24 September 
2007, case 3-2-1-75-07, para 12. 
120  Helmut Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Wien: Jan 
Sramek Verlag, 2012), p 234. 
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The LOA’s strict liability rules are structured in such a manner that § 1056 
sets out general rules, while §§ 1057–1060 set out special rules. The latter include 
the strict liability of the possessor of a motor vehicle. Under § 1057 of the LOA, 
the direct possessor of a motor vehicle is liable for any damage caused upon the 
operation of the motor vehicle. However, such special liability for the 
dangerousness of a motor vehicle is subject to exceptions set out in clauses 1–5 
of § 1057 of the LOA. It follows from these clauses that the direct possessor of 
the motor vehicle is not liable where: 1) damage is caused to a thing being 
transported by the motor vehicle and it is not being worn or carried by a person 
in the vehicle; 2) damage is caused to a thing deposited with the possessor of the 
motor vehicle; 3) damage is caused by force majeure or by an intentional act on 
the part of the injured person, unless the damage is caused upon the operation of 
aircraft; 4) the injured person participates in the operation of the motor vehicle; 
5) the injured person is carried without charge and outside the economic activities 
of the carrier. 
Section 1057 of the LOA does not provide a list of legally safeguarded inte-
rests, but it follows from subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA (general composition 
of strict liability) that these include life, health and items of property. 
To be able to hold the possessor of a self-driving vehicle liable for damage 
caused by operating the vehicle within the meaning of § 1057 of the LOA, it 
needs to be established whether a self-driving vehicle can be considered a motor 
vehicle. As demonstrated above, a self-driving vehicle can indeed be considered 
a motor vehicle for the purposes of § 1057 of the LOA. 
It is explained in the Commentary on the LOA that the operation of a motor 
vehicle means any purposeful use of the vehicle in the course of which a danger 
characteristic of the motor vehicle as a source of greater danger may be mani-
fested.121 The Supreme Court has clarified that damage is considered to have been 
caused upon operating a motor vehicle where, above all, it stems from the pur-
poseful use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle in traffic. The slow movement of a 
vehicle or, in exceptional circumstances, even the static status of a vehicle on the 
road may be considered the operating of the vehicle.122 
Under § 1057 of the LOA, only the direct possessor of a motor vehicle can be 
held liable for damage.123 As explained on p 8 in Article IV, it may happen that 
self-driving vehicles may be put into operation for the provision of taxi services. 
In a situation where a self-driving taxi happens to cause a traffic accident while 
providing taxi services, the question of who the direct possessor of the taxi at the 
moment of the accident was, can be raised. By way of analogy with the con-
ventional taxi service it can be argued that, since the customer cannot be deemed 
the direct possessor of a conventional taxi while they receive the service, the same 
does not happen in the case of a self-driving taxi either. Thus, the customer is not 
                                                                                                 
121  Varul and others (n 31), p 696. 
122  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 20. 
123  For a more detailed discussion of the meaning of the term ‘direct possessor,’ see item 2.3.5 
below. 
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liable for damage under § 1057 of the LOA. Thereby it does not matter whether 
the taxi company owns or leases the vehicle because in either case the company 
is considered an indirect possessor to whom § 1057 of the LOA does not apply. 
In an employment relationship, it may happen that an employee merely ‘serves’ 
the employer’s possession using a self-driving vehicle in their household or 
business to perform employment tasks. As pointed out on p 8 in Article IV, 
§ 1057 of the LOA is not applicable to the employee who is a possessory 
servant.124 However, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, the possessory servant 
could still be liable under rules governing fault-based tortious liability.125 The 
fruitfulness of seeking damages based on such grounds of liability is questionable 
in the case of self-driving vehicles because fault-based tortious liability would 
normally be precluded due to the absence of fault or a breach of the duty to 
maintain safety on the part of the possessory servant. Nevertheless, it can be 
considered a fair solution, given that damage caused by a self-driving vehicle 
cannot be imputed to a possessory servant. 
The above analysis concerns mainly the special rules of strict liability applic-
able to motor vehicles. Where damage has been caused by a self-driving (motor) 
vehicle it is probably possible, in addition to the special rules of strict liability set 
out in § 1057 of the LOA, to apply general strict liability rules provided for in 
§ 1056 of the LOA.126 Under subsection 1 of the said section, where damage 
resulting from a danger characteristic of a thing that constitutes the source of 
greater danger or from an extremely dangerous activity is caused, the person who 
controls the source of danger is liable for causing the damage, regardless of their 
fault. Thereby the person who controls the source of greater danger is liable for 
causing the death, personal injury or impairment of the health of the injured 
person or damage to an item of property of the injured person, unless otherwise 
provided by law. Under subsection 2 of § 1056 of the LOA, a thing or activity is 
deemed to be the source of greater danger where, due to its nature or to the 
substances or means used in connection therewith, extensive or frequent damage 
may arise therefrom even where the thing is handled or the activity is performed 
with the level of care expected of a specialist. Where statutory liability not 
dependent on the fault of the person controlling a source of danger is established 
for a source of danger similar to the thing or activity, it is presumed that the thing 
or activity is the source of greater danger. Subsection 3 of the same section states 
that the provisions of this division do not preclude or restrict the right to bring 
claims on any other legal basis, including claims for compensation of unlawfully 
and wrongfully caused damage. 
Section 1056 of the LOA lays down general rules for all cases of the strict 
liability of the person controlling a source of greater danger. The Supreme Court 
has explained that, in addition to the fact that strict liability arises from a 
heightened risk characteristic of a thing or activity one should, upon determining 
                                                                                                 
124  Varul and others (n 31), p 696. 
125  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 21. 
126  SCCC judgment, 18 April 2007, case 3-2-1-27-07, para 10. 
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the circle of the entitled persons under strict liability, keep in mind the safe-
guarding purpose of strict liability, which arises from the first sentence of sub-
section 1 of § 1056 of the LOA, and the principle of good faith.127 The Supreme 
Court has held that, in accordance with the principle of good faith, strict liability 
protects, above all, those persons whom the person controlling the source of 
greater danger is supposed to keep safe but, given the fact that the source of greater 
danger essentially poses a greater threat, the person controlling such source may 
be unable to keep them completely safe even if the person exercises utmost care.128 
It follows from subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA that the general pre-
requisites for strict liability include the harming of a legally safeguarded interest 
(ie life, health and items of property) and the manifestation of a risk characteristic 
of the source of greater danger. The latter means that a person is harmed as a 
result of a typical risk emanating from the source of greater danger. The liability 
for such damage rests with the person who controls the source of greater danger. 
Thereby the actions of the person controlling it are irrelevant. Even in a situation 
where multiple persons controlling multiple sources of greater danger cause 
damage to one another, their fault is not of relevance from the point of view of 
establishing of strict liability.129 However, their fault may be of relevance upon 
reduction of the indemnity awarded to them for the damage suffered.130 
Under subsection 2 of § 1056 of the LOA, the source of greater danger 
essentially means an object or activity that poses a heightened threat either in the 
form of the severity or likelihood of harm. It is noted in the Commentary on the 
LOA that a heightened threat is expressed in the objective impossibility to 
completely prevent the threat. 131  Tampuu explains that an object may be 
especially dangerous when it is used in a particular way or when it is simply 
positioned a particular location.132 
It follows from case-law that, in order to be considered a source of greater 
danger, the motor vehicle needs to be in operation and in order for the damage 
caused by the motor vehicle to be considered to arise from its operation, the 
damage needs to be caused by the purposeful use of the vehicle in the capacity of 
a motor vehicle in road traffic.133 This means that a risk characteristic of a self-
                                                                                                 
127  ibid, para 12. 
128  ibid. It also follows from the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the same case that, 
where a person participates in controlling the source of greater danger, exercises temporary 
control over it or benefits from controlling it, the principle of good faith prohibits such person 
from being entitled to claim damage from the person controlling the source of greater danger 
on the basis of the strict liability rules. 
129  SCCC judgment, 2 March 2011, case 3-2-1-161-10, para 11. 
130  For further information see SCCC judgment, 24 September 2007, case 3-2-1-75-07, para 12; 
SCCC judgment, 2 March 2011, case 3-2-1-161-10, para 12; SCCC judgment, 18 April 2007, 
case 3-2-1-7-13, paras 27–33. 
131  Varul and others (n 31), p 691. 
132  Tampuu (n 30), p 285. The same is confirmed by the Supreme Court in its judgment of19 
March 2013 in case 3-2-1-7-13, para 20. 
133  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 20. 
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driving vehicle emanates from it, above all, while it is moving because, for 
instance, due to its heavy mass, speed or possibly a technical defect it cannot be 
made to stop in an instant. The Supreme Court has pointed out that, where an 
object or activity may pose multiple threats but not all of these threats make it a 
source of greater danger, the application of strict liability is justified only where 
the injured person suffers damage because of the very risk factor due to which 
the object or activity is considered a source of greater danger.134 
As pointed out on p 6 in Article IV, the courts have a wide margin of discretion 
as to what objects or activities to consider to be sources of greater danger on the 
basis of the provision. Nevertheless, self-driving vehicles can be considered a 
source of greater danger. It is a separate issue of whether the absence of a driver 
in a self-driving vehicle increases or decreases its dangerousness. On the one 
hand, if there is no driver who would be standing by at all times to take over 
control of the vehicle at any moment in order to, for example, fill in the gaps or 
errors in the vehicle’s software, the absence of a driver could be considered a 
factor increasing dangerousness. On the other hand, traffic accidents largely 
occur due to human error135 and, therefore, the absence of a driver could be seen 
as a dangerousness-reducing factor. It cannot be precluded that the safety of self-
driving vehicles will at some point reach a level where accidents are almost 
completely precluded. In such an event there would perhaps no longer be any 
reason for treating self-driving vehicles as sources of greater danger. 
 
 
2.3.3.2. Burden of proof 
The advantage of the strict liability regime to the claimant (the injured person/ 
victim) lies in the fact that the claimant is discharged from the duty to prove the 
existence of the objective elements (ie the defendant’s act and a causal link 
between the defendant’s act and the claimant’s damage) as well as unlawfulness 
of the act. The claimant merely needs to prove the existence and extent of damage 
as well as a causal relationship between the damage and the materialisation of the 
risk characteristic of the source of greater danger. To be discharged from strict 
liability, the defendant (the tortfeasor) needs to demonstrate the existence of an 
exonerating circumstance listed in clauses 1–5 of § 1057 of the LOA. 
It follows from subsection 3 of § 1056 of the LOA that the injured person can 
choose whether to bring their claim based on rules regulating fault-based tortious 
liability or strict liability. The injured person might prefer bringing a claim based 
on fault-based tortious liability in a situation where damage cannot be considered 
the consequence of a threat characteristic of a source of greater danger or where 
                                                                                                 
134  SCCC judgment, 18 April 2007, case 3-2-1-27-07, para 11; SCCC judgment, 22 October 
2008, case 3-2-1-85-08, para 11. 
135  See, for example, Christoph Grote, ‘Connected vehicles will enhance traffic safety and 
efficiency’ (The European Files, 18 February 2019) <www.europeanfiles.eu/digital/connected- 
vehicles-will-enhance-traffic-safety-efficiency> accessed 8 October 2020. 
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the injured person does not have the right to file strict liability claims because 
they participated in operating the vehicle or were carried without charge and 
outside the carrier’s economic activities (ie under clause 4 or 5 of § 1057 of the 
LOA).136 
 
 
2.3.4. Liability for a defective product 
2.3.4.1. Prerequisites for product liability 
As noted on p 62 in Article I, the issue of product liability (also called manu-
facturer’s liability, producer’s liability and liability for a defective product) is 
likely to be more burning regarding self-driving vehicles than conventional motor 
vehicles. In a situation where a self-driving vehicle has caused damage, one can 
almost always raise the question of a defect of the vehicle. For instance, if the 
injured person demands that the direct possessor of the self-driving vehicle 
compensate for damage under § 1057 of the LOA, the issue of product liability 
can usually be raised. This entitles the direct possessor who has compensated the 
injured person for damage to file a recourse claim against the manufacturer 
(provided, of course, that the manufacturer is indeed liable) based on subsection 
2 of § 137 of the LOA, which regulates mutual recourse claims of persons that 
are jointly and severally liable for causing damage. 
Liability for a defective product is regulated in §§ 1060–1067 of the LOA.137 
The following can be pointed out as prerequisites for the liability of a manu-
facturer under the LOA: damage has been caused in the form of harming a legally 
safeguarded interest (life, health and, subject to certain reservations set out in 
subsection 2, also an item of property), there is a defective product that has been 
put into circulation and there is a causal link between the defective product and 
the damage caused. 
                                                                                                 
136  In this respect it should be pointed out that the views expressed in the NTF Report also 
concern strict liability, especially that of the (frontend and backend) operator and the burden 
of proving causation. These aspects have been discussed in greater detail in the framework of 
the burden of proof of fault-based tortious liability (see item 2.3.2 above). 
137  These provisions are based on Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ L210/29 (hereinafter PLD) and represent 
one of the few fields of the Estonian law of obligations harmonised at the EU level. The PLD 
is a full harmonisation directive, which means that Member States can only deviate from it to 
the extent explicitly permitted by the PLD. Thus, the reasons behind the respective provisions 
of the LOA can be derived from, among other things, the recitals of the Directive. Based on 
Recitals 2 and 7 of the PLD it can be argued that the respective provisions of the LOA seek to 
establish a fair apportionment of risk between the injured person and the manufacturer. 
Although the product liability provisions of the LOA do not directly require fault or unlawful 
conduct on the part of the manufacturer and, thus, resemble strict liability, they also give the 
manufacturer a chance to avoid liability in the event of furnishing proof of certain exonerating 
circumstances. This makes the current product liability regime rather a mixture of strict and 
fault-based liability. 
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As regards legally protected interests, it should be pointed out that there are 
certain reservations concerning items of property. It follows from subsection 2 of 
§ 1061 of the LOA that protection is given only to items of property that are 
intended for private use or consumption or used by the injured person mainly for 
their own private use or consumption and have suffered damage in excess of 
500 euros. Thereby the item of property (defective product) itself is not pro-
tected.138 Furthermore, the injured party does not necessarily need to be the owner 
of the damaged item of property but may be its possessor or holder of other similar 
rights therein (see, for instance, clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA). 
Under subsection 1 of § LOA § 1063, any movable, including electricity and 
computer software,139 is deemed to be a product, even where the movable forms a 
part of another movable or has become part of an immovable.140 The authors of the 
Commentary on the LOA find that, for the purposes of product liability rules, pro-
grams processing data in a computer as well as any electronically recorded informa-
tion explaining to the computer user the use of computer programs should be con-
sidered a product.141 Some lawyers argue that tailor-made and embedded software 
should be treated differently from non-embedded software which is mass-produced 
                                                                                                 
138  As noted on p 79 in Article II, on the one hand, this ensures the precedence of contractual 
guarantees because defective products are usually put into circulation via a chain of contracts, 
which divides the risks between the parties in a balanced way. On the other hand, it means 
that based on product liability rules one cannot pursue a claim aimed at changing the way the 
product itself functions. 
139  In that regard, the legislative choice made by Estonia stands out among EU Member States. 
There appears to be no consensus among European experts over whether software is indeed a 
product for the purposes of the PLD. It is also pointed out that it has become increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between products and services. For further information, see the NTF 
Report (n 93), p 28. For a list of legal scholars supporting the idea of considering software a 
product see fn 19 on p 7 in Bernhard A Koch, ‘Product liability for autonomous vehicles’ 
(2019) 4 Insurance Review / Wiadomości Ubezpieczeniowe, pp 3–12 DOI: <https://doi.org/ 
10.33995/wu2019.4.1>. The European Commission has noted that, while the PLD’s definition 
of ‘product’ is broad, its scope could be further clarified to better reflect the complexity of 
emerging technologies, ensuring the availability of compensation for damage caused by 
products defective due to software. For further information see Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, ‘Report on the safety and liability implication of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet 
of Things and robotics’ (Brussels, 19 February 2020) COM(2020) 64 final (hereinafter Safety 
and Liability Report), pp 13–14. 
140  Subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA: ‘Product’ means all movables, even though incorporated 
into another movable or into an immovable; ‘product’ includes electricity and computer soft-
ware. 
141  Varul and others (n 31), p 706. A similar approach seems to be taken by, for instance, the 
authors of the Munich commentary on the German Civil Code. See Gerhard Wagner in 
Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, Band 6, 7. Auflage [Munich Commentary on the Civil Code. 
Vol. 6. 7th edition] (Munich: Verlag C.H.Beck 2017). The exact reference in German law: 
MüKoBGB/Wagner, 7. Aufl. 2017, ProdHaftG § 2 Rn 17. Hereinafter the German reference 
is used for the Munich commentary. 
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and mass-distributed.142 However, as regards the manner and scale of distribution, 
it should be pointed out that the PLD is not limited to mass-produced goods.143 
As explained on pp 180–181 in Article II and on pp 97–98 in Article III, the 
self-driving vehicle is a highly complex product that combines hardware (among 
other things, various sensors that conventional vehicles do not have), software 
(notably such that fuses sensors and data obtained via these sensors) and services 
(smart traffic signs and road markings, various positioning systems, weather 
information, etc). 
Clauses 1–3 of subsection 2 of § 1063 of the LOA define the defectiveness of 
a product. To decide whether a self-driving vehicle is defective, account should 
be taken of all circumstances, including the presentation of the vehicle, the use to 
which it could reasonably be expected to be put and the time of putting the vehicle 
into circulation. In view of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
case-law it can be argued that the defectiveness of a self-driving vehicle depends 
on what a person (the public at large) is entitled to (reasonably) expect of the self-
driving vehicle in terms of its safety.144 Thus, given that the users of a self-driving 
vehicle are in a particularly vulnerable situation, the safety requirements for the 
vehicle, which the users are entitled to expect, are particularly high. By way of 
analogy it can be derived from the CJEU’s judgment in joined cases C-503/13 
and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik that the potential lack of safety 
which would give rise to the manufacturer’s liability stems from the abnormal 
potential for damage which the self-driving vehicle might cause to the person 
concerned.145  Based on CJEU case-law it can also be argued that the safety 
                                                                                                 
142  Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies – Product Liability Formation, Minutes 
of the Meeting (Brussels, 8 June 2018, revised draft) grow.ddg1.b.1(2018)6498114, p 3 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc
&docid=22625> accessed 8 October 2020. 
143  Case C-203/99 Henning Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:258, 
para 22; MüKOBGB/Wagner, 7. Aufl. 2017, ProdHaftG § 2 Rn 4. For respective criticism of 
the PLD see Helmut Koziol, ‘Harmonising Tort Law in the European Union: Advantages and 
Difficulties’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal, pp 76 and 78 <https://eltelawjournal.hu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/03/ELJ_Separatum_koziol.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. 
144  An overview of the guidance given by the CJEU over the years regarding product defect-
iveness can be found in Article II. Recital 6 of the PLD points out that the defectiveness of a 
product must be assessed having regard to the reasonable expectations of the public at large. 
As pointed out on p 82 in Article II, it can be derived from the CJEU’s explanations that safety 
must be assessed taking into account, among other things, the intended purpose, the objective 
characteristics and properties of the vehicle in question and the specific requirements of the 
group of users for whom the vehicle is intended. See also Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 
Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and 
Betriebskrankenkasse RWE [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:148, paras 37–41. 
145  Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik [2014] Opinion of 
AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2306, para 30. In paras 39–40 of its judgment, the CJEU supported 
the AG’s position. See Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik 
GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:148. 
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requirement is not met where there is a manufacture-related risk of failure of a 
component in the self-driving vehicle.146 
It has been noted in the Commentary on the LOA that product defects can be 
divided into, for instance, manufacturing defects, design defects and marketing 
defects.147 As explained by the author on p 183 in Article II, while manufacturing 
defects are attributable to negligence and thus avoidable, design-related defects 
are those of an inadequate concept. In the case of a design defect the product is 
as planned by the designer but the design proves unsafe. In this regard, also the 
experts called upon by the European Commission have drawn attention to the fact 
that where a product implementing machine learning is legally permissible and 
the manufacturer made use of state-of-the-art knowledge at the time the product 
put into circulation, any subsequent choices made by the self-learning product 
independently may not necessarily be attributable to a flaw in its original design, 
which leads to the question whether the choice to allow it to be put into circulation 
is in itself a breach of the duties of care applicable to such choices.148 
It should also be pointed out, in the light of subsection 3 of § 1063 of the LOA, 
that a self-driving vehicle should not be considered defective for the sole reason 
that a better self-driving vehicle is subsequently put into circulation. However, 
where the improvement of the vehicle is expressed in higher safety in the form 
of, for instance, software vulnerability patches, the manufacturer should make 
these available also to the self-driving vehicles that have already been put into 
circulation if the manufacturer is to avoid liability for defectiveness.149 
The LOA mentions putting a product into circulation in clause 3 of sub-
section 2 of § 1063 and clause 1 of subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA, but does 
not define the term. As demonstrated on p 180 in Article II, the CJEU has dis-
cussed the meaning of this term in its case-law. Associating the CJEU’s views 
with self-driving vehicles, one could argue that it means that the manufacturer 
has caused the self-driving vehicle to leave the process of manufacture.150 It 
follows that, where a self-driving vehicle exits the process of manufacture against 
the will of the manufacturer, it cannot be considered putting the vehicle into 
                                                                                                 
146  Case C-661/15 X BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:753, para 30. 
147  Varul and others (n 31), p 707. 
148  NTF Report (n 93), p 24. 
149  This view appears to be shared by the NTF in its recommendation 14 (see the NTF Report 
(n 93), pp 42–43) on the condition that the manufacturer of self-driving vehicles remains in 
control of the updates and upgrades of the technology. Examples of the application of the same 
principle can also be found in the context of contract law in Recital 47 and Article 8(2) of 
Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on 
certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services 
[2019] OJ L136/1 and in Recital 30 and Article 7(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning con-
tracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 
and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC [2019] OJ L136/28. 
150  Case C-203/99 Henning Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:258, 
para 16. 
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circulation. Furthermore, it can be derived from the CJEU’s case-law by way of 
analogy that a self-driving vehicle should be considered as having been put into 
circulation when it leaves the manufacturing process operated by the manu-
facturer and enters a marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the 
public in order to be used or consumed.151 
Once it has been established that a person has suffered damage for the pur-
poses of subsection 1 or 2 of § 1061 of the LOA, the damage has been caused by 
a self-driving vehicle as a product for the purposes of subsection 1 of § 1063 of 
the LOA, the self-driving vehicle can be considered defective for the purposes of 
subsection 2 of § 1063 of the LOA, the defective self-driving vehicle has been 
put into circulation for the purposes of the vehicle the product and its 
defectiveness have been established, a causal link between the defective product 
and the damage needs to be established in order to hold the manufacturer liable 
for the damage. The principles and rules of establishment of causality introduced 
in item 2.3.2 above also apply thereto. 
 
 
2.3.4.2. Burden of proof 
Section 1065 of the LOA explicitly places the burden of proof on the injured 
person who is required to prove the damage, the defect and a causal link between 
the defect and damage. In this regard, it should also be pointed out that Estonian 
law does not provide for any specific standard of proof in civil proceedings.152 
Should the injured person succeed in proving the defectiveness of the self-driving 
vehicle in that it is not as safe as the public at large is entitled to expect, the injured 
person is faced with the task of proving the existence of a causal link between the 
defect of the vehicle and the damage. The difficulty stems from not only the chain 
of events and the complexity of the physical environment where the damage was 
suffered but, above all, from the structural and technical complexity of the self-
driving vehicle as well as entire driving automation-enabling infrastructure. 
Furthermore, this entire sphere is under the control of the manufacturer and various 
                                                                                                 
151  Case C-127/04 Declan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd and Sanofi Pasteur SA [2006] 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, para 27. 
152  Under the CCP, evidence in a civil matter means any information which is in the 
procedural form prescribed by law and on the basis of which the court, in accordance with the 
rules provided by law, ascertains the presence or absence of the circumstances on which the 
claims and objections of the parties are based, as well as other facts relevant to the just 
adjudication of the matter. Evidence should be relevant (subsection 1 of § 238 of the CCP), 
admissible (subsection 3 of § 238 of the CCP) in the procedural form (subsection 1 of § 229 
of the CCP) prescribed by law, of a type or form prescribed by law or an agreement and 
submitted in a timely manner (§ 237 of the CCP). The court evaluates all evidence in 
accordance with law from all perspectives, exhaustively and objectively and decides, based 
on its inner conviction, whether to deem an assertion made by a party proven. No evidence 
has any predetermined weight for the court (subsection 2 of § 232 of the CCP). See, for 
instance, SCCC judgment, 13 April 2016, case 3-2-1-181-15, para 51. The Court pointed out 
that there was no difference between the probative value of direct and indirect evidence. 
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external service providers. Assuming that machine learning153 is used in the vehicle 
as well as in traffic control and smart mobility infrastructure, the level of com-
plexity may be too high or expensive to handle.154 Software components of self-
driving vehicles and smart infrastructure are also likely to get updates over time 
and these could be provided not only by the manufacturer but also third parties. 
This may further complicate establishing which part of the code is causally linked 
to the damage and who is liable for it. In order to attain driving automation, the 
systems need to obtain and process vast quantities of data in real time.155 The data 
obtained may also be flawed or get corrupted during processing due to, for instance, 
design flaws in algorithms. Therefore, establishing the causal relationship may 
prove technically impossible or impractical due to financial or temporal reasons. 
Even if the injured person manages to prove the damage, the self-driving 
vehicle’s defectiveness and a causal link between these, the manufacturer may 
still be exonerated. Transposing Article 7 of the PLD, § 1064 of the LOA sets out 
an exhaustive list of the grounds for discharging the manufacturer from liability 
for a defective product. Under subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA, the manu-
facturer is not liable for damage arising from a product where the manufacturer 
proves that: 1) the manufacturer has not placed the product on the market; 
2) circumstances exist on the basis of which it can be presumed that the product 
did not have the damage-causing defect at the time the product was placed on the 
market by the manufacturer; 3) the manufacturer did not make the product for 
sale or for marketing in any other manner and did not manufacture or market it 
in the course of the manufacturer’s economic or professional activities; 4) the 
defect was caused by compliance of the product with mandatory requirements in 
force at the time of placing the product on the market; 5) given the level of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time of placing the product on the 
market, the defect could not be detected. Additionally, the producer of a raw 
material or a part of a product is not liable for damage where the producer proves 
that the defect of the raw material or part was caused by the construction of the 
finished product or the instructions given by the manufacturer of the finished 
product (subsection 2 of § 1064 of the LOA). 
As regards holding the manufacturer liable for damage caused by the defects 
of a self-driving vehicle or parts thereof, the key provision is, as noted also on 
p 64 in in Article I, clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA. 156  Too 
                                                                                                 
153  For more information, see Article III, pp 97–98. 
154  See, for instance, NTF Report (n 93), p 28; Safety and Liability Report (n 139), pp 13–14. 
155  According to Intel CEO Brian Krzanich, one self-driving vehicle will generate and consume 
approx. 40 terabytes of data per eight hours of driving. Patrick Nelson, ‘Just one autonomous 
car will use 4,000 GB of data/day’ (Network World, 7 December 2016) <www.networkworld. 
com/article/3147892/one-autonomous-car-will-use-4000-gb-of-dataday.html> accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2020. 
156  For a more detailed discussion of the development risk defence, see pp 185–187 in 
Article II. See also pp 42–44 of the NTF Report (n 93), which recommends not applying the 
development risk defence set out in Article 7(e) of the PLD (clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1064 
of the LOA, respectively). 
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extensive application of this defence cannot be deemed reasonable regarding 
defects of self-driving vehicles, because otherwise product liability rules would 
largely lose their meaning when it comes to emerging technologies, including 
self-driving vehicles. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, in a situation where product liability is 
precluded, the manufacturer can be held liable under fault-based tortious liability 
rules (subsection 5 of § 1061 of the LOA). Where the manufacturer is exonerated, 
for instance, owing to the development risk defence, the manufacturer could 
easily demonstrate that they were not at fault regarding the damage and be dis-
charged from liability, nonetheless. 
To prevent such situations, the NTF Report, as also noted in item 2.3.2 above, 
recommends a reversal of the burden of proving not only causation and fault but 
also defectiveness. 157  Regarding a causal link, the NTF Report supports the 
currently applicable general rule whereby the injured person is required to prove 
what caused them harm.158 However, the NTF suggests that the burden of proof 
of a causal link may be ‘alleviated’ where a balancing of certain factors justify it.159 
These include, among other things, the likelihood that the technology caused, 
contributed to or was causally within the sphere of the harm, the unequal positions 
of the developer/manufacturer and the injured person not only regarding the 
technology itself but also potential evidence generated by it, and the type and 
extent of harm.160 Reversal of the burden of proving causation seems to be in the 
NTF’s view justified in a situation where safety rules have not been complied with 
and the damage is of a kind that safety rules were meant to avoid.161 
Furthermore, the NTF also finds that manufacturers of emerging digital techno-
logies should be required to equip their products with ‘means of recording infor-
mation about the operation of the technology (logging by design)’ for the purpose 
of establishing the source of the malfunction that resulted in damage.162 In the 
NFT’s view, failure to log or make available such information should ‘trigger a 
rebuttable presumption that the condition of liability to be proven by the missing 
information is fulfilled.’163 
The application of the NTF’s recommendation to the burden of proving the 
defectiveness 164  of a self-driving vehicle results in the following cumulative 
prerequisites: it is proven that the self-driving vehicle caused harm; establishing 
the relevant level of safety or proving that it has not been met is dispropor-
tionately difficult or expensive. The NTF notes that the prerequisites should not 
prejudice the reversal of the burden of proof in a situation where the manufacturer 
                                                                                                 
157  NTF Report (n 93), pp 42–44. 
158  ibid, p 49. 
159  ibid, pp 49–52. 
160  ibid. 
161  ibid, p 48. 
162  ibid, pp 47–48. 
163  ibid, p 47. 
164  ibid, pp 42–44. 
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fails to provide the injured person with or grant them access to logs or where 
causation, fault or defect needs to be proven due to failure to comply with the 
safety rules in the event of damage that such rules were meant to prevent.165 
Since § 1065 of the LOA explicitly places on the injured person the burden of 
proof of the damage, the defectiveness of the self-driving vehicle as well as a 
causal link between the vehicle’s defectiveness and the damage, it is probably not 
possible to follow the NTF’s recommendations without amending § 1065 of the 
LOA which, in turn, is dependent on the amendment of the PLD. 
 
 
2.3.4.3. Distinguishing between a product and a service 
2.3.4.3.1. General considerations 
The self-driving vehicle is a product that is entwined with various services, most 
notably, communications and data provision services (eg traffic control, location, 
cloud computing, etc).166 A defect in such a service required for operating the 
self-driving vehicle could lead to the causing of harm by the vehicle. 
The product liability rules of the LOA make no explicit mention of services. 
Even though Part 8 of the LOA sets out various types of service contracts, neither 
the LOA nor the GPCCA give any general definition of the term ‘service.’ 
However, it is noted in the introduction to the Commentary on the LOA that ‘an 
authorisation (mandate) contract (käsundusleping) is aimed at an activity, at the 
provision of a service as a process.’167 The other service contract type which is 
aimed at a result rather than a process is the contract for work (töövõtuleping).168 
In public law, on the other hand, various definitions can be found.169 In essence, 
a service means an activity or process. However, the absence of a legal definition 
                                                                                                 
165  ibid, pp 42–44, 47–49. 
166  See, for instance, Martin Ebers, ‘Haftung für fehlerhafte Daten beim autonomen Fahren’ 
in Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, Nikola Werry and Susanne Werry (eds), Datenrecht in 
der Digitalisierung (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag 2019), pp 901–902. 
167  Varul and others (n 31), p 1. 
168  ibid, p 3. 
169  For instance, clause 4 of subsection 1 of § 2 of the Consumer Protection Act defines ‘service’ 
as a benefit other than goods, which is rendered, provided or distributed in any other manner 
or other performance [tarbijakaitseseadus] – RT I, 31.12.2015, 1; RT I, 08.01.2020, 1. English 
translation: <www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512022020001/consolide> accessed 8 October 2020. 
For the purposes of clause 3 of subsection 2 of § 2 of the Value Added Tax Act, ‘service’ means 
the provision, in the course of business activities, of benefits or the transfer of rights, including 
securities, which are not goods, and obligations to refrain from economic activity, to waive the 
exercise of a right or to tolerate a situation for a charge. Thereby software and information trans-
mitted by electronic means, and data media carrying software or information that are especially 
compiled or adjusted according to the purchaser’s specifications are also considered to be 
services [käibemaksuseadus] – RT I 2003, 82, 554; RT I, 21.04.2020, 1. English translation: 
<https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/527042020008/consolide> accessed 8 October 2020. Note 
that both of these definitions define services negatively, essentially as non-products. 
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of the term ‘service’ in the LOA does not necessarily constitute a problem in the 
context of product liability rules because the key question in terms of the manu-
facturer’s liability is whether a service (a non-product) can be considered to be 
part of the self-driving vehicle. 
The PLD, which serves as the basis for the product liability provisions of the 
LOA, focuses on the tangible. The reason for making the distinction between the 
tangible and the intangible may to some extent also lie in the fact that, at the time 
of drafting the PLD, the Commission was also planning on drafting a separate 
directive for defective services.170 
The CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that services do not fall within the scope 
of the PLD.171 As noted on p 181 in Article II, the PLD was adopted for the pur-
pose of, among other things, making it easier for the injured person to bring claims 
against the manufacturer in spite of complex distribution chains and organisation 
structures.172 Difficulties experienced by injured persons in identifying the person 
against whom to bring a product liability claim have given rise to CJEU case-
law. The CJEU has explained that the liability of a service provider in providing 
services using defective equipment not produced by the service provider does not 
fall within the scope of the PLD.173 The CJEU has also noted that there are appre-
ciable differences between the activities of service providers who, having acquired 
goods, used them in the provision of services to third parties and as a result 
thereof that activity could not be considered equivalent to the activities of manu-
facturers, importers and suppliers.174 
The Commission has noted that separating products from services remains an 
open question.175 Products and services have changed considerably since the 
                                                                                                 
170  Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive relating 
to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning liability for defective products’ [1979] (OJ C 114, pp 15–19) C:1979:114:TOC, p 17, 
item 2.2.1 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1979:114:FULL 
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171  Case C-495/10 Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon v Thomas Dutrueux and 
Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:869, para 39; Case  
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Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, 
paras 28–29. 
173  Case C-495/10 Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon v Thomas Dutrueux and 
Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie du Jura [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:869, para 39. 
174  Case C-203/99 Henning Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:258, 
para 33. 
175  See, for instance, point 5.4 in Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Application 
of the Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC)’ 
(Brussels, 7 May 2018) COM(2018) 246 final, where a reference is made to stakeholders’ 
concerns over open questions about what separates a product from a service. 
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adoption of the PLD. Highly technical modern products are so entwined with 
services that they may be rendered completely unusable when a service is un-
available. It has been argued that, while the distinction between products and 
services has not faced insurmountable difficulties, it is impractical to separate 
products and services, especially in the case of artificial intelligence systems as 
these blur the lines between products and services.176 Indeed, sophisticated pro-
ducts such as self-driving cars that are heavily reliant on machine learning are not 
necessarily ever truly finished products. Instead, the manufacturers of self-
driving vehicles will need to retain a certain degree of control over the vehicle’s 
further development after the vehicle has been put into circulation. This calls into 
question the justification for treating manufacturers and service providers 
differently in terms of tortious liability. 
As noted on p 181 of Article II, some of these services ‘fuelling’ the self-
driving vehicle could be of fundamental importance to the safe and proper func-
tioning of the vehicle. The vehicle needs to be able to know what is happening 
around it. To that end, it needs to communicate with other road users, smart traffic 
signs and road markings. It needs to know the weather conditions, the street 
network, know its own position and that of other vehicles with very high accuracy, 
etc. Where the self-driving vehicle is designed in such a way that damage is not 
precluded when such a fundamental service proves defective, the vehicle itself 
could be deemed defective. Subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA explicitly includes 
software among products. Software is essentially never fully finished. Usually, it 
is improved and updated over time because information technology advances at 
a fast pace and a solution that once proved reasonable might not be reasonable in 
the light of some new knowledge acquired later. Therefore, it is essentially reliant 
on some additional activity or process (service), which is of paramount importance 
for the purposes of the safety of the vehicle. Via software the intangible service 
component has entered the field of liability for otherwise tangible products. 
Finally, in the context of distinguishing products and services note should also 
be taken of Directives 2019/771 and 2019/770.177 Recitals 15 and 17 of Directive 
2019/771 introduce the considerations based on which one can determine whether 
the sale of goods178  involves a digital service or not. Recital 15 explains that 
whether the supply of the incorporated or interconnected digital service forms 
part of the sales contract with the seller should depend on the content of the 
                                                                                                 
176  NTF Report (n 93), p 28. 
177  Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 
on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services 
[2019] OJ L136/1; Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC 
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178  The legal definitions of goods are given in Articles 2(5)(a) and (b) of Directive 2019/770 
and Articles 2(5)(a) and (b) of Directive 2019/771 and the legal definition of digital services 
in Articles 2(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2019/770 and Articles 2(7)(a) and (b) of Directive 
2019/771, respectively. Both terms are defined via the functions. 
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contract. This should include incorporated or interconnected digital services the 
supply of which is explicitly required by the contract as well as sales contracts 
which can be understood as covering the supply of a specific digital service because 
they are normal goods of the same type and the consumer could reasonably expect 
the service, given the nature of the goods and taking into account any public 
statement made by or on behalf of the seller or other persons in previous links of 
the chain of transactions, including the producer. This should apply regardless of 
whether the digital service is pre-installed in the good itself or has to be down-
loaded subsequently on another device and is only interconnected to the good as 
well as to situations where the digital service is supplied by a third party under 
the sales contract. In the event of doubt as to whether the supply of the digital 
service forms part of the sales contract, the rules of the Directive should apply. 
Recital 17 of Directive 2019/771 states that where a contract includes elements 
of both sales of goods and provision of services, it should be left for national law 
to determine whether the whole contract can be classified as a sales contract 
within the meaning of the Directive. It follows from Recitals 12 and 13 of Directive 
2019/770 that Member States are free to provide non-contractual remedies for the 
consumer in the event of lack of conformity of a digital service against person in 
previous links of the chain of transactions or other persons that fulfil the obli-
gations of such persons as well as to regulate liability claims of consumers against 
third parties other than the trader that supplies or agrees to supply the digital 
service, such as a developer which is not at the same time the trader under Directive 
2019/770. 
The definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘digital service’ in Directives 2019/771 and 
2019/770 help to further clarify the boundaries between products and services. It 
follows from Article 2(5) of Directive 2019/771 that ‘goods’ means tangible 
movable items, including those that incorporate or are interconnected with a digital 
service in such a way that the absence of the service would prevent the goods 
from performing their functions (ie goods with digital elements).179 Recital 27 of 
the Directive further clarifies that functionality should be understood to refer to 
ways in which the goods can perform their functions having regard to the purpose 
of the goods and that successful functioning could include the ability of the goods 
to exchange information with other software and hardware and to use the infor-
mation exchanged. Thus, fully self-driving vehicles could, in principle, be con-
sidered goods for the purposes of Article 2(5) of Directive 2019/771. 
Under Article 2(7) of Directive 2019/771 and Article 2(2) of Directive 
2019/770, ‘digital service’ means a service that allows the consumer to create, 
process, store or access data in digital form or a service that allows the sharing of 
or any other interaction with data in digital form uploaded or created by the 
consumer or other users of that service. This is makes it yet another reference to 
the notion of an activity, which underpins any service definition. 
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2.3.4.3.2. Liability for software updates 
Subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA explicitly states that (computer) software is a 
product. By doing so, the Estonian legislature has eliminated the issue of whether 
software should be considered a product or a service. Of course, this raises the 
question of whether subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA is truly fully aligned with 
Article 2 of the PLD. While the PLD does not explicitly place software among 
products, software’s classification as a product could, by way analogy, still be 
derived not only from the fact that electricity is also explicitly considered a product 
but also from the Union’s product safety legislation.180 There appears to be support 
for classifying software under products in the academia 181  as well as the 
Commission.182 
Unlike products that only consist of hardware, software can be updated relat-
ively easily. In the case of self-driving cars, it may take the form, for example, a 
set of changes programmed and planned by the developer over a longer period or 
possibly even machine learning. This raises a question about the status of soft-
ware updates in the context of product liability – does the updating of software 
qualify putting (the product) into circulation? 
Relying on a guide on the implementation of EU product rules,183 it has been 
noted in the context of the product safety legislation of the EU that software 
updates could be compared to maintenance operations for safety reasons, provided 
that they do not significantly modify a product already placed on the market and 
they do not introduce new risks that were not foreseen in the initial risk assess-
ment.184 The same report also suggests that if the software update modifies sub-
stantially the product in which it is downloaded, the entire product might indeed 
be considered as a new product and compliance with the relevant safety product 
legislation should be reassessed at the time of making the modification.185 As 
noted in the Commission’s White Paper on AI, while these guidelines might help 
the executive and the judiciary find the appropriate solution in a given situation, 
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49 
they do not change the fact that the product liability rules in force are not attuned 
to a reality where intelligent products in essence improve themselves over the 
course of their life span, thus giving rise to new risks that were not present at the 
time when the product was first put into circulation.186 
Imagine a situation where service provider B updates the software of a self-
driving vehicle made by manufacturer A so that it would adequately respond to 
various sorts of trash lying on the road. Following an update, the self-driving 
vehicle used by user C mistakes pedestrian D crossing a pedestrian crossing in 
the middle of the night for a plastic bag and does not stop or slow down for it. 
The vehicle severely injures pedestrian D. In such a situation, pedestrian D could 
(at least in the context of Estonian law) argue that, since software is a product for 
the purposes of subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA, the flawed update is a 
defective component thereof and, thus, service provider B is liable for the damage 
under the product liability rules. Alternatively, pedestrian D could also have a 
claim against service provider B on the basis of fault-based tortious liability rules 
and against user C on the basis of strict liability rules. 
A question on whether and for how long manufacturers of self-driving vehicles 
are required to provide updates can also be raised. Estonian product liability law 
does not currently provide for any explicit general requirement to update products. 
As already explained in item 2.3.2.2 above, the relevant case-law of the Supreme 
Court instructs that, in order to trigger the defendant’s tortious liability under 
clause 7 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA,187 the claimant bears the burden 
of proving that the unlawfulness stems from a breach of a statutory duty (safe-
guarding rule) by the defendant.188 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has pointed 
out that the claimant should, in addition to proving the breach of a safeguarding 
rule under the law of tort by the defendant, also prove that the prevention of 
damage to the claimant was at least one of the purposes of the statutory duty 
under subsection 3 of § 1045 of the LOA.189 Currently, a statutory duty to update 
can be derived from subsection 3 of § 11 of the Product Conformity Act190 which 
imposes on manufacturers the duty to take measures commensurate with the 
characteristics of the products they supply, enabling them to be aware of risks 
these products might pose and choose to take appropriate action to avoid these 
risks. Alternatively, if there was no such statutory duty, a possible duty to update 
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the software of a self-driving vehicle could nevertheless be derived from the 
general duty to maintain safety.191 
Finally, it should also be pointed out that, for instance, in the context of contract 
law, the European legislator has noted in Recital 28 of Directive 2019/771 that 
updates can improve and enhance the digital service element of the goods, extend 
their functionalities, adapt them to technical developments, protect them against 
new security threats or serve other purposes.192 It follows from the Recital that 
the conformity of goods with digital services which are incorporated in or inter-
connected with the goods should therefore also be assessed in relation to whether 
the digital service element of such goods is updated in accordance with the sales 
contract. Thereby failure to supply updates that had been agreed in the sales 
contract should be considered as a lack of conformity of the goods and the same 
applies to defective or incomplete updates, given that that would mean that such 
updates are not performed in the manner stipulated in the sales contract. 
 
 
2.3.5. Persons liable for damage caused by a self-driving  
vehicle under tort law 
2.3.5.1. Direct possessor 
As noted in item 2.3.3 above and on pp 7–8 in Article IV, only the direct possessor 
of a motor vehicle can be held liable under § 1057 of the LOA. It follows from 
subsection 1 of § 33 of the Law of Property Act (LPA)193 that a possessor is a 
person under whose actual control a thing is. Subsection 2 of the same section 
stipulates that a person who possesses a thing on the basis of a commercial lease, 
tenancy, deposit, pledge or other similar relationship which entitles the person to 
temporarily possess the thing of another person is the direct possessor, while the 
other person is the indirect possessor. It follows from the case-law of the Supreme 
Court that § 1057 of the LOA imposes liability on, above all, the person who has 
actual control (be it on a legal basis or not) over a motor vehicle. In other words, 
the person who controls the vehicle (ie decides where and when the vehicle 
moves) bears the costs and economic risks arising from the vehicle, and enjoys 
the benefits of using the vehicle.194 For instance, in a situation where a pedestrian 
crosses the road in a non-designated place in the middle of the night, walks in 
front of a fully self-driving car and suffers serious injuries as a result of the 
collision, the pedestrian does not need to, in order to receive damages from the 
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direct possessor (owner) of the car and its insurer, prove that the direct possessor 
committed some act or that it was unlawful. The pedestrian merely needs to prove 
that they suffered damage as a result of a heightened risk emanating from the 
source of greater danger. The direct possessor is discharged from liability only 
where they prove that a liability-precluding circumstance set out in § 1057 of the 
LOA existed at the time of the incident. Under clause 5 of § 1057 of the LOA, 
the direct possessor’s strict liability may be precluded, for instance, in a situation 
where they allowed a friend to ride along in the car outside their economic 
activities and suffered a traffic accident where the friend suffered an injury. In 
such a situation the direct possessor may still be liable under general fault-based 
tortious liability rules. 
In a situation where someone physically breaks into a self-driving car, over-
rides its systems and assumes control of the car, that person can also be con-
sidered the direct possessor of the car, albeit not a legal one. However, should the 
break-in and assumption of control take place remotely, it becomes debatable 
whether the person still fits under the notion ‘direct possessor’ or should be con-
sidered to be in control of the car for the purposes of § 1056 of the LOA instead. 
Should the purchase and sale of future self-driving vehicles remain similar to 
that of the current conventional vehicles, the person who acquires a self-driving 
will generally be its direct possessor as well. However, it may happen that com-
panies will merely provide a transport service using self-driving vehicles and 
individuals will not be able to acquire them. Such a service may resemble the 
conventional taxi service. If a self-driving vehicle causes a traffic accident during 
the provision of such a transport service, one can raise the question of who the 
direct possessor of the vehicle at the moment of the accident was. It can be argued 
that, since a customer of the conventional taxi service does not transform into the 
direct possessor of the vehicle at the time of receiving the service, the same does 
not happen in the case of a self-driving vehicle. This means that the person 
receiving the transport service is not liable for the damage under § 1057 of the 
LOA. Above all, the company providing the transport service is liable. Thereby 
it is irrelevant whether the respective company is the owner of the vehicle that 
caused damage or possesses the vehicle on the basis of, for instance, a lease 
contract. In the latter case, the owner of the vehicle is the indirect possessor of 
the vehicle to whom § 1057 of the LOA does not apply either. In addition, the 
driver of a conventional motor vehicle cannot always be considered the direct 
possessor of the vehicle. It follows from subsection 3 of § 33 of the LPA that the 
possessor is not a person who exercises actual control over a thing in accordance 
with the orders of another person in their household or business. Such possessory 
servant is, for example, an employee who uses a vehicle to perform the tasks 
given by the employer. In principle, it may happen in the case of a self-driving 
vehicle that the employee uses it for performing certain employment tasks. In 
such an event, § 1057 of the LOA is not applicable to the employee either.195 At 
the same time the possessory servant may still be held liable in accordance with 
                                                                                                 
195  See also Varul and others (n 31), p 696. 
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the provisions governing general tortious liability. However, this may not prove 
doable in practice in the case of self-driving vehicles, because the employee’s 
liability would usually be precluded owing to the absence of their fault. 
 
 
2.3.5.2. Person controlling a source of greater danger 
As noted on p 9 in Article IV, the LOA also sets out general strict liability. It is a 
flexible solution that enables the courts to keep up with the times, qualifying 
technologies whose safety is not yet sufficiently proven as sources of greater 
danger. On the basis of the general composition of strict liability, the person 
controlling a source of greater danger can be held liable. 
The definition of a person controlling a source of greater danger set out in 
subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA does not overlap with the definition of the 
direct possessor of a motor vehicle under § 1057 of the LOA. Thus, it cannot be 
precluded that a person in a self-driving vehicle (eg an employee) who cannot be 
qualified as the direct possessor of the motor vehicle under § 1057 of the LOA 
can still be considered a person controlling the source of greater danger within 
the meaning of subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA. Even though this position has 
not been explicitly confirmed by case-law, a respective discussion is fuelled by a 
decision of the Supreme Court where the court held that a person who was riding 
a horse but was simultaneously not the keeper of the animal for the purposes of 
§ 1060 of the LOA, could be considered a person controlling a source of greater 
danger within the meaning of subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA.196 By the same 
token, it should not necessarily be precluded that a vehicle owner who is not the 
vehicle’s direct possessor can be the person controlling the source of greater 
danger. A respective question could be raised, for instance, in the event of the 
insolvency of the direct possessor. In light of the aforementioned discussion of 
the definition of a person controlling a source of greater danger one should never-
theless not draw the conclusion that a person receiving transport service could be 
considered a possessor of a self-driving vehicle for the purposes of § 1056 of the 
LOA. The receipt of a temporary service does not give a person any right or 
opportunity to control the self-driving vehicle. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
196  SCCC judgment, 18 April 2007, case 3-2-1-27-07, paras 13–14. The application of the 
general composition of strict liability (LOA § 1056) may be precluded by the fact that the 
injured person was somehow linked to the source of greater danger. In the same decision, the 
Supreme Court noted that persons who participate in controlling a source of greater danger, 
temporarily take the source under their control or benefit from controlling the source are not, 
in the light of the principle of good faith, entitled to demand that the person controlling the 
source of greater danger compensate for the damage caused to them based on provisions 
governing strict liability. 
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2.3.5.3. Manufacturer 
It follows from CJEU case-law197 that the class of persons specified as obligated 
persons in Article 3 of the PLD (clause 1 of subsection 1 of § 1062 of the LOA, 
respectively) should be regarded as exhaustive. In the context of self-driving 
vehicles, the obligated persons are the manufacturers of finished vehicles, their 
component parts and raw materials. Having laid this foundation, clause 2 of sub-
section 1 of § 1062 of the LOA moves on to broaden the circle of obligated persons 
to include those who present themselves as manufacturers by putting their name, 
trade mark or some other distinguishing feature on the vehicle. Subject to certain 
specifications and conditions, clause 3 adds importers and suppliers to the mix.198 
A self-driving vehicle consists of numerous parts made by numerous manu-
facturers. Likewise, the supply chain of a self-driving vehicle may consist of 
numerous links. In the context of the circle of obligated persons, the issue of 
application of the PLD to various links in the distribution chain has been repeatedly 
dealt with by the CJEU.199 The reason behind extending product liability to other 
links in the supply chain lies in an attempt to make it easier for the injured person 
to bring direct action against the manufacturer, as confirmed by the CJEU 
caselaw.200 The CJEU has held that when one of the links in the distribution chain 
is closely connected to the manufacturer, that entity could be regarded as being 
involved in the manufacturing process. 201  The CJEU has pointed out that 
unlimited product liability cannot be extended to a supplier because this is exactly 
what the PLD tries to avoid.202 The CJEU has confirmed that a supplier who fails 
to inform the injured person of the identity of the manufacturer within a reason-
able time must be treated as the manufacturer.203 Both the person who manu-
factured vehicle on the whole as well as a component part thereof (including 
                                                                                                 
197  Case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette 
Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, para 33; Case C-127/04 Declan 
O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd and Sanofi Pasteur SA [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, para 35; 
Case C-358/08 Aventis Pasteur SA v OB [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:744, para 36. 
198  In the light of the underlying Article 3 of the PLD, it has been argued in, for instance, a 
commentary on the German ProdHaftG that, in doing so, the Directive seems to go beyond 
the limits of tortious product liability because in commerce one’s liability is usually limited to 
one’s own actions (see MüKoBGB/Wagner, 7. Aufl. 2017, ProdHaftG § 4 Rn 1). 
199  See, for instance, Case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavpris-
varehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, paras 27–
29. 
200  Case C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:252, para 40; Case C-402/03 
Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and 
Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, paras 28 and 36. 
201  Case C-127/04 Declan O’Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd and Sanofi Pasteur SA [2006] 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:93, paras 27–29. 
202  Case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette 
Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:6, para 36. 
203  Case C-358/08 Aventis Pasteur SA v OB [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:744, paras 55–58. 
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software) can be considered the manufacturer under clause 1 of subsection 1 of 
§ 1062 of the LOA (Article 2 of the PLD, respectively). However, a third party 
who provides services required for operating and using the vehicle cannot be 
considered the manufacturer. Where, for example, a network service failure 
results in a traffic accident, the network service provider cannot be deemed liable 
under the product liability rules. 
 
 
2.3.5.4. Service provider 
2.3.5.4.1. General considerations 
At this juncture, there is a lot of uncertainty about the services that self-driving 
vehicles will come to be provided with, as the related products and services are 
developing at a fast pace and the industry’s standards (including safety standards) 
are yet to take form.204 Therefore, respective legal analyses and writings remain 
vague, even though certain generalisations can be made.205 Nevertheless, it cannot 
be precluded that self-driving vehicles will one day come to rely on various ITS 
services for road, traffic and travel data as well as on various other ICT services. 
If such a service were to prove defective, the self-driving vehicle might end up 
harming a third party. 
Imagine a situation where B provides a non-stop cloud navigation service 
which enables the driving automation of a vehicle manufactured by A. Due to a 
flaw in the service, the self-driving vehicle used by C receives the signal with a 
long lag, causing it to rear-end D’s vehicle in front. In such a situation, D could 
claim damages from B based on the rules of fault-based tortious liability. Further-
more, D could also argue that A should have manufactured the vehicle in such a 
way that the causing of damage would be precluded in the event of a defective 
cloud navigation service. That would open the door for the possibility of the 
transition of the defect of the service into that of the vehicle (product). Further-
more, in the case of this illustrative situation, D’s and C’s contribution to the 
accident (if any) could be taken into account as well. 
Let us look at a situation where local authority B has equipped the city with 
local positioning sensors for self-driving vehicles and, at an intersection, a mal-
functioning sensor causes a self-driving car manufactured by A and used by C to 
make a sudden change of lanes to avoid colliding with a non-existent obstacle. 
As a result, C’s self-driving car collides with D’s car. Does D have a claim against 
B? On the condition that the service provided by B does not qualify as the 
                                                                                                 
204  While driving automation researchers and developers are optimistic about addressing all 
of the open problems with the help of interdisciplinary academic collaboration and support 
from the industries and the public, many services of crucial importance for self-driving vehicles 
are not available yet (see Yurtsever and others (n 10), p 58462). For example, there is no 
operational connected ADS in use yet (n 10, p 58447) and deep learning based location 
planners are not widely used in real-world systems yet (n 10, p 58460). 
205  See, for instance, NTF Report (n 93), key finding [11], pp 6, 23, 39–41. 
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management of traffic and the sensors cannot be deemed traffic control devices, 
one could argue that D does have a claim against B based on rules governing 
fault-based tortious liability.206 It is also possible that also A and C (jointly with 
B) are held liable. 
The tort law rules of the LOA do not contain any legal definition of the term 
‘service’ or provide for a special liability regime for defective services either. 
Thus, ruling out product liability for reasons noted above, the service provider’s 
liability for damage caused by a self-driving vehicle depends on whether the 
service provider can be considered a direct possessor of the self-driving vehicle 
under § 1057 of the LOA (special strict liability) or a person controlling a source 
of greater danger under § 1056 of the LOA (general strict liability) or a tortfeasor 
under § 1043 of the LOA (fault-based tortious liability).207 In principle, a defective 
service could also cause damage to the possessor/owner of the vehicle. Thus, the 
possessor or owner of the vehicle could also have a claim against the service 
provider under the rules governing general fault-based tortious liability, unless 
they have a contractual relationship or the possessor/owner is not subject to 
protection for the purposes of § 81 of the LOA (ie under a contract aimed at 
protecting third parties). 
                                                                                                 
206  However, note that it follows from clause 2 of subsection 3 of § 1 of the State Liability Act 
(SLA) that the performance of the obligations provided for in § 6 of the TA (management of 
traffic) are not governed by private law legislation and in the event of related damage one 
needs to rely on the SLA [riigivastutuse seadus] – RT I 2001, 47, 260; RT I, 17.12.2015, 
1. English translation: <www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/507062016001/consolide> accessed 8 Oc-
tober 2020. 
207  It should be pointed out that the NTF introduces the term ‘backend operator’ to describe a 
service provider. More specifically, the NTF divides operators into two separate types: the 
frontend operator (owner/possessor/user) and the backend operator (manufacturer/service 
provider). When put in the context of self-driving vehicles, the former decides on the use of 
the vehicle (ie where it comes and goes) and benefits from it. The latter makes driving auto-
mation possible, introduces the required updates and keeps the systems running and even 
benefits therefrom economically. In the NTF’s view, where a central backend operator has a 
higher degree of control over the operational risks other persons are exposed to as compared 
to the frontend operator (see p 41 of the NTF Report (n 93)), the backend operator should be 
held strictly liable. To illustrate its point, the NTF gives a rather vague example of where a 
self-driving vehicle is private owned by a person who decides how often, when and where to 
go with it, while the manufacturer/service provider of the vehicle controls the vehicle on a 
continuous basis by providing, among other things, cloud navigation services, updating map 
data and the vehicle’s software using ‘supervised fleet machine learning’ and deciding on the 
maintenance of the vehicle. The NTF recommends that Member States define the circum-
stances in which either of the two operators is held liable (for further information, see pp 39–
42 of the NTF Report). However, as regards the LOA, the backend operator cannot currently 
be considered a direct possessor for the purposes of § 1057 of the LOA. It cannot be fully 
precluded that the backend operator qualifies as a person controlling a source of greater danger 
for the purposes of § 1056 of the LOA. Since the way a self-driving vehicle operates currently 
still remains, to a certain extent, hypothetical, this dissertation will not attempt to go into detail 
in that regard. The vagueness of the illustration 7 given on p 41 of the NTF Report is telling 
for these very reasons as well. 
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Provided that the prerequisites are met, the service provider can be held liable 
under the rules governing fault-based tortious liability.208 In a situation where 
damage does not stem from any direct act of a service provider of a self-driving 
vehicle, the service provider needs to have breached a statutory duty or the general 
duty to maintain safety in order to be held liable for the damage caused.209 Where 
a person provides a service needed for the attainment of driving automation, the 
general duty to maintain safety obligates the person to make every reasonable effort 
to prevent harming third parties. Thus, one needs to substantively assess whether 
the service provider has been externally (ie objectively) negligent.210 
 
 
2.3.5.4.2. Liability for an information society service 
Imagine a situation where a person who has bought a self-driving car from the 
manufacturer receives a car software update service from a third party. Due to a 
flaw in the process, the car does not ‘know’ that the traffic arrangement at an inter-
section has been changed and hits a cyclist. Where such an update service cannot 
be deemed a transport service or a service in the field of transport, the rules 
governing information society services may be applicable. 
Where liability is precluded under such special regulation, the general fault-
based tortious liability rules may need to be set aside. This might be the case, for 
instance, where the service is considered an information society service for the 
purposes of clause 1 of § 2 of the Information Society Services Act (ISSA).211 It 
has been argued that such rules stand above or next to the domestic general 
structure of torts.212 
                                                                                                 
208  For a more detailed discussion see pp 54–57 in Article I and item 2.3.2 above. 
209  See item 2.3.2 above. 
210  SCCC judgment, 20 June 2013, case 3-2-1-73-13, para 10. 
211  Information Society Services Act [infoühiskonna teenuse seadus] – RT I 2004, 29, 191; 
RT I, 12.12.2018, 3. English translation: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/515012019001/ 
consolide> accessed 8 October 2020. The Act transposes Directive 2000/31/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on 
electronic commerce’) [2000] OJ L178/1 and Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision 
of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services 
[2015] OJ L241/1, which replaces Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1998] OJ L217/18 
(see Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535). Thereby Articles 12–14 of Directive 2000/31/EC 
(ie those concerning mere conduit/access, caching and hosting) have been transposed to §§ 8–
10 of the ISSA almost word-for-word. 
212  For further information see, for instance, Karmen Turk, ‘Teabe talletaja deliktiõiguslik 
vastutus’ [The delictual liability of the host] (Master’s thesis, University of Tartu 2010), p 80; 
Sören Wollin, ‘Störerhaftung im Immaterialgüter- und Persönlichkeitsrecht: Zustandshaftung 
analog § 1004 I BGB’ (Dissertation, Nomos Verlag 2018), p 118. 
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It follows from clause 1 of § 2 of the ISSA that ‘information society service’ 
means a service provided in economic or professional activities at the direct 
request of a recipient of the service, without the parties being simultaneously 
present at the same location, whereby data are processed, stored and transmitted 
by means of electronic equipment for the digital processing and storage of data. 
Thereby the information society service must be entirely transmitted, conveyed 
and received by electronic means of communication. Article 1(b) of Directive 
(EU) 2015/1535 defines an information society service as any service normally 
provided for remuneration: without the parties being simultaneously present; sent 
initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the 
processing (including digital compression) and storage of data; entirely trans-
mitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other 
electromagnetic means; and provided through the transmission of data on 
individual request. According to the indicative list of services given in Annex I 
to the Directive, the services provided by transmitting data without individual 
demand for simultaneous reception by an unlimited number of individual 
receivers include television and radio broadcasting services as well as teletext. 
The meaning of ‘individual request’ has been clarified by the CJEU in its 
judgment in Case C-390/18 Airbnb Ireland.213 The court came to the conclusion 
that the service was provided at the individual request because it involved both 
the placing online of an advertisement by a host and an individual request from a 
guest who was interested in that advertisement. In other words, the prerequisite 
for an individual request can be considered as met where a service provider has 
acted to make a service available and a recipient has acted to receive the service. 
In the context of self-driving cars, this might be the case in a situation where a 
data provider has made, for instance, traffic-related data (eg the location, speed, 
direction of movement of other road users) available and a user of a self-driving 
car has switched on a functionality specifically requesting such input. Of course, 
in the given example the user does not request access to any specific item but 
rather a dataset in a particular location at a particular moment (in real time). 
Furthermore, where a particular functionality is embedded in the technology of 
the vehicle and cannot be controlled by the service recipient in any way, there 
can hardly be any individuality or directness of the request. Given the context of 
transportation, the range of issues in this regard is obviously broader and the key 
issues will be discussed in the following subsection. 
The definition of ‘information society service’ contained in § 2 of the ISSA 
differs from the definition used in the Directive in that the former refers to a direct 
request instead of an individual one. Similarly to the English version of the 
Directive, the German version of the Directive also uses the word individuell and 
the French version the word individuelle. In addition to questions concerning 
                                                                                                 
213  Case C-390/18 Airbnb Ireland [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112, para 48; see also Case  
C-390/18 Airbnb Ireland [2019] Opinion of AG Maciej Szpunar, ECLI:EU:C:2019:336, para 
39 and Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECLI:EU: 
C:2010:159, paras 23 and 110. 
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possible substantive differences between direct and indirect requests, the Estonian 
definition raises the question of whether all of the constituent elements of an 
information society service exist in a situation where a recipient of the service 
has made an individual yet indirect request. Individual indirect requests from the 
recipient of the service might arise in a situation where a self-driving car is made 
available with pre-defined settings which the user cannot change. In these 
circumstances it could be argued, first, that the service cannot be considered an 
information society service because there has been no direct or individual request 
from the user to the service provider. Second, it could be argued that by using the 
self-driving vehicle made available with such settings, the user did make at least 
an indirect request, which qualifies as an individual request for the purposes of a 
Directive-conforming interpretation of the Estonian provision. Third, it is also 
possible that the Estonian definition does not fully comply with the Directive due 
to the use of ‘direct’ instead of ‘individual.’ These aspects have not come under 
judicial scrutiny in Estonian courts yet. 
The rules governing information society services should not be overlooked in 
the context of self-driving vehicles because the liability of a provider of an infor-
mation society service (an intermediary) is precluded where certain preconditions 
are met. It follows from § 8 of the ISSA (respectively, Article 12 of Directive 
2000/31/EC) that in the case of mere conduit the service provider is not liable for 
the information transmitted where the service provider does not initiate the 
transmission, select the receiver of the transmission and select or modify the 
information contained in the transmission. In the event of cashing (§ 9 of the 
ISSA/Article 13 of Directive 2000/31/EC), the service provider’s liability is 
precluded, among other things, on condition that the provider does not modify 
the information, complies with conditions on access to the information, complies 
with rules regarding the updating of the information in a manner widely 
recognised and used in the industry. In the event of hosting (subsection 1 of § 10 
of the ISSA/ Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC), the service provider is not 
liable where the service provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal acts 
or information or, where the service provider does have such knowledge, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to illegal information. 
In its judgment of 10 June 2009 in case 3-2-1-43-09, the Estonian Supreme 
Court took the view that the activities of the service provider were not of a merely 
technical, automatic and passive nature and the service in question did not amount 
to an intermediary service for the purposes of Directive 2000/31/EC because the 
service provider had integrated a commenting environment into its news portal, 
actively inviting visitors to comment on the news published in the portal.214 The 
Supreme Court pointed out that although the service provider was not the author 
of the comments, it still had control over the commenting environment via estab-
lishing and revising the rules and deciding which comments get published and 
which do not. Thus, the service constituted a content service, rendering the 
liability-precluding circumstances arising from § 10 of the ISSA inapplicable. 
                                                                                                 
214  SCCC judgment, 10 June 2009, case 3-2-1-43-09, para 13. 
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The judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court was later upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights.215 
Regarding Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC, the CJEU has taken the view 
that, to establish whether the liability of a service provider may be limited under 
the article, it is necessary to examine whether the role played by that service 
provider is neutral, ie that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, 
pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.216 Similar 
derivations can be made from Articles 12 and 13 as well. In its judgment in Case 
C-324/09 L’Oréal and others,217 the CJEU held that where the service provider 
has provided assistance which entails optimising the presentation or promotion 
of sales offers for sale, it cannot be considered any longer a neutral position. In 
the CJEU’s view, such a service (ie data) provider plays an active role which gives 
it knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those offers and, thus, the 
provider cannot rely on the exemption from liability referred to in Article 14(1) 
of Directive 2000/31/EC. The court added that, where the service provider has 
not played an active role, the service provider nonetheless cannot, in a case which 
may result in an order to pay damages, rely on the exemption from liability 
provided for in that provision if it was aware of facts or circumstances on the 
basis of which a diligent economic operator should have realised that the subject-
matter of the service in question was unlawful and, in the event of it being so 
aware, failed to act expeditiously in accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 
2000/31/EC.218 In Case C-291/13 Papasavvas, the CJEU held that a company 
that had knowledge of and exercised control over the information published in an 
online version of a newspaper could not be considered an intermediary service 
provider and was not subject to limitations of liability under Articles 12–14 of 
Directive 2000/31/EC.219 In its case-law, the CJEU has repeatedly emphasised 
the importance of the level of control exercised by the service provider.220 
It can be derived from the above that where a service provider exercises active 
control over the data provided to self-driving vehicles, it may not be subject to 
the exemption from liability under the §§ 8–10 of the ISSA/Articles 12–14 of 
Directive 2000/31/EC. For instance, where a service provider collects traffic data 
or data on road conditions from vehicles, processes these data and transmits these 
to other vehicles, the service provider can no longer be considered a mere host 
but rather a content provider. As demonstrated by the above case-law, operations 
                                                                                                 
215  Delfi AS v Estonia, ECHR 6456/09, 16 June 2015, paras 120–129. 
216  Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France and Google [2010] ECLI:EU:C: 
2010:159, para 114. See also Recital 42 of Directive 2000/31/EC. 
217  Case C-324/09 L’Oréal and others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, para 116. 
218  ibid, para 124. 
219  Case C-291/13 Papasavvas [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2209, para 45. Thereby the court also 
pointed out that it did not matter whether the content could be accessed free of charge. 
220  In addition to the cases mentioned above, see also Case C-390/18 Airbnb Ireland [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112, paras 66–67 and Case C-521/17 SNB-REACT [2018] ECLI:EU: 
C:2018:639, paras 47–48. 
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such as optimisation and selection of data are especially indicative of the service 
provider’s active engagement. Such non-neutral (active) service providers cannot 
rely on the argument that they should not be held liable because the data come 
from third parties. In the light of the aforementioned case-law, this argument would 
be convincing only where the service provider was not in any way in control of 
the data. 
It has been argued that the liability regime established in Directive 2000/31/EC 
is not fully suited for Internet of Things (IoT) 221  failures and needs new 
preclusions of the intermediaries’ liability, provided that these are used sparingly 
and only where the intermediary does not give rise to risks via its behaviour.222 
In principle, the author of this dissertation agrees with this highly generalised 
suggestion but notes that the number of technologies that can be placed under the 
term ‘IoT’ is so increasingly high that even if new preclusions are added, certain 
technologies are bound to be overlooked or be subject to different rules 
altogether. 223  The following section demonstrates that where an information 
society service is combined with a transport service, it may be subject to a 
different liability regime. 
Directive 2000/31/EC has also been criticised for not preventing fragmenta-
tion due to diverging application of the CJEU-developed passivity criterion (ie 
the neutrality condition) by national courts.224 However, this criticism appears to 
be aimed at hosting safe harbours and stem from the fact that the passivity 
criterion discourages more preventive measures and leads to the avoidance of the 
                                                                                                 
221  International Telecommunication Union, Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000 (formerly 
Y.2060) ‘Overview of the Internet of things’ (06/2012), p 1 <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-
Y.2060-201206-I> accessed 8 October 2020. According to the ITU’s definition, IoT means 
global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by intercon-
necting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information 
and communication technologies. The ITU also notes that, through the exploitation of identi-
fication, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of 
things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy 
requirements are fulfilled. 
222  Rolf H. Weber, ‘Liability in the Internet of Things’ (2017) 5 Journal of European 
Consumer and Market Law, p 211. 
223  This view seems to be at least in part shared also by the experts entrusted with the task of 
analysing the e-commerce Directive, even though the focus of their recommendations is on 
other types of services. See Alexandre de Streel and Martin Husovec, ‘The e-commerce Dir-
ective as the cornerstone of the Internal Market,’ Study for the committee on Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection (Luxembourg 2020) Policy Department for Economic, Scientific 
and Quality of Life Policies, European Parliament, p 49 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/648797/IPOL_STU(2020)648797_EN.pdf> accessed 8 October 
2020. 
224  Alexandre de Streel and Martin Husovec, ‘The e-commerce Directive as the cornerstone 
of the Internal Market,’ Study for the committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
(Luxembourg 2020) Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 
European Parliament, p 20 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/ 
648797/IPOL_STU(2020)648797_EN.pdf> accessed 8 October 2020. 
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Directive’s framework by national courts.225 In the long run, Directive 2000/31/EC 
is supposed to be revised and perhaps even be replaced by the Digital Services 
Act which is expected to align the legal framework with the present market reality 
as regards the liability and safety rules for digital platforms, services and 
products.226 It has been argued that, to improve the EU liability regime, the EU 
law itself should clearly stipulate the situations in which platform operators are 
liable for failure to perform their obligations. 227  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that platform operators acting as intermediaries for contracts between 
platform users and being given a high degree of trust for caring for the security 
and quality of services made available on the platform could be made liable for 
the non-performance of such services.228 
 
 
2.3.5.4.3. Liability for a transport service and  
a service in the field of transport 
It follows from Article 58(1) of the TFEU that the freedom to provide services in 
the field of transport is governed by the provisions of the Title relating to 
transport. Under Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC,229 the Directive does 
not apply to services in the field of transport, which fall within the scope of Title 
V of the Treaty.230 Thus, in view of the above discussion on information society 
services, the key question in the context of liability for services relating to self-
driving vehicles is whether a service can be classified as a service in the field of 
transport or an information society service. 
The CJEU has given guidance in answering this question in its judgment in 
Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, which can be summarised as 
follows.231 In practice, multiple services governed by different legal instruments 
may be provided simultaneously (as observed here, for instance, an information 
society service and a service in the field of transport). The CJEU has taken the 
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view that, in a situation where the intermediation service provider selects drivers, 
the drivers would be unable to provide and the passengers unable to use the trans-
port services and where the intermediation service provider exercises ‘decisive 
influence’ over the conditions of provision of the transport services (sets the 
maximum fare, collects it from the client, exercises certain control over the 
quality of the vehicles and drivers), the main component of the overall service is 
the transport service, while the intermediation service ‘inherently linked’ thereto 
is merely a service enabling the transport service, thus qualifying as a ‘service in 
the field of transport.’232 
More specifically, the CJEU has explained that the term ‘service in the field 
of transport’ demonstrates the intention of the EU legislature not to restrict the 
exclusion set out in Article 2(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC merely to means of 
transport in themselves.233 The CJEU has noted that it is therefore necessary to 
interpret that exclusion as covering not only any physical act of moving persons 
or goods from one place to another by means of a vehicle, aircraft or waterborne 
vessel, but also any service inherently linked to such an act.234 
In addition to transport services and services in the field of transport in general, 
the European legislature has, for the purpose of preventing fragmented and un-
coordinated deployment, chosen to regulate Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) 
which ‘aim to provide innovative services relating to different modes of transport 
and traffic management and enable various users to be better informed and make 
safer, more coordinated and smarter use of transport networks’ and ‘integrate 
telecommunications, electronics and information technologies with transport 
engineering in order to plan, design, operate, maintain and manage transport 
systems’ in Directive 2010/40/EU on the framework for the deployment of 
Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with 
other modes of transport.235 Under Article 11 of Directive 2010/40/EU, Member 
States must ensure that liability issues concerning the deployment and use of ITS 
applications and services are addressed in accordance with EU law, including in 
particular Council Directive 85/374/EEC as well as relevant national legislation. 
In addition to the explicit reference to the PLD, it follows from this reference to 
national legislation that the national fault-based tortious liability rules discussed 
have relevance in this regard as well. Thus, in a situation where a service cannot 
be deemed an information society service but a transport service or a service in 
the field of transport and where contract law, strict liability and product liability 
is inapplicable, one may still need to turn to fault-based liability for answers. 
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2.3.5.5. Persons subject to fault-based tortious liability 
It follows from subsection 3 of § 1056 of the LOA that §§ 1056–1057 do not 
preclude or prejudice bringing a claim against the direct possessor of a self-
driving vehicle (§ 1057 of the LOA) or a person controlling a self-driving vehicle 
(§ 1056 of the LOA) on another legal ground, including a claim for compensation 
for unlawfully and wrongfully caused damage. Likewise, subsection 5 of § 1061 
of the LOA does not preclude bringing a claim against the manufacturer on 
another legal ground, including a claim for compensation for unlawfully and 
wrongfully caused damage. Thus, the persons discussed above, ie the self-driving 
vehicle’s direct possessor, the person controlling the vehicle as a source of greater 
danger, the manufacturer, the service provider as well as, in principle, any other 
person who has a certain level of control over the self-driving vehicle or certain 
duties in connection with the self-driving vehicle can be held liable for damage 
caused by the vehicle under fault-based tortious liability rules. 
As explained in greater detail in item 2.3.2 above, where the harmful effect on 
the injured person is a more remote outcome of the tortfeasor’s conduct, a duty 
which the latter has breached needs to be identified to hold the tortfeasor liable 
under fault-based tortious liability.236 It may be a statutory duty or the general 
duty to maintain safety, in other words, the duty to make every reasonable effort 
to ensure that other persons are not harmed as a result of one’s actions.237 Since 
the general duty to maintain safety and the element of fault are entwined,238 one 
needs to substantively assess whether the tortfeasor has been objectively negligent, 
in order to establish whether the general duty to maintain safety has been 
breached.239 
Regarding the user’s duty of care in the context of German law, M. Ebers has 
pointed out in reference to subsection (1) of § 823 of the BGB that the liability of 
a user of an autonomous system (these include self-driving vehicles as well) may 
arise from a breach of the duty of care upon selecting, operating or monitoring 
the system.240 According to M. Ebers, the user must, first of all, make certain that 
the system is indeed suitable for the purpose – the manufacturer may have de-
signed its self-driving car solely for specific roads and if the user disregards these 
specifications, the user may be liable for resulting damage. 241  For example, 
Ford’s CTO has pointed out that self-driving vehicles will be attuned to particular 
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cities,242 which means that in such a situation a person who uses in Tallinn a self-
driving vehicle attuned to operate in Helsinki could be in breach of their duty to 
maintain safety. M. Ebers also draws attention to the fact that, upon operating the 
autonomous system, the user is also responsible for properly configuring the 
system in line with the manufacturer’s instructions and for following all other 
safety precautions prescribed by the manufacturer – if, for example, the user is 
required to install a security update and fails to do so, the risks stemming from 
the continued use of the system transfer to the user.243 It has also been observed 
in connection with other autonomous systems that the user’s liability could arise 
from wrongfully training the system.244 Finally, M. Ebers notes that once the user 
has switched the autonomous system on, the user is also required to monitor it 
during operation and if the user detects or is otherwise made aware of any safety 
issues, the user can be expected to immediately stop using the system.245 
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3. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FIELD OF RESEARCH  
AND THE POSITION OF THE RESEARCH  
PROBLEM THEREIN 
3.1. Current status of legal research concerning  
tort liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles 
Liability issues related to self-driving vehicles have proven an intriguing topic. 
However, while countries, manufacturers and legal scholars are rushing to solve 
driving automation as well as the respective legal rules, the technology itself is 
still far from being finalised or mature246 and it exists in numerous points of 
development across the globe, as a result of which lawyers may be struggling to 
understand how these systems will eventually come to be operated, owned and 
used and where the related risks and duties truly lie. 
There is no single central work which could be credited with giving the author 
an exhaustive overview of all of the technical nuances and tortious liability aspects 
concerning self-driving vehicles. The author has had to complete the techno-
logical and legal puzzle based on numerous sources having a narrower focus and 
being more specific rather than general or more exhaustive. Nevertheless, as 
regards the technological and social side of self-driving vehicles, some landmark 
works do stand out among others owing to their thoroughness: Artificial Intelli-
gence: A modern approach247; ‘A Survey of Autonomous Driving: Common 
Practices and Emerging Technologies’248; Autonomes Fahren249. The first work 
gives an exceptionally detailed insight into the theory and practice of artificial 
intelligence. The second source (the most recent of the three) discusses unsolved 
issues and the technical side (eg localisation, mapping, perception, planning, 
human-machine interfaces, datasets and tools available for developing automated 
driving systems, etc) of driving automation in general, covering also semi-auto-
nomous technology. The third source represents one of many (largely, but not 
entirely) European attempts to map practical issues raised by self-driving vehicles 
in terms of not only road traffic safety, mobility, human-machine interaction, ethics 
and liability but also regarding the social acceptance of self-driving vehicles and 
the provision of services (eg provision of data for self-driving vehicles). 
At the level of a doctoral thesis, legal issues concerning specifically self-driving 
vehicles have not been discussed in Estonia. There have been some attempts to 
tackle the related issues in master’s theses. Albeit taking a general focus, Kadri 
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Alekõrs has ventured an analysis into the manufacturer’s liability for a defective 
product.250 Rauno Kinkar has analysed product liability and the fault-based liability 
of the driver in the event of damage arising from the defects of the technology of 
semi-autonomous vehicles.251 As regards the substance and relevance of the duty 
to maintain safety, there are connotations to Iko Nõmm’s dissertation in the context 
of not only the meaning of the duty to maintain safety but also fault-based tortious 
liability in situations where a harmful effect on a legally safeguarded interest is a 
more remote outcome of the tortfeasor’s conduct.252 Over the years, various fault-
based tortious liability, strict liability and product liability issues pertaining to, 
among other things, conventional motor vehicles have been discussed in numerous 
works by Estonian Supreme Court Justice Tambet Tampuu and Tartu University 
Law School’s Tort Law Professor Janno Lahe. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that there is no self-driving vehicle-related 
Estonian case-law but that of conventional vehicles remains ample, as a large 
share of judge-made law is characteristic of tort law. Since self-driving vehicles 
are currently in the testing phase and there is but a handful of developers in 
Estonia, they have not been involved in any serious traffic incidents. The first and 
so far the only traffic accident involving a self-driving vehicle in Estonia occurred 
on 14 July 2020 in Tallinn when the driver operating a conventional vehicle did 
not give way to a self-driving shuttle riding on the priority road.253 The vehicles 
suffered minor damage and no people were hurt. Both vehicles were insured and 
the damage was to be covered by the insurance undertaking. It should also be 
noted that the Estonian Supreme Court has not had a chance to adjudicate a single 
product liability dispute yet. 
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3.2. Policy efforts at EU level in relation  
to the topic of the dissertation 
In the field of liability for defective products, which is harmonised at EU level, 
various initiatives have been launched and expert groups formed. Their work has 
been based on, among other things, legal scholarly work. From 1995 to 2018, the 
European Commission has produced five reports on the application of the PLD.254 
In 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with recommendations to 
the Commission on civil law rules on robotics, including self-driving vehicles.255 
A year later, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published a 
study on self-driving vehicles to accompany the Parliament’s legislative own-
initiative report.256 It is noted in the report that fault liability will remain relevant 
mostly for semi-autonomous vehicles, while not as much in the case of full 
automation or near-full automation and that the current duties of care attuned to 
conventional vehicles will become irrelevant and new ones will need to be 
developed by case-law, which will result in a considerable period of legal 
uncertainty which will, in turn, increase transaction costs and lead to inadequate 
protection of injured persons.257 
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In 2018, the Commission also published a Staff Working Document on 
liability for emerging digital technologies covering, among other things, self-
driving vehicles.258 The Commission also issued Communication on Artificial 
Intelligence for Europe,259 aiming at becoming ‘a leader in the AI revolution’ and 
placing ‘the power of AI at the service of human progress.’ 
Following these initiatives taken by the European Parliament and the Euro-
pean Commission, the latter set up the Expert Group on Liability and New 
Technologies, operating in two formations: the New Technologies formation and 
the Product Liability Directive formation. The New Technologies formation was 
asked to examine, among other things, whether and to what extent the existing 
liability schemes were adapted to emerging technologies, among these, self-
driving cars as well as make recommendations on matters of non-contractual 
liability, where necessary. The New Technologies formation published its report 
in November 2019. To the author’s knowledge, the Product Liability Directive 
formation’s report is yet to be published. 
The European Commission has noted in its Safety and Liability Report that 
both product safety as well as product liability law serve the same policy goal of 
a functioning single market of highly safe goods. 260  The Commission has 
recognised the importance and potential of technologies such as artificial intelli-
gence, the IoT and robotics and is committed to making Europe a world-leader 
in these fields.261 The Commission has established that the characteristics of these 
technologies challenge the liability frameworks of the EU and Member States 
and could reduce their effectiveness by making liability claims based on national 
tort laws difficult or too expensive to prove, thus depriving injured persons of 
adequate compensation.262 The Commission has pointed out that it still needs to 
be assessed whether these new technologies could cause legal uncertainty as to 
how existing laws would apply.263 
The author agrees with the Commission in that liability rules should indeed 
strike a balance between protecting consumers from harm while enabling busi-
nesses to innovate.264 However, the author does not entirely share the Commis-
sion’s self-assessment that the Union’s liability frameworks have functioned well 
in this regard.265 The PLD in its current form has the potential to marginalise 
product liability law and, especially in the light of emerging autonomous and 
connected technologies, is at risk of being replaced by national strict liability 
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schemes, thus possibly increasing the fragmentation of liability frameworks 
across the EU. The risk of marginalisation stems from the fact that, as demon-
strated above, the Union’s product liability system is not a system of fully fledged 
strict liability because the development risk defence allows the manufacturer to 
be discharged from liability.266 Furthermore, unlike strict liability and fault-based 
liability, the burden of proving the damage, the defect and the causal link between 
the two may put the injured person at an insurmountable disadvantage in the con-
text of product liability for emerging autonomous and connected technologies. 
The Commission has also stated that it is important to ensure that victims of 
accidents of products and services, including emerging digital technologies like 
artificial intelligence, are not subject to a lower level of protection compared to 
similar other products and services for which they would get compensation under 
national tort law.267  This statement raises the question of whether the Com-
mission is planning on introducing a harmonised strict tortious liability regime 
for services with an artificial intelligence component or attempting to come forth 
with a harmonised set of criteria that serve as a basis for a reversal of the burden 
of proof with regard to AI applications. 
In explaining how new technologies challenge the existing legal frameworks 
and in what manner these challenges could be addressed, the Commission focuses 
on the complexity, connectivity, openness, autonomy and opacity of products, 
services, value chains and IoT environments.268 Given that subsection 1 of § 1063 
of the LOA explicitly refers to software as a product, the author welcomes the 
Commission’s admission that the software steering the operations of a tangible 
product could indeed be considered part or component of the product and the 
intention to clarify the definition (scope) of the term ‘product’ in the PLD in the 
light of the realisation that software can render a tangible product defective and 
lead to physical damage.269 
Since the Commission is seeking views on whether and to what an extent it 
may be necessary to mitigate via an appropriate EU initiative the consequences 
of complexity by alleviating/reversing the burden of proof required by national 
liability rules,270 the author would like to point out that from the perspective of 
the functioning of Estonian substantive and procedural law such an initiative 
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might not be necessary. As explained above,271 the Estonian Supreme Court has 
taken the view that where one needs to prove a circumstance the occurrence of 
which was under the control of another party and the party relying on the 
circumstance cannot objectively furnish proof and where the other party refuses 
to aid the proving of the circumstance, the burden of proof may be reversed based 
on the principle of good faith. Thus, from the narrow perspective of Estonian law 
there is not urgent need to reverse the burden of proof in this regard, but for the 
purposes of increasing legal clarity it can, in principle, be done. 
As regards the Commission’s suggestion that the PLD term ‘putting into 
circulation’ could the revisited, to take into account that products may change and 
be altered,272 the author notes that once the European legislature clearly stipulates 
in Union legislation that software is a product, it is bound to attend to the con-
sequences of such stipulation and this inevitably calls for taking into account the 
characteristics of such products. Thus, the term ‘putting into circulation’ not only 
could but indeed should be revisited in the light of emerging autonomous techno-
logies such as, for instance, self-driving cars.273 
Since the Commission is, based on the NTF Report, thinking of the reversal 
of the burden of proof in a situation where the potentially liable party has not 
logged the data relevant for assessing liability or is not willing to share such data 
with the injured person,274 the author of this dissertation would like to point out 
that the complexity of some of the so-called conventional systems is so high that 
it may take years for an error to manifest itself or be detected, found and estab-
lished.275 In the case of systems using artificial intelligence, there is no reason to 
believe that the situation will be any different. Thus, it may prove impractical or 
outright impossible to find out where the error truly lies. In the light thereof, 
perhaps the idea of associating a self-driving vehicle’s defectiveness with the 
mere fact that it has caused damage is not so far-fetched after all. 
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The results of the open public consultation on the European White Paper on 
AI276 show that a vast majority of the respondents consider the possibility that AI 
endangers safety or takes actions that cannot be explained very important and are 
highly concerned over AI’s lack of accuracy as well as lack of compensation 
following harmed caused by AI. To address these concerns, most (42%) of the 
respondents would like the introduction of a new regulatory framework on AI, 
while a somewhat smaller group (33%) find the current legislation to be in need 
of modification to address the established gaps.277 Nearly 61% of the respondents 
supported a revision of the PLD to cover particular risks posed by certain AI 
applications.278 
In its second and most recent deliverable279 the High-Level Expert Group on 
Artificial Intelligence has, in the spirit of the subsequent requirements listed in 
the Commission’s White Paper on AI280 and the Safety and Liability Report,281 
suggested considering the necessity and desirability of introducing traceability 
and reporting requirements for safety-critical AI applications in order to facilitate 
their auditability, external oversight prior to deployment, systematic monitoring, 
ongoing oversight by competent authorities. The expert group emphasises that 
civil liability rules should be able to ensure adequate compensation (as the expert 
group puts it, ‘either through strict or tort liability’) in case of harm and violation 
of rights and that these liability rules may need to be complemented with 
mandatory insurance rules.282 However, the feasibility, effectiveness and cost of 
these otherwise reasonable requirements remain a concern. 
This latter concern has been dealt with extensively in the European Parlia-
ment’s recent European assessment of the civil liability regime for artificial 
intelligence,283 which is based on a realisation that a clear and coherent EU civil 
liability regime for AI has the potential to reduce risks and increase safety, reduce 
legal uncertainty and related legal and litigation costs as well as safeguard 
consumers rights and increase their trust in AI. The report concludes that the 
European Parliament, the Commission’s expert group and the Commission itself 
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seem to agree on a need to adapt the PLD to the challenges of new technologies 
such as, for instance, self-driving cars and artificial intelligence.284 
On 5 October 2020, the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
published the Report with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability 
regime for artificial intelligence.285 While the Parliament wishes to refrain from 
major changes to the Union’s liability framework, it does see a legal gap in the 
liability of deployers of AI-systems.286 To overcome this gap, the Parliament 
recommends dividing AI-systems into two categories: high-risk AI-systems287 
and all other AI-systems. The Parliament recommends that strict liability be 
applied to high-risk AI-systems, while fault-based liability be applied to other 
AI-systems.288 
Simultaneously, the EU is working on replacing the e-Commerce Directive 
with the Digital Service Act289 in an attempt to bring liability and safety rules 
applicable to platform, products and services up to date with the market reality of 
today 290  and the outcomes of these efforts may also affect product liability 
associated with self-driving vehicles. 
 
 
3.3. Policy efforts in Estonia in relation  
to the topic of the dissertation 
In Estonia, the respective discussions have been sparked and fuelled by the 
development of self-driving delivery robots regulated in the TA, the self-driving 
shuttles that are being developed and tested by the Tallinn University of 
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Technology, the driving automation-related cooperation between Bolt (one of 
Europe’s largest ridesharing companies) and the researchers of the University of 
Tartu, and the yet-to-be-introduced self-driving robot couriers of Cleveron.291 
In October 2016, the Cabinet Office, in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, formed an expert group on self-driving 
vehicles to, inter alia, come up with legislative amendment proposals for the pur-
pose of enabling the use of self-driving vehicles on roads and streets.292 In August 
2017, the interim report of an analysis on putting vehicles of SAE Levels 4 and 5 
was published.293 The interim report contains a short section on civil liability, 
notably strict liability, product liability and the burden of proof,294 but remains a 
brief insight into a few individual issues, which cannot be compared to an analysis 
expected of, for instance, a dissertation. The final report emphasises that further 
legislative drafting in the field should provide the Estonian state and its people 
with a new level of quality instead of merely adapting the existing legal rules to 
self-driving vehicles.295 Arguably based on feedback from the members of the 
expert group and the public,296 the focus of the legal discussion on self-driving 
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vehicles shifted towards robotics and the creation of new legal concepts and 
definitions such as ‘intelligent robot’ and ‘operator’297. 
After attending to self-driving vehicles, the state’s exploratory efforts have 
focused on legal issues concerning artificial intelligence.298 It is expected that 
approximately 50 AI applications will be put into use in the public sector in 
Estonia by the end of 2020.299 While the expert group on artificial intelligence 
came to the conclusion that no major overhaul of the legislation was needed and 
there was no need for a code or Act of Parliament covering all possible uses of 
artificial intelligence,300 the Cabinet seems to be determined to come up with such 
a general statute nonetheless.301 
Regarding the substance of the prospective statute, it is noted in the report 
that, in the interests of legal clarity, it should be ensured that, when exercising 
public authority or performing other public functions, the actions of the AI 
application are, for the purposes of state liability, attributed to the state via the 
authority or body that used the application, while in private law the actions of the 
AI application should be deemed the actions of the individuals and legal 
entities.302 In developing the law further in connection with the increasing intro-
duction of AI applications, the report aims at ensuring the legal clarity required 
for the functioning and development of society via sufficient and sufficiently 
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clear regulation of matters pertaining to the use of AI applications, ie who is 
liable, to what an extent, how is the liability divided, etc.303 
Regarding tort law the report notes that, in principle, it is possible to apply the 
concept ‘source of greater danger’ to AI applications whereby human control is 
limited and risks are higher, noting that it could be combined with voluntary or 
mandatory liability insurance, so that persons benefiting from the sophisticated 
technology would bear liability for the risk emanating from the operation of the 
equipment.304 The report states that those who benefit the most from, above all, 
self-learning software applications, should also bear the liability for the mistakes 
and risks of the applications even where the system is unpredictable.305 Regarding 
product liability, the report notes that the rules of the burden of proof  
should be revised due to its possible insurmountability in the light of complex 
technology.306 
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4. METHODS 
Although, to the author’s knowledge, self-driving vehicles have not been put on 
the market yet and there is also no infrastructure designed specifically for them, 
they can nevertheless be hypothetically placed in the existing legal space in order 
to assess what issues it raises from the point of view of tort liability. To attain its 
purpose, the dissertation takes a doctrinal approach. It looks at the law governing 
the tort liability for damage caused by self-driving vehicles, identifies and 
interprets the relevant primary and secondary sources of law and synthesises those 
sources to formulate respective legal rules. In this process, an evaluation and 
critique of the competing and inconsistent sources has been carried out. Doctrinal 
research has led to suggestions of ways in which the tort law governing self-
driving vehicles should develop. The main aim of the doctrinal method was, for 
the purpose of identifying an underlying system, to accumulate, organise and 
describe the legal rules and provide comments on the emergence and importance 
of authoritative legal sources (ie case-law) in which these rules are considered. 
A systemic analysis of relevant legislation, case-law and legal writings was 
carried out. The author has sought to move from assumptions to conclusions. The 
assumptions are based on the characteristics of self-driving vehicles, the legis-
lation in force and how this legislation functions and is understood in practice via 
case-law and legal writings. 
The focus of the dissertation is on Estonian tort law which, with the exception 
of product liability, is not subject to EU-wide harmonisation. Thus, in relation to 
product liability, respective EU law is analysed as well. Unlike fault-based tortious 
liability and strict liability, the field of product liability has been harmonised in 
the European Union via the PLD. The PLD seeks to establish a fair apportionment 
of the risks inherent in technological production between manufacturers and con-
sumers. However, the largely analogue products of the 1970s and 1980s when 
the PLD was drafted and adopted have become considerably more digital and 
service-related by 2020s. The dissertation draws comparisons between the PLD 
and the LOA – the latter being a considerably younger legal act – and identifies 
key differences and issues of relevance from the perspective of self-driving 
vehicles. Thereby the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union is used as a source of interpretation. To the author’s knowledge, there is 
currently no Supreme Court case-law in the field of product liability in Estonia. 
The reason for focusing on Estonian law stems from the fact the Estonian state 
is determined to bring self-driving vehicles onto roads as soon as possible.307 In 
spite of the focus being on Estonian law, parallels are frequently drawn with 
relevant German legal rules, case-law and opinions of legal scholars because the 
tort law provisions of the LOA have been inspired by, among other legal systems, 
German law, case-law and legal scholarly opinions.308 
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5. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
OF THE PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED  
IN THE COMPENDIUM 
5.1. Fault-based tortious liability for damage caused  
by a self-driving vehicle 
5.1.1. The fault of the tortfeasor for a breach of the duty  
to maintain safety by the tortfeasor in the event  
of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle 
Description of the problem. Under § 1043 of the LOA, a person who unlawfully 
causes damage to another must compensate for the damage where the person who 
caused damage is at fault of the damage or bears statutory liability for causing 
the damage. Fault-based tortious liability is built in three stages. As a general 
rule, objective elements are verified at the first stage: the tortfeasor’s act, damage 
to the rights of the injured person, and a causal link between them. Unlawfulness 
is verified at the second stage. The tortfeasor’s fault is verified at the third stage. 
Since, in the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle, there is no driver 
and all the persons inside the self-driving vehicle are merely passengers, estab-
lishing both the unlawfulness of the damage as well as the fault of the tortfeasor 
(ie the prerequisites for fault-based tortious liability) may prove problematic. 
Statement set forth for defence. The injured person’s ability to enforce their 
claim on the basis of fault-based tortious liability is considerably affected by the 
fact of whether the damage was caused by a conventional motor vehicle or a self-
driving vehicle. Due to the absence of the tortfeasor’s fault or breach of duty to 
maintain safety, the injured person cannot usually enforce a claim for damages 
based on fault-based tortious liability for damage caused by a self-driving vehicle. 
Reasoning. In the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle, engaging 
in traffic may be deemed to be the tortfeasor’s act. The injured person’s legal 
right that is being violated can, above all, be their life (clause 1 of subsection 1 
of § 1045 of the LOA), health (clause 2 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA) or 
ownership (clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA). The same applies to 
damage caused by a conventional motor vehicle. Likewise, establishing a causal 
link between the tortfeasor’s act and the damage suffered by the injured person 
is not special in any way.309 
At the second stage of the criteria for fault-based tortious liability, the unlaw-
fulness of causing damage is established. Clauses 1–4 of subsection 2 of § 1045 
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of the LOA establish the circumstances that preclude the unlawfulness of causing 
damage (eg consent or self-defence). Where damage is caused by the driver of a 
conventional motor vehicle, the unlawfulness can alternatively arise from a 
violation of a protective provision (clause 7 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA 
in combination with a protective provision in the TA) or be based on the general 
catalogue of unlawful damage (clause 2 of subsection 1 of § 1045 of the LOA – 
causing a bodily injury or health damage to the injured person; clause 5 of sub-
section 1 of § 1045 of the LOA – infringement of ownership). 
In the event of infringement of absolute legal interests such as human life, 
health or ownership, unlawfulness is based on the harmful effect as such, while 
it is not important whether the tortfeasor also violated any duty.310 Unlawfulness 
comes from the wrongfulness of the outcome. 
Establishing unlawfulness merely based on the harmful effect is, however, not 
an exceptionless rule even in the event of infringing the absolutely protected legal 
rights. Where an absolutely protected right has been infringed by failure to act or 
where the harmful effect is a more remote outcome of the tortfeasor’s conduct, a 
duty which the latter has breached must be identified. It may be a statutory duty 
or the general duty to maintain safety.311 According to case-law, the general duty 
to maintain safety means a person’s duty to make every reasonable effort to 
ensure that other persons are not harmed as a result of the person’s actions. 
While in the event of damage caused by a conventional motor vehicle the 
unlawfulness of causing damage can usually be derived from harming the injured 
person’s legal right (or, alternatively, also from a violation of the provisions of 
the TA), it is rather questionable in the event of damage caused by a self-driving 
vehicle. One might argue that, for instance, in a situation where a person is inside 
a self-driving vehicle that causes a traffic accident, the person has not harmed the 
injured person’s legal right by their active conduct. In such an event, the damage 
caused by the person who was inside the vehicle cannot be deemed to be unlawful 
owing to the mere harming of the injured person’s legal right. In order to hold the 
person inside the vehicle liable, a duty which the person has breached should be 
established. Presumably, it cannot be a statutory duty (eg under the TA). Thus, 
the liability of the liable person can be based, above all, on a breach of the general 
duty to maintain safety. According to case-law, the general duty to maintain safety 
and the element of fault are entwined.312 Thus, when examining whether a person 
has breached the general duty to maintain safety, one must substantively assess 
whether the person has been externally (ie objectively) negligent. The Supreme 
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Court has explained that since the general duty to maintain safety means, 
according to the generally recognised view, a duty of care for the purposes of the 
legal theory, negligence is one of the forms of fault under subsection 2 of § 104 
of the LOA and subsection 1 of § 1050 of the LOA establishes that a person who 
unlawfully caused damage is presumed to be at fault, the defendant has the burden 
to prove that it did not breach the general duty to maintain safety.313 
It has been argued in the context of German law that putting ‘blind trust’ in 
the automated vehicle technology over a long period may constitute a breach of 
the duty to maintain safety.314 Under Estonian law, one could partly agree with 
the opinion. The owner or possessor of a self-driving vehicle might be hypotheti-
cally criticised for a breach of the general duty to maintain safety where the 
vehicle is not properly serviced (eg software updates have not been made in a 
timely manner) or where detected errors are not reacted to. ‘Maintaining safety’ 
should not usually require more of the owner or possessor. 
The fault of the tortfeasor is the third main criterion of the fault-based tortious 
liability.315 The types of fault are negligence, gross negligence and intent (sub-
section 2 of § 104 of the LOA). Negligence means failure to exercise necessary 
care (subsection 3 of § 104 of the LOA). Gross negligence means failure to 
exercise necessary care to a material extent (subsection 4 of § 104 of the LOA). 
Intent means the will to bring about an unlawful consequence upon creation, 
performance or termination of an obligation (subsection 5 of § 104 of the LOA). 
In Estonian tort law, the injured person’s fault (including negligence) should also 
be assessed based on the characteristics of the tortfeasor. Under subsection 2 of 
§ 1050 of the LOA, the situation, age, education, knowledge, abilities and other 
personal characteristics of a person should be taken into consideration upon 
assessment of the person’s fault. Under subsection 1 of § 1050 of the LOA, the 
negligence of the tortfeasor is presumed, ie the tortfeasor who wishes to avoid 
liability should prove the absence of their fault. 
In the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle, the absence of fault 
(or a breach of the duty to maintain safety) may be the reason why fault-based 
tortious liability is not applicable to the owner or possessor of the vehicle (or a 
person who simply travelled in the self-driving vehicle at the time of the traffic 
accident). For instance, if a self-driving vehicle causes damage to a third party 
due to a bug in the control program, one cannot usually argue that the owner or 
possessor of the vehicle failed to exercise due care or perform the duty to maintain 
safety. As noted above, the situation may prove different where the vehicle has 
not been properly maintained or serviced. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that 
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usually it is not reasonable or fruitful for the injured person who has suffered 
damage caused by a self-driving vehicle to bring a claim against the owner or 
possessor of the vehicle based on provisions governing fault-based tortious 
liability. 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the injured person’s ability to 
enforce their claim on the basis of fault-based tortious liability is considerably 
affected by the fact of whether the damage was caused by a conventional motor 
vehicle or a self-driving vehicle. However, the difference will not create a deep 
practical issue where the injured person’s chances of receiving compensation for 
damage are sufficiently ensured using other instruments, above all, rules on strict 
liability and product liability. 
 
 
5.1.2. Need for a safeguarding provision under tort law  
in connection with self-driving vehicles 
Description of the problem. Germany has already passed traffic legislation 
governing self-driving vehicles, including related legal definitions. Subsection 
(2) of §1a of the German Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz or StVG)316 
lists the technical equipment that makes a vehicle a highly or fully automated 
motor vehicle. It follows from subsection (4) of §1a of the StVG that the driver 
is the one to switch on the highly or fully automated driving function and apply 
it for controlling the vehicle. Such an approach to automated driving means that 
even a vehicle with a fully automated driving function is required to have a 
steering wheel and a licensed driver behind it at all times. This person is required 
to sit in the front seat to drive, and certain controls, displays, and indicators need 
to be visible to the driver so that they would be able to drive the vehicle properly. 
This also means that even a vehicle equipped with fully automated driving 
functionality must not drive ‘empty’ – even when there are no passengers, there 
must be at least one occupant (the driver) while it is driving. In addition, it follows 
from subsection (4) of §1a of the StVG that the driver must be prepared to take 
over control of the vehicle at all times. This raises the question whether Estonia 
should follow Germany’s example and also establish a similar safeguarding 
provision that would require the driver to take over the driving of a self-driving 
vehicle at any time. 
Statement set forth for defence. Estonia does not necessarily need to follow 
the example of the German Road Traffic Act because it is rather an interim 
solution stemming from the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic of 8 November 
1968 and does not take the characteristics of self-driving vehicles into account. 
Reasoning. For manufacturers, the German approach means a self-driving 
vehicle must have a steering wheel and other control equipment and could only 
engage in traffic with the help of a licensed driver. Similarly to conventional 
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vehicles, the driver is required to sit in the front seat and certain controls, displays, 
and indicators need to be visible to the driver so that they would be able to drive 
the vehicle safely. This would also mean that a self-driving vehicle could not 
drive empty. 
The German approach seems to be inspired by the characteristics of semi-
automated vehicles. The fundamental difference between fully automated (self-
driving) vehicles and semi-automated vehicles lies in the fact that in the case of 
the former a driver is not needed in any circumstances and, thus, there is no need 
to stay alert and be ready to take over control of the vehicle. The implementation 
of a safeguarding provision attuned solely to semi-automated vehicles would put 
Estonian developers317 of self-driving vehicles at a disadvantage. 
The German legislature’s choices would strip self-driving vehicles of some of 
their alleged key advantages (disabled people’s access to mobility, reduction of 
human errors, etc318), while giving rise to a plethora of new issues related to the 
human driver taking back control of the vehicle or, more generally, to human–
machine interaction. Once the driver has transferred control of the vehicle to the 
system, it is difficult to get it back in an instant. Nevertheless, the driver remains 
responsible and is required to stay alert and ready to retake control in the blink of 
an eye. While the approach taken by the German legislature is acceptable for SAE 
Levels 1–4, it practically precludes the introduction of Level 5 vehicles. 
The approach taken by Germany might be associated with the fact that, as has 
the rest of the EU, Germany has ratified the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road 
Traffic319 which, in spite of subsequent modifications320, rules out the introduction 
                                                                                                 
317  Raivo Sell and Krister Kalda, ‘Self-driving shuttle ISEAUTO’ (26th ITS World Congress, 
Singapore, 21–25 October 2019) <www.researchgate.net/publication/337720410_Self-
driving_shuttle_ISEAUTO> accessed 8 October 2020; Epp Joala, ‘Isejuhtiv buss alustas 
Kadriorus regulaarset opereerimist’ [Self-driving shuttle begins regular operation in 
Kadriorg] (TalTech, 29 August 2019) <https://ttu.ee/isejuhtiv-buss-alustas-kadriorus-
regulaarset-opereerimist> accessed 8 October 2020; University of Tartu, ‘University of Tartu 
and Bolt presented autonomous driving lab’s test car’ (29 January 2020) <www.ut.ee/ 
en/news/university-tartu-and-bolt-presented-autonomous-driving-labs-test-car> accessed 
8 October 2020; Janno Riispapp, ‘Cleveron arendab uut isejuhtivat kullerrobotit’ [Cleveron is 
developing a new self-driving robot courier] (Postimees, 29 March 2019) <https://tehnika. 
postimees.ee/6557088/cleveron-arendab-uut-isejuhtivat-kullerrobotit> accessed 8 October 
2020. 
318  European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), para 29. 
319  Convention on Road Traffic, Vienna, 8.11.1968, entry into force 21.5.1977 (consolidated 
text) <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/Conv_road_traffic_EN.pdf> 
 
320  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) – Inland Transport 
Committee – Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, ‘Report of the sixty-eighth session of the 
Working Party on Road Traffic Safety’ (Geneva, 24–26 March 2014) ECE/TRANS/WP.1/145 
<www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2014/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-145e.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
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of driverless road vehicles. 321 While such restrictions are inevitable in the case 
of semi-autonomous vehicles, the entire concept of a fully self-driving vehicle is 
based on the underlying assumption that no human driver is required under any 
circumstances. Therefore, it may well be that the current solution in Germany is 
merely a temporary one in place until the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic 
can be amended and the level of full automation is truly reached. 
While there might be a need to clarify the driver’s duties while using a highly 
automated driving mode (ie a semi-automated vehicle), the presence of the driver 
and their duty to be ready to take over control of the vehicle at any moment does 
not fully align with the characteristics of self-driving vehicles. 
 
 
5.2. Strict liability for damage caused  
by a self-driving vehicle 
Description of the problem. Strict liability is liability for damage caused by a 
source of greater danger, which does not depend on fault. H. Koziol has noted that 
strict liability is liability for dangerousness.322 The LOA’s strict liability provisions 
are structured in such a manner that § 1056 contains the general composition of 
strict liability, while §§ 1057–1060 set out the special compositions of strict 
liability. The latter include, among other things, the strict liability of the direct 
possessor of a motor vehicle: the direct possessor of a motor vehicle is liable for 
any damage caused upon the operation323 of the vehicle. The question about who 
can be deemed to be the direct possessor of a self-driving vehicle arises. 
The first sentence of subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA states that where 
damage is caused as a result of a danger characteristic of an especially dangerous 
thing or activity, the person who controls the source of danger is liable for causing 
the damage regardless of the person’s fault. The first sentence of subsection 2 of 
§ 1056 of the LOA states that a thing or activity is deemed to be a source of 
greater danger where, due to its nature or the substances or means used therein, 
major damage or frequent damage may be suffered even where the level of care 
expected of a professional is exercised. Where statutory liability not dependent 
on the fault of the person controlling a source of danger is established for a source 
                                                                                                 
321  It is explicitly stated in Article 8(1) of the Convention that every moving vehicle or 
combination of vehicles shall have a driver. The Traffic Act does not explicitly provide for 
such a requirement but it nevertheless stems from numerous provisions (see, for example, 
clauses 19 and 41 of § 2, clause 3 of subsection 1 of § 7, subsection 2 of § 8 of the TA, etc). 
322  Helmut Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Wien: Jan 
Sramek Verlag, 2012), p 234. 
323  The Estonian Supreme Court has held that damage is caused upon operating a motor 
vehicle, above all, when it is caused by the purposeful use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle in 
traffic. The slow movement of a vehicle or, in exceptional circumstances, the static status of 
a vehicle on the road, may be considered operating the vehicle (see the SCCC judgment, 
19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 20). 
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of danger similar to the thing or activity, it is presumed that the thing or activity 
is the source of greater danger. In the context of self-driving vehicles one can ask 
who can be considered the person controlling such vehicle as a source of greater 
danger. 
Overall, the question is who can on the basis of the strict liability rules be held 
liable for damage caused upon operating a self-driving vehicle. 
Statement set forth for defence. From the point of view of application of 
strict liability, the automation or non-automation of the vehicle does not make 
any difference. A self-driving vehicle is a motor vehicle for the purposes of 
§ 1057 of the LOA and a source of greater danger for the purposes of subsection 
2 of § 1056 of the LOA. Variations may arise with regard to the obligated parties 
and depend on whether self-driving vehicles will come to be owned as 
conventional vehicles or whether they will be only made available to economic 
operators who provide transport services. 
Reasoning. In the case of strict liability, the act and fault of the tortfeasor are 
irrelevant. The determining factor is whether the harmful consequence was 
caused by the manifestation of a risk characteristic of the object or activity. Thus, 
upon holding the operator of a motor vehicle (ie the person controlling it) liable 
it is of no relevance whether they violated the traffic rules by engaging in traffic 
or whether they were at fault when doing it. The Supreme Court has also held 
that the causing of damage by a source of greater danger means that damage is 
suffered as a result of the realisation of a risk characteristic of the source of greater 
danger, ie as a result of the manifestation of a heightened threat characteristic of 
a source of greater danger stemming from the object or activity.324 
A self-driving vehicle can be deemed to be a motor vehicle for the purposes 
of § 1057 of the LOA. Thus, the application of strict liability to damage is, in 
principle, possible also in the event of damage caused by a self-driving vehicle. 
In addition to § 1057 of the LOA, the fault-based tortious liability provided for in 
§ 1056 of the LOA can also be applied to damage caused by a self-driving vehicle. 
The courts have a wide margin of discretion as to what objects or activities to 
consider to be sources of greater danger on the basis of the provision. Never-
theless, self-driving vehicles quite clearly can be considered sources of greater 
danger. It is a separate issue of whether the absence of a driver in a self-driving 
vehicle increases or decreases its dangerousness. If there is no driver who would 
be standing by at all times to take over control of the vehicle at any moment in 
order to, for example, fill in the gaps or errors in the vehicle’s software, the 
absence of a driver could be considered a factor increasing dangerousness. On 
the other hand, traffic accidents largely occur due to human error325 and, there-
fore, the absence of a driver could be seen as a dangerousness-reducing factor. It 
cannot be precluded that the safety of self-driving vehicles will at some point 
                                                                                                 
324  SCCC judgment, 2 March 2011, case 3-2-1-161-10, para 11. 
325  See, for example, Christoph Grote, ‘Connected vehicles will enhance traffic safety and 
efficiency’ (The European Files, 18 February 2019) <www.europeanfiles.eu/digital/ 
connected-vehicles-will-enhance-traffic-safety-efficiency> accessed 8 October 2020. 
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reach a level where accidents are almost completely precluded. In such an event 
there would perhaps no longer be any reason for treating self-driving vehicles as 
sources of greater danger. Thus, at the level of the prerequisites for strict liability 
there are (similarly to conventional motor vehicles) no such obstacles that would 
render the application of § 1057 or even § 1056 of the LOA impossible. 
In the context of the application of strict liability the question is who can be 
held liable based on the strict liability rules. As noted above, under § 1057 of the 
LOA only the direct possessor of a motor vehicle can be held liable. It follows 
from subsection 1 of § 33 of the LPA that a possessor is a person under whose 
actual control a thing is. Subsection 2 of the same section stipulates that a person 
who possesses a thing on the basis of a commercial lease, tenancy, deposit, pledge 
or other similar relationship which entitles the person to temporarily possess the 
thing of another person is the direct possessor, while the other person is the 
indirect possessor. According to the case-law of the Supreme Court, § 1057 of 
the LOA imposes liability on, above all, the person who has the actual control (be 
it on a legal ground or not) over motor vehicle.326 In other words, on the person 
who controls the vehicle, ie decides where and when the vehicle moves, bears 
costs and economic risks related to the vehicle and enjoys the benefits of using 
the vehicle. 
Thus, an answer to the question of who can be held liable based on § 1057 of 
the LOA largely depends on how self-driving vehicles will actually come to be 
used. If the purchase and sale of future self-driving vehicles remains similar to 
that of the current conventional vehicles, the person who acquires a self-driving 
vehicle becomes, in general, its direct possessor as well. However, it may well 
happen that companies will merely provide a transport service using self-driving 
vehicles and individuals will not be able to acquire them. Such a service may 
resemble the conventional taxi service. If a self-driving vehicle causes a traffic 
accident during the provision of such a transport service, one can raise the 
question of who the direct possessor of the vehicle at the moment of the accident 
was. It can be argued that, since a customer of the conventional taxi service does 
not transform into the direct possessor of the vehicle at the time of receiving the 
service, the same does not happen in the case of a self-driving vehicle. This means 
that the person receiving the service is not liable for the damage under § 1057 of 
the LOA. Above all, the company providing the transport service is liable. 
Thereby it is irrelevant whether the respective company is the owner of the 
vehicle that caused damage or possesses the vehicle on the basis of, for instance, 
a lease contract. In the latter case, the owner of the vehicle is the indirect pos-
sessor of the vehicle to whom § 1057 of the LOA does not apply either. 
The driver of a motor vehicle cannot always be considered the direct possessor 
of the vehicle. It follows from subsection 3 of § 33 of the LPA that the possessor 
is not a person who exercises actual control over a thing in accordance with the 
orders of another person in their household or business. Such ‘servant of pos-
session’ or possessory servant is, for example, an employee who uses a vehicle 
                                                                                                 
326  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 21. 
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to perform the tasks given by the employer. In principle, it may happen in the 
case of a self-driving vehicle that the employee uses it for performing certain 
employment tasks. In such an event, § 1057 of the LOA is not applicable to the 
employee either.327 At the same time the servant of possession may still be held 
liable in accordance with the provisions governing fault-based tortious liability. 
This may not prove doable in practice because the employee’s liability would 
usually be precluded owing to the absence of their fault. 
As noted above, the LOA also contains the so-called general composition of 
strict liability (general strict liability). It is a flexible solution that enables the 
courts to keep up with the times, declaring technologies whose safety is not yet 
sufficiently proven to be sources of greater danger. On the basis of the general 
strict liability, the person controlling a source of greater danger can be held liable. 
Thereby it should be pointed out that the definition of a person controlling a source 
of greater danger set out in subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA does not overlap 
with the definition of the direct possessor of a motor vehicle under § 1057 of the 
LOA. Thus, it cannot be precluded that a person in a self-driving vehicle (eg an 
employee) who cannot be qualified as the direct possessor of the motor vehicle 
under § 1057 of the LOA can still be considered a person controlling the source 
of greater danger within the meaning of subsection 1 of § 1056 of the LOA. Even 
though this position has not been explicitly confirmed by Estonian case-law, a 
respective discussion is fuelled by a decision of the Supreme Court where the 
court held that a person who was riding a horse but was simultaneously not the 
keeper of the animal for the purposes of LOA § 1060 could be considered a 
person controlling a source of greater danger within the meaning of subsection 1 
of § 1056 of the LOA.328 
By the same token, it should necessarily not be precluded to consider the 
owner of a vehicle who is not its direct possessor as the person controlling the 
source of greater danger. A respective question could be raised, for instance, in 
the event of the insolvency of the direct possessor. In the light of the aforemen-
tioned discussion over the definition of a person controlling a source of greater 
danger one should nevertheless not draw the conclusion that a person receiving a 
transport service could be considered a possessor of a self-driving vehicle for the 
purposes of LOA § 1056. The receipt of a temporary service does not give a 
person any right or opportunity to control the self-driving vehicle. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
327  See also Varul and others (n 31), p 696. 
328  SCCC judgment, 18 April 2007, case 3-2-1-27-07, paras 13–14. The application of the 
general composition of strict liability (LOA § 1056) may be precluded by the fact that the 
injured person was somehow linked to the source of greater danger. In the same decision, the 
Supreme Court noted that persons who participate in controlling a source of greater danger, 
temporarily take the source under their control or benefit from controlling the source are not, 
in the light of the principle of good faith, entitled to demand that the person controlling the 
source of greater danger compensate for the damage caused to them based on provisions 
governing strict liability. 
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5.3. Product liability for damage caused  
by a self-driving vehicle 
5.3.1. Defects of a self-driving vehicle as a product 
Description of the problem. Under subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA, ‘product’ 
means all movables, even though incorporated into another movable or into an 
immovable; ‘product’ includes electricity and computer software. While 30–40 
years ago products with an intangible or service component might have been a 
relatively new phenomenon for the average consumer, the products of today are 
increasingly becoming entwined with software and services. Software itself is 
often provided as a service. Driving automation becomes possible owing to the 
combination of hardware, software and services. Software replaces the decision-
making mechanisms of a human being, while sensors replace their senses. Article 2 
of the PLD, which serves as the basis of subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA makes 
no explicit mention of computer software or services. The only intangible product 
which Article 2 of the PLD refers to is electricity. No reference to services is 
made in subsection 1 of § 1063 of the LOA or in Article 2 of the PLD. 
A bug or error in the software of a self-driving vehicle or in a service used 
may lead to the causing of damage by a self-driving vehicle. Due to a software 
bug, the self-driving vehicle may misinterpret the surrounding environment or 
inadequately react to it and, as a result thereof, cause a road accident. Exploiting 
a software vulnerability, a third party might take over the control of the vehicle 
and intentionally cause harm with it. Ensuring the security of the software of a 
self-driving vehicle is essentially a continuous process that lasts as long as the 
vehicle remains in circulation. 
A self-driving vehicle presumably cannot cope without other important 
services: it must, among other things, be able to communicate with other road 
users and traffic signs, be aware of the weather conditions, find a route in and 
navigate through the surrounding area, know its location towards the surrounding 
objects with high precision, etc. If any of these key services does not function, 
the vehicle might be unable to function properly. If the self-driving vehicle is 
designed in such a way that its safe operation depends on a certain service (eg the 
operator service, traffic management service, local position service, etc) but there 
is a disruption in such service or the service provides the self-driving vehicle with 
misleading input, the vehicle may also misinterpret the surrounding environment 
or react to it inadequately and cause damage as a result thereof. 
Statement set forth for defence. If the cause of damage is a defect in the 
software of a self-driving vehicle or in a digital service used by it, it should be 
deemed a defect of the self-driving vehicle. 
Reasoning. The legal definition of a defective product is given in subsection 2 
of § 1063 of the LOA (transposes Article 6 of the PLD). By and large, a product 
is defective where it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to 
expect. Thereby account should be taken of all the circumstances, including the 
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presentation of the product, the use to which it could reasonably be expected to 
be put and the time of putting the product into circulation. Regarding self-driving 
vehicles, it ultimately comes down to what the public at large is entitled to 
reasonably expect of the self-driving vehicle in terms of its safety. 
It follows from the guidelines given by the CJEU in Boston Scientific that the 
assessment of reasonable safety expectations must be carried out from the 
perspective of the public at large, taking into account the intended purpose, the 
objective characteristics and properties of the self-driving vehicle and the specific 
requirements of the group of users whom the vehicle is intended.329 In the light 
of the function of self-driving vehicles and the particularly vulnerable situation 
of people using such products, the safety requirements for those vehicles which 
all road users are entitled to expect are particularly high. Furthermore, it can be 
derived from the CJEU’s analysis set out in Boston Scientific that the potential 
lack of safety of a self-driving vehicle stems from the abnormal potential for 
damage which those vehicles might cause to the person concerned.330 
At this juncture, we can merely speculate on the presentation of self-driving 
vehicles, the use to which they could reasonably be expected to be put and the 
time of putting such vehicles into circulation. However, we can discuss the 
intended purpose, objective characteristics and properties as well as the group of 
users whom self-driving vehicles will be intended. The main purpose of motor 
vehicles designed to be used on roads is to carry cargo and people. In conven-
tional vehicles, a driver who has successfully completed training in the respective 
motor vehicle category and passed a test of traffic knowledge and skills (ie holds 
a driving licence). In spite of such requirements, human errors remain the main 
cause of traffic accidents. It is hoped that self-driving vehicles will alleviate or 
eventually solve this problem entirely. Thus, their main intended purpose might 
be the safe automated transportation of cargo and people from the point of 
departure to the destination. 
Given the laws of physics, above all, the mass and speed of movement of the 
vehicle, a self-driving vehicle is a source of greater danger for other road users. 
A conventional vehicle is controlled by a driver, but in a self-driving vehicle the 
driver is replaced by various hardware and software. Subsection 1 of § 1063 of 
the LOA explicitly places software among products. Being intangible, software 
is, as a rule, not final in its original form and it can be and often should be 
improved and modified. The need for modification arises from the fact that it is 
not possible to create completely flawless software. 331  Likewise, technology 
                                                                                                 
329  For further details see Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizin-
technik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse 
RWE [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:148, paras 37–41. 
330  ibid; see also Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston Scientific Medizintechnik 
GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE [2014] 
Opinion of AG Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2306, para 30. 
331  See, for instance, Tom Alexander, ‘What is a Software Defect’ (Smartbear Zephyr, 
26 May 2018) <https://qacomplete.com/resources/articles/what-is-a-software-defect/> accessed 
8 October 2020. It should be noted that the understanding of a defect is somewhat different 
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develops at a fast pace and for this reason the initial solution may subsequently 
prove unadvisable. A self-driving vehicle as a product is presumably meant for 
use over a longer period of time. Its software has many critical functions which 
the safety of the vehicle depends on. Among other things, the security of the soft-
ware of a self-driving vehicle is of great importance. To ensure this, the software 
needs to be continuously updated. Thus, keeping the software component of a 
self-driving vehicle operational is essentially a process. In other words, it con-
stitutes an internal service component of the product. If a self-driving vehicle is 
designed in such a manner that its safe operation depends, in addition to the 
internal service component, on the availability or functioning of a certain external 
service, a bug or error in that service should be treated as a defect of the self-
driving vehicle. Road users have the right to expect that a self-driving vehicle 
does not cause damage in a situation where an important service is disrupted or 
unavailable. 
 
 
5.3.2. Development risk of self-driving vehicles  
as a circumstance precluding the manufacturer’s liability 
Description of the problem. The manufacturer’s liability for a defective self-
driving vehicle is not absolute. Transposing Article 7(e) of the PLD, clause 5 of 
subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA allows for discharging the manufacturer from 
liability where the manufacturer proves that, given the level of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time of placing the vehicle on the market, the defect 
could not be detected. While, initially, the European legislature had the plan to 
establish product liability as strict liability, the manufacturer’s strict liability was 
eventually limited by the development risk defence clause.332 Similarly to most 
Member States,333 Estonia has transposed the given provision to Estonian law 
without reservations. 
However, in the case of self-driving vehicles, the persons affected (ie road 
users) are in a different situation than, for instance, consumers of medicinal 
products. Likewise, self-driving vehicles are developed with the aim of saving 
people’s lives.334 While, for example, the injection of a vaccine affects only the 
                                                                                                 
among software developers and the legislature. The former see it as a situation where the 
software does not provide the person with the expected benefits. In the case of a self-driving 
vehicle, the benefits might include, for example, the chance to engage in other activities while 
travelling in the vehicle, the prevention of human errors, higher fuel efficiency, smoother 
traffic, etc. 
332  Case C-300/95 Commission v UK [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:35, Opinion of AG Tesauro, 
para 19. 
333  COM(2011) 0547 final, p 8. 
334  U.S. Department of Transportation, ‘Preparing for the future of transportation: Automated 
vehicles 3.0’ (October 2018) <www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policy-initia-
tives/automated-vehicles/320711/preparing-future-transportation-automated-vehicle-30.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2020. 
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person into whom the vaccine was injected and indirectly also protects third 
parties via the person’s immunity to a disease, a self-driving vehicle is a source 
of greater danger due to its physical characteristics and the laws of physics, 
having the capacity to harm the life, health and ownership of third parties (road 
users). 
The underlying idea of the development risk defence was to encourage 
innovation by reducing manufacturers’ risks so that they would take advantage 
of the most recent knowledge and spend money on research and development 
rather than insurance policies.335 However, the opponents argued that it unfairly 
forced injured persons (consumers) to bear risks arising from developing new 
products.336 However, there are car manufacturers that have publicly announced 
their readiness to voluntarily admit liability for damage.337 
Statement set forth for defence. The development risk defence provided for 
in clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA allows for, in principle, a fair 
apportionment of liability. However, extensive application of this exception to 
defects of self-driving vehicles is not reasonable because in such an event the law 
governing product liability would largely become meaningless in the context of 
innovative technologies. 
Reasoning. Completely flawless software cannot be created and, presumably, 
software developers would be reluctant to guarantee that their software is 
completely flawless. The software of a self-driving vehicle may also have vulner-
abilities through which a criminal can access its systems and cause damage at a 
far larger scale than with a conventional vehicle. Ensuring software security is a 
never-ending process that calls for continued improvement efforts and research 
and development. Thereby a security vulnerability may not become evident at the 
time of placing a self-driving vehicle in the market but years later. Keeping in 
mind this possible scenario, the development risk defence could be deemed 
justified also in the context of self-driving vehicles. 
However, one cannot disregard the fact that risks emanating from a product 
that is not a source of greater danger are not equal to risks threatening persons 
(road users) in the case of sources of greater danger (including self-driving 
vehicles). While the defects of a vaccine pose a threat to, above all, the person to 
whom it has been administered, a self-driving vehicle is inevitably a certain threat 
to the surrounding road users and property because of its mass and speed of 
movement, including to road users other than the passengers of the vehicle. 
Upon holding the manufacturer liable for damage caused by the defects of a 
self-driving vehicle or parts thereof, the key question is, above all, how to apply 
                                                                                                 
335  SWD(2018) 157 final, p 35. 
336  BEUC, ‘Review of Product Liability Rules’ Position Paper (2017) <www.beuc.eu/ 
publications/beuc-x-2017-039_csc_review_of_product_liability_rules.pdf> accessed 8 Octo-
ber 2020. 
337  See, for instance, Jim Gorzelany, ‘Volvo Will Accept Liability For Its Self-Driving Cars’ 
(Forbes, 9 October 2015) <www.forbes.com/sites/jimgorzelany/2015/10/09/volvo-will-
accept-liability-for-its-self-driving-cars/#10f0878572c5> accessed 8 October 2020. 
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clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA. In other words, how extensive 
will be manufacturers’ chances of proving that a defect of the product could not 
have been detected based on the scientific and technical level at the time. It cannot 
be precluded that in the case of self-driving vehicles the courts will be more eager 
to apply the development risk defence arising from clause 5 of subsection 1 of 
§ 1064 of the LOA in order not to adversely affect the development of 
technology. However, too extensive application of this exception cannot be 
deemed reasonable regarding defects of self-driving vehicles because otherwise 
the product liability legislation would largely lose its meaning in the context of 
new technologies. 
On the one hand, as noted above, not all Member States of the European Union 
have fully transposed the development risk clause to their legislation. On the 
other hand, there are manufacturers who have expressed readiness to opt for 
voluntary strict liability and set aside the option of using the development risk 
defence. 
Similarly to strict liability, the manufacturer can be held liable based on fault-
based tortious liability in a situation where product liability is precluded (sub-
section 5 of § 1061 of the LOA). Where product liability rules are not applicable, 
for instance, because of clause 5 of subsection 1 of § 1064 of the LOA, this fact 
allows the manufacturer to easily prove that it was not at fault regarding the 
damage and still be discharged from liability. 
 
 
5.4. Division of liability in the event of mutual damage 
caused between a self-driving vehicle and  
a conventional vehicle 
Description of the problem. Situations where mutual damage is caused with 
motor vehicles occur in traffic on a daily basis. In Estonia, there is no separate 
legal rule for the division of liability in the event of mutual damage caused by 
motor vehicles. However, the ultimate damages can be adjusted based on a general 
rule that regulates the reduction of damages (ie subsection 1 of § 139 of the LOA), 
which states that where damage is caused in part by circumstances dependent on 
the injured person or due to a risk borne by the injured person, the amount of 
damages is reduced to the extent that such circumstances or risk contributed to 
the damage.338 The LOA is based on the idea according to which persons who 
have caused mutual damage with motor vehicles are (above all, based on § 1057 
of the LOA) fully liable for causing damage to each other in the first step, but the 
damages payable by either one of them can be adjusted on the basis of subsection 1 
                                                                                                 
338  Special problems arise where more than two motor vehicles have been involved in causing 
damage. On such a situation see, for instance, Werner Bachmeier, Verkehrszivilsachen (Munich: 
Verlag C.H.Beck, 2010), pp 72–77. 
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of § 139 of the LOA, ie the damages payable can be reduced because of the share 
of the injured person in causing the damage. 
Under § 139 of the LOA, upon reducing damages, circumstances stemming 
from the operational risk of the motor vehicle as well as circumstances charac-
terising the drivers’ behaviour can be taken into account.339 The reason for taking 
into account the motor vehicle’s operational risk lies in the understanding that 
once a person already engages in traffic using a motor vehicle (ie enters a dan-
gerous situation), alone this fact is a sufficient ground for reducing the damages 
to a certain extent. 340 In the framework of the operational risk, one can distin-
guish between the general operational risk and a special operational risk. 341 The 
general operational risk arises from, for instance, the mass, dimensions, speed of 
movement, roadworthiness and safety equipment of the vehicle, while a special 
operational risk means the objective nature and dangerousness of a specific 
manoeuvre. 342 In addition to the operational risk, it is important to also assess the 
behaviour of the persons who were involved in the accident, above all, whether 
they failed to exercise due care and disregarded the traffic rules.343 Based on the 
operational risk and the behaviour of the drivers, the grounds of reduction of the 
damages of each party involved in the accident are identified in the light of 
subsection 1 of LOA § 139.344 
Regarding self-driving vehicles, the first question is how to assess the size of 
their operational risk. It is possible to build up a case in one or the other direction. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the operational risk of self-driving 
vehicles should be higher than that of conventional vehicles, because there are 
merely driven by a computer program and a human essentially lacks the ability 
to ‘correct’ for the mistakes of the computer program. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that the operational risk of a self-driving vehicle should be considered 
lower, because self-driving vehicles do not cause damage due to human errors 
and refrain from causing damage to the extent possible according to the laws of 
physics. It is clear that in the case of self-driving vehicles, it is not possible to 
take into account the driver’s behaviour (ie whether the driver violated the traffic 
rules) upon reducing the damages. This seems to cause the main problem in the 
light of a fair division of damages. 
                                                                                                 
339  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, paras 29–33. The same criteria are relied 
on upon the division of liability also in German law. See Franz J Säcker and others. Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. Band 2. Schuldrecht (Munich: Verlag C.H.Beck, 
2012), p 528. 
340  Lahe, Luik and Merila (n 42), p 94. 
341  ibid. 
342  SCCC judgment, 19 March 2013, case 3-2-1-7-13, para 31. 
343  ibid, paras 30 and 32. 
344  For further information on different groups of cases see Janno Lahe and Irene Kull, ‘Motor 
Vehicle Operational Risk and Awarding Damages in the Event of a Traffic Accident’ (2014) 
5/1 Journal of European Tort Law, pp 105−120. 
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Statement set forth for defence. In order to divide liability fairly, the 
circumstances of the traffic accident involving a self-driving vehicle should be 
taken into account. Although it is complicated to talk about a ‘driver’ and their 
culpable conduct, one should still assess whether the self-driving vehicle violated 
the traffic rules and the extent to which it affected the occurrence of the traffic 
accident. 
Reasoning. The Estonian Supreme Court has held that where it becomes 
evident that both drivers violated the rules of safe road use established in the TA 
and their involvement in the traffic accident was, taking into account their 
behaviour and the operational risks emanating from the vehicles, more or less 
equal, the court has a ground under subsection 1 of § 139 of the LOA to reduce 
the compensation for material damage to be awarded to the injured person 
presumably by 50%.345 The Supreme Court has also taken the view that where 
the involvement of a person in a traffic accident was higher than that of another, 
it must be taken into account upon reducing the damages based on subsection 1 
of § 139 of the LOA. A possible violation of the TA by the other party can be 
assessed upon determining the size of the claimant’s damages, because the 
significance of the claimant’s own violation depends on it.346 
In a situation where two self-driving vehicles have mutually caused damage, 
the violations of the persons in the vehicles cannot be taken into account. Thus, 
one solution would be, since the operational risk of the self-driving vehicles is 
presumably equal and the drivers’ behaviour cannot be taken into account, the 
damages payable to each party should, regardless of the circumstances of the 
traffic accident, always be reduced by 50%. This does not seem to be a fair 
solution. Instead, one could argue that also in the event of damage mutually 
caused by self-driving vehicles, an assessment of the circumstances of the traffic 
accident nevertheless remains inevitable upon deciding over the division of 
damages. This means that, instead of the driver’s behaviour, it must be assessed 
whether the self-driving vehicle followed the traffic rules. If the accident can be 
traced back to a programming error in one of the self-driving vehicles as a result 
of which it failed to give way to another vehicle travelling on the priority road, a 
fair solution would be one where the owner of the vehicle that travelled on the 
priority road has all or most of their damage compensated for. Thus, a solution 
according to which, in the context of reduction of damages, the adherence to the 
traffic rules by a self-driving vehicle can be assessed analogously to the behaviour 
of a human driver, is worth considering. 
In a situation where a self-driving vehicle and a conventional vehicle cause 
mutual damage, two alternatives can also be considered upon division of the 
                                                                                                 
345  SCCC judgment, 26 November 2015, case 3-2-1-64-15, para 11. In German case-law, 
liability is also divided equally in the event of an equal operational risk and fault. For further 
information see, for instance, Christian Grüneberg, Haftungsquoten bei Verkehrsunfällen. Eine 
systematische Zusammenstellung veröffentlichter Entscheidungen nach dem StVG. (Munich: 
Verlag C.H.Beck, 2007). 
346  SCCC judgment, 26 November 2015, case 3-2-1-64-15, para 13. 
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damages. One option would be, similarly to the aforementioned, to add to the 
self-driving vehicle an imaginary human driver and ask whether causing damage 
in the particular manner would have qualified as a violation of the traffic rules 
and how serious violation it would have been in comparison with the violation 
committed by the other party. For instance, if the self-driving caused damage in 
a manner that, in the case of a conventional vehicle, would qualify as a serious 
mistake by a human driver (eg drives onto an intersection while the traffic lights 
prohibit it), the damages of the owner of the self-driving vehicle should be 
reduced to zero and the injured person should be fully compensated for the damage 
suffered. If both vehicles ‘violated’ the traffic rules, the impact and relevance of 
each violation regarding the occurrence of the accident should be assessed. The 
alternative would be to deem the operational risk of self-driving vehicles to be 
considerably higher than that of conventional motor vehicles. However, finding 
a fair final solution in an individual case still calls for taking into account the 
circumstances of the accident. 
In summary, it can be noted that even though a fair division of liability upon 
damage caused by a self-driving vehicle calls for certain adjustments to the practice 
of the application of § 139 of the LOA, it is not an overwhelming task in 
developing case-law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Self-driving vehicles are on their way. Traffic accidents caused by self-driving 
vehicles cannot be precluded. While the mandatory motor third party liability 
insurance of self-driving vehicles will certainly be of great importance in the 
Member States, insurance is bound to come into play, above all, where the 
tortfeasor is liable. Thereby the key question in the context of Estonian tort law 
is whether the traditional rules of tort law ensure adequate liability regimes for 
damage caused by self-driving vehicles. The same question is bound to arise in 
all countries where self-driving vehicles are put into circulation. 
The application of fault-based tortious liability towards the owner or possessor 
is considerably affected by the fact of whether damage is caused by a conven-
tional motor vehicle or a self-driving vehicle. Above all, it is expressed in 
difficulties of applying general fault-based tortious liability rules to the owner or 
possessor of a self-driving vehicle. The reason lies in the fact that, usually, the 
owner of a self-driving vehicle cannot be accused of negligence or a breach of 
the duty to maintain safety. The difficulty in applying fault-based liability to 
damage caused by a self-driving vehicle is universal and should concern other 
legal systems besides Estonia. However, there is no reason to consider this an 
insurmountable problem in practice as long as the injured person can claim 
damages based on strict liability or product liability rules. In addition to the owner 
and possessor, all other persons including, for instance, digital service providers 
(backend operators) and users of the self-driving vehicle to whom the provisions 
governing strict liability and product liability cannot be applied, can be held liable 
on the basis of fault-based liability rules. In a situation where they are not subject 
to any statutory duty and damage stems not from a direct act of theirs, fault-based 
liability may arise from a breach of the duty to maintain safety. In the context of 
self-driving vehicles such duty may stem from or be associated with the manu-
facturer’s requirements on the use of the vehicle, monitoring the vehicle and 
maintaining the vehicle. 
Strict liability constitutes the easiest means of obtaining redress for an 
infringement of the injured person’s absolute interests safeguarded under tort law 
because the injured person merely needs to demonstrate the existence and extent 
of damage and a causal link between the damage and the manifestation of a risk 
characteristic of the self-driving vehicle which may be considered a source of 
greater danger. The person who decides where and when the self-driving vehicle 
goes, bears the costs and economic risks arising from the vehicle, and enjoys the 
benefits of use of the vehicle, is considered its direct possessor or at least a person 
controlling the vehicle. 
With the introduction of self-driving vehicles and, more broadly, emerging 
digital technologies, the practical relevance of product liability can be expected 
to rise. The European legislator should follow the example set by Estonia in the 
field of product liability and explicitly include software among products. Since 
self-driving vehicles will be heavily entwined with and reliant on services, greater 
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legal clarity in terms of division of liability between manufacturers and service 
providers would be welcome. Where the self-driving vehicle is designed in such 
a way that damage is not precluded when a service of fundamental importance 
for its safety proves defective, the defectiveness of the vehicle cannot be precluded 
either. Furthermore, the author agrees with those who find that the manufacturer’s 
development risk defence should not be available in cases where it was 
predictable that unforeseen developments might occur. However, contrary to the 
NTF’s recommendation to abolish the development risk defence, the author of 
this dissertation argues that the development risk defence is not always unfair or 
unjustified in the case of self-driving vehicles and should not be eliminated. 
The author supports the NTF’s recommendation according to which, because 
of the ‘informational asymmetry’ between the injured person and the manu-
facturer or service provider, the latter should be required to keep logs and bear at 
least some of the burden of proving causation, fault and defectiveness. Although 
Estonian civil procedure rules are already at least to some extent prepared for the 
attainment of a balanced solution in the event of a civil dispute concerning 
damage caused by self-driving vehicles, the Estonian legislature should consider 
whether to introduce a special rule that would eliminate the need to resort to the 
judicial reversal of the burden of proof based on the good faith principle. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Deliktiline vastutus isejuhtiva sõidukiga  
kahju põhjustamise korral Eesti õiguse näitel 
Väitekirja uurimisese on deliktiõiguslik ehk lepinguväline vastutus isejuhtiva 
sõidukiga kahju põhjustamise korral. Kuigi isejuhtivate sõidukite kontekstis saab 
eeldatavasti olema oluline roll ka lepingu- ja kindlustusõigusel, piirdutakse 
väitekirjas deliktiõiguse käsitlusega. Isejuhtivate sõidukite all peetakse silmas 
täisautomatiseeritud juhita mootorsõidukeid, milles viibivad isikud on pelgalt 
reisijad ning mis tulevad toime kõigi dünaamilise juhtimisülesande aspektidega 
kõigi tee- ja keskkonnatingimuste korral, millega tuleb toime ka inimene. 
 
Kuna tegu on nii tehniliselt kui ka õiguslikult kiiresti muutuva valdkonnaga, 
põhineb väitekiri autori avaldatud neljal õigusteaduslikul artiklil: 
• „Delictual Liability for Damage Caused by Fully Autonomous Vehicles: the 
Estonian Perspective“, milles analüüsitakse Eesti õiguse näitel, kas delikti-
õiguslikku vastutust mõjutab sõiduki isejuhtivus ning kui mõjutab, siis kas 
asjaomased erinevused on olulised ja kas deliktiõiguse norme on neist eri-
nevustest lähtuvalt vaja muuta; 
• „Liability of a Manufacturer of Fully Autonomous and Connected Vehicles 
under the Product Liability Directive“, milles uuritakse, kas direktiiv 
85/374/EMÜ, mis reguleerib tootjate vastutust puudustega toodete eest, on 
isejuhtivate sõidukite kasutuselevõtuga kaasnevateks väljakutseteks valmis 
või vajab see muutmist. Artiklis analüüsitakse muu hulgas termini „toode” 
määratluse relevantsust isejuhtivate sõidukite omadusi silmas pidades, ise-
juhtivate sõidukite puuduse tuvastamise kaalutlusi, tootjana käsitletavate isi-
kute ringi ja toote arendusriski tähendust; 
• „What Safety Are We Entitled to Expect of Self-driving Vehicles?“, milles 
analüüsitakse ohutuse taset, mida Euroopa Liidu riikides elavatel inimestel 
(või ka juriidilistel isikutel) on õigus tootjavastutuse kontekstis isejuhtivatelt 
sõidukitelt oodata; 
• „Strict Liability for Damage Caused by Self-driving Vehicles: the Estonian 
Perspective“, milles analüüsitakse deliktiõigusliku vastutuse võimalikke eri-
nevusi tavasõiduki ja isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjustamise korral ning 
selgitatakse välja, kas isejuhtivate sõidukite kasutuselevõttu silmas pidades on 
vaja Eestis õiguses muuta riskivastutust reguleerivaid norme. 
 
Ehkki täielikult isejuhtivaid sõidukeid autorile teadaolevalt veel turule lastud ei 
ole ja puudub ka spetsiaalselt neile mõeldud taristu, saab neid siiski hüpoteeti-
liselt asetada olemasolevasse õigusruumi ja püüda hinnata, milliseid probleeme 
see lepinguvälise vastutuse vallas kaasa toob. Väitekirjas on kasutatud selleks 
dogmaatilist uurimismeetodit. Kuna võlaõigusseaduse (VÕS) asjaomaste sätete 
väljatöötamisel on võetud eeskuju ka Saksa tsiviilseadustikust, on võlaõigus-
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seaduse sätete analüüsimisel kasutatud täpsustava võrdlusmaterjalina ka asja-
omaseid Saksa õigusnorme, kohtupraktikat ja õigusteadlaste arvamusi. Delikti-
lise üldvastutuse ja riskivastuse analüüsimisel keskendutakse asjakohasele Eesti 
õigusele ja Riigikohtu praktikale. Erinevalt deliktilisest üldvastutusest ja riski-
vastutusest on tootjavastutuse valdkond Euroopa Liidus põhiosas eelkõige direk-
tiivi 85/374/EMÜ kaudu ühtlustatud. Seda direktiivi võrreldakse töös võlaõigus-
seadusega. Olulise tõlgendamisallikana on seejuures kasutatud Euroopa Liidu 
Kohtu asjassepuutuvaid lahendeid. Autorile teadaolevalt Riigikohtu praktika 
tootjavastutuse vallas puudub. 
Eeldatavasti ei saa isejuhtiva sõidukiga tekitatud kahju puhul enamasti rääkida 
inimese vahetust teost kui selle kahju põhjusest, sest inimese asemel kasutatakse 
sõiduki juhtimiseks sobivat riist- ja tarkvara, sh inimese vahetu sekkumiseta 
osutatavaid teenuseid. Eesti seadusandja peab ka tarkvara tooteks, kuid ei saa 
eirata, et tarkvaraga varustamine võib olla teatavas ulatuses ka teenus. Toodete ja 
teenuste läbipõimumine tähendab ka erinevate vastutusrežiimide läbipõimumist. 
Seetõttu võib isejuhtivate sõidukite kontekstis prognoosida kahjutekitaja vastu-
tusele võtmisel näiteks tootjavastutuse regulatsiooni osatähtsuse suurenemist. 
Isejuhtivate sõidukitega kahju põhjustamise puhul kerkib esile – erinevalt tava-
sõidukitega kahju põhjustamisest – muu hulgas ka digitaalsete teenuste osutajate 
vastutuse küsimus. Seejuures ei saa välistada, et tootjal või teenusepakkujal 
saabki olema isejuhtiva sõiduki liikumise ja sellega seonduvate riskide üle kõige 
suurem kontroll. 
Alljärgnevalt esitatakse kokkuvõte töös käsitletavatest probleemidest, kaitsta-
vatest väidetest ja nende põhjendustest. 
Väitekirja üldine eesmärk on selgitada välja, kas ja millises ulatuses mõjutab 
deliktiõigusliku vastutuse kohaldamist mootorsõiduki isejuhtivus ja mil määral 
tingib see asjaomaste õigusnormide muutmise vajaduse. Töö eesmärgi saavuta-
miseks uuris autor alltoodud uurimisküsimusi. 
 
 
• Kas ja millistel alustel saab kannatanu maksma panna delikti üldkoos-
seisule tuginevat nõuet isejuhtiva sõidukiga põhjustatud kahju hüvita-
miseks? 
Võlaõigusseaduse § 1043 kohaselt peab teisele isikule (kannatanu) õigusvastaselt 
kahju tekitanud isik (kahju tekitaja) kahju hüvitama, kui ta on kahju tekitamises 
süüdi või vastutab kahju tekitamise eest vastavalt seadusele. Sarnaselt Saksa 
tsiviilkoodeksi (BGB) deliktilisele üldvastutusele tuvastatakse see ka Eestis 
kolmes etapis. Reeglina kontrollitakse esmalt objektiivset teokoosseisu ehk kahju 
tekitaja tegu, kannatanu õigushüvede kahjustamist ja nendevahelise põhjusliku 
seose olemasolu. Teises etapis kontrollitakse õigusvastasust ja kolmandas kahju 
tekitaja süü olemasolu. Kuna isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjustamisel on kõik 
sõidukis viibivad isikud reisijad, võib osutuda problemaatiliseks nii kahju põhjus-
tamise õigusvastasuse kui ka kahju põhjustaja süü kui delikti üldkoosseisu eel-
duste tuvastamine. 
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Autor leiab, et kannatanu nõude maksmapaneku võimalikkust deliktilise üld-
vastutuse alusel mõjutab oluliselt see, kas kahju on talle tekitatud tavalise 
mootorsõidukiga või isejuhtiva sõidukiga. Kahju tekitaja süü või käibekohustuse 
rikkumise puudumise tõttu ei saa kannatanu üldjuhul maksma panna delikti üld-
koosseisul tuginevat nõuet isejuhtiva sõidukiga põhjustatud kahju hüvitamiseks. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjusta-
mise puhul võib kahju põhjustaja teona käsitada isejuhtiva sõidukiga liikluses 
osalemist. Kannatanu õigushüveks, mida kahjustatakse, saab olla eelkõige kanna-
tanu elu (VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 1), tervis (VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 2) või omand (VÕS 
§ 1045 lg 1 p 5). Sama kehtib ka tavalise mootorsõidukiga kahju põhjustamise 
korral. Ka põhjusliku seose tuvastamine kahju tekitaja teo ja kannatanu kahju 
vahel ei ole isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjustamisel kuidagi eripärane. 
Deliktilise üldvastutuse eelduste kontrollimise teises etapis tehakse kindlaks 
kahju tekitamise õigusvastasus. Võlaõigusseaduse § 1045 lg 2 p-d 1–4 sätestavad 
olukorrad, milles kahju tekitamise õigusvastasus on välistatud (nt nõusolek või 
hädakaitse). Tavapärase mootorsõiduki juhi poolt kahju tekitamise korral saab 
õigusvastasus tuleneda alternatiivselt kas kaitsenormi rikkumisest (VÕS § 1045 
lg 1 p 7 koostoimes liiklusseaduses sisalduva kaitsenormiga) või põhineda õigus-
vastaste kahju tekitamise juhtude üldisel kataloogil (VÕS § 1045 lg 1 p 1 – surma 
põhjustamine; § 1045 lg 1 p 2 – kehavigastuse või tervisekahjustuse põhjusta-
mine; § 1045 lg 1 p 5 – omandi rikkumine). 
Janno Lahe ja Tambet Tampuu on märkinud, et absoluutselt kaitstavate õigus-
hüvede (s.o inimelu, tervis, omand) rikkumise korral on õigusvastasuse aluseks 
kahjulik tagajärg ja et seejuures pole oluline, kas kahju tekitaja rikkus ka mingit 
kohustust, sest õigusvastasus tuleb tagajärje ebaõigsusest. Õigusvastasuse 
tuvastamine ainuüksi kahjuliku tagajärje alusel ei ole siiski eranditeta reegel ka 
absoluutselt kaitstavate õigushüvede kahjustamise korral. Nimelt, kui absoluut-
selt kaitstavat õigushüve on kahjustatud tegevusetusega või on kahjulik tagajärg 
kahju põhjustaja käitumise kaugem tulem, tuleb kahju põhjustaja vastutusele 
võtmiseks leida siiski kohustus, mida viimane on rikkunud. Selleks võib olla 
õigusnormist tulenev kohustus või ka üldine käibekohustus. 
Kui tavalise mootorsõidukiga kahju põhjustamise korral on kahju põhjusta-
mise õigusvastasus üldjuhul tuletatav kannatanu õigushüve kahjustamisest (või 
loomulikult alternatiivselt lisaks ka liiklusseaduse sätete rikkumisest), siis ise-
juhtiva sõidukiga kahju tekitamise korral on see pigem küsitav. Võiks öelda, et 
näiteks olukorras, kus isik viibib isejuhtivas sõidukis, mis põhjustab liiklusõnne-
tuse, pole see isik oma aktiivse käitumisega kannatanu õigushüve kahjustanud. 
Sellisel juhul ei saa ka kahju tekitamist sõidukis viibinud isiku poolt pidada õigus-
vastaseks ainuüksi kannatanu õigushüve kahjustamise tõttu. Tema vastutusele 
võtmiseks oleks seega tarvis tuvastada kohustus, mida isik on rikkunud. Eeldus-
likult ei saa selleks olla õigusnormist (liiklusseadus) tulenev kohustus. Seega saab 
vastava isiku vastutus põhineda eelkõige üldise käibekohustuse rikkumisel. 
Eesti kohtupraktika järgi on üldine käibekohustus ja süü element omavahel 
läbi põimunud, mistõttu vastates küsimusele, kas isik on rikkunud üldist käibe-
kohustust, tuleb sisuliselt hinnata, kas isik on olnud väliselt, s.t objektiivselt 
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hooletu. Saksa õiguse kontekstis on leitud, et isejuhtiva sõiduki tehnika „pime 
usaldamine” pika aja vältel võib endast kujutada käibekohustuse rikkumist. Eesti 
õiguse alusel võiks selle seisukohaga nõustuda osaliselt. Isejuhtiva sõiduki 
omanikule või valdajale võib ette heita üldise käibekohustuse rikkumist ehk 
juhul, kui sõidukit nõutavatesse hooldustesse ei viida või ilmnenud vigadele ei 
reageerita. Enamat ei tohiks „käive” omanikult või valdajalt üldjuhul nõuda. 
Kahju põhjustaja süü on deliktilise üldvastutuse kolmas põhieeldus. Süü 
vormid on hooletus, raske hooletus ja tahtlus (VÕS § 104 lg 2): hooletus on 
käibes vajaliku hoole järgimata jätmine (VÕS § 104 lg 3); raske hooletus on 
käibes vajaliku hoole olulisel määral järgimata jätmine (VÕS § 104 lg 4); tahtlus 
on õigusvastase tagajärje soovimine võlasuhte tekkimisel, täitmisel või lõpeta-
misel (VÕS § 104 lg 5). Olgu lisatud, et Eesti deliktiõiguses tuleb kannatanu süüd 
hinnata lisaks veel kahju põhjustaja isikust lähtuvalt. Võlaõigusseaduse § 1050 
lg 2 sätestab, et isiku süü hindamisel arvestatakse muu hulgas tema olukorda, 
vanust, haridust, teadmisi, võimeid ja muid isiklikke omadusi. Võlaõigusseaduse 
§ 1050 lg-st 1 tuleneb, et kahju põhjustaja süüd eeldatakse. See tähendab, et kahju 
põhjustaja, kes soovib vastutusest vabaneda, peab ise tõendama oma süü puudu-
mist. 
Isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjustamise korral võib just süü (või käibekohus-
tuse rikkumise) puudumine olla põhjuseks, miks deliktilist üldvastutust isesõitva 
sõiduki omaniku või valdaja (või ka isiku, kes lihtsalt viibis liiklusõnnetuse ajal 
isesõitvas sõidukis) suhtes kohaldada ei saa. Näiteks juhul, kui isejuhtiv sõiduk 
põhjustab juhtimisprogrammi vea tõttu kahju kolmandale isikule, ei saa üldjuhul 
väita, et selle sõiduki omanik või valdaja oleks jätnud järgimata käibes nõutava 
hoolsuse või rikkunud käibekohustust. Nagu ülal märgitud, võib olukord olla 
teistsugune, kui sõiduk on jäetud nõuetekohaselt hooldamata. Sellest hoolimata 
võib järeldada, et üldjuhul pole kannatanul, kellele isejuhtiv sõiduk on kahju 
põhjustanud, mõistlik ega perspektiivikas esitada nõuet sõiduki omaniku või 
valdaja vastu deliktilise üldvastutuse sätete alusel. 
Eeltoodust võib järeldada, et kannatanu võimalust panna oma nõue maksma 
deliktilise üldvastutuse alusel mõjutab oluliselt see, kas kahju on talle tekitatud 
tavapärase mootorsõidukiga või isejuhtiva sõidukiga. Kirjeldatud erisus ei tekita 
sügavat praktilist probleemi juhul, kui kannatanu võimalused saada kahju hüvita-
mist on piisavalt tagatud muude instrumentidega, eelkõige riskivastutuse ja 
tootjavastutuse normidega. 
 
 
• Kas ja millistel kaalutlustel peaks Eesti seadusandja kehtestama liiklus-
seaduses eraldi deliktiõigusliku kaitsenormi seoses isejuhtivate sõidukitega? 
Saksamaa Liitvabariik on juba lisanud oma liiklusseadusesse (Straßenverkehrs-
gesetz (StVG)) isejuhtivaid sõidukeid reguleerivad sätted. StVG § 1a lg 2 loetleb 
tehnilised seadmed, mille olemasolu teeb sõidukist kõrge isejuhtivuse tasemega 
või täielikult isejuhtiva mootorsõiduki. StVG § 1a lõikest 4 tuleneb, et mootor-
sõiduki juhiks loetakse ka isikut, kes kõrge isejuhtivuse tasemega või täieliku 
isejuhtivuse režiimi sisse lülitab ja seda sõiduki juhtimiseks kasutab, isegi kui ta 
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ise vahetult sõidukit ei juhi. StVG §-st 1b tuleneb, et kõrge või täieliku ise-
juhtivuse režiimi kasutamisel peab juht siiski jääma tähelepanelikuks ja olema 
valmis viivitamata juhtimise üle võtma, kui süsteem palub tal seda teha või ta ise 
mõistab, et kõrge või täieliku isejuhtivuse režiimi kasutamiseks vajalikud eel-
dused pole täidetud. Tekib küsimus, kas Eesti peaks Saksamaa eeskujul sätestama 
oma liiklusseaduses sarnase deliktiõigusliku kaitsenormi, mis kohustaks isikut 
olema igal ajal valmis isejuhtiva sõiduki juhtimist üle võtma. 
Autor leiab, et Saksa liiklusseaduse lahendust ei ole vaja Eestis ilmtingimata 
üle võtta, sest tegu on pigem vahelahendusega 1968. aasta Viini teeliikluse kon-
ventsioonist tuleneva juhi olemasolu nõude tõttu, mis ei arvesta isejuhtivate 
sõidukite eripäraga. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Saksa lähenemisviis tähendab tootjate 
jaoks seda, et neil tuleb ka täielikult isejuhtiv sõiduk disainida nii, et sellel oleks 
rool ja muud juhtimisseadmed ning liikluses saaks see osaleda üksnes juhiloaga 
inimese abil. Sarnaselt tavasõidukitele ja kõrge isejuhtivuse tasemega sõidukitele 
peaks ka isejuhtivas sõidukis olema juht, kes istub esiistmel ning kelle jaoks on 
olemas juhtseadmed, ekraanid ja näidikud, mis võimaldavad sõidukit ohutult 
juhtida. Samuti järeldub, et täielikult isejuhtiv sõiduk ei tohi sõita tühjalt. 
Saksa lähenemisviis lähtub üksnes poolautomatiseeritud sõidukite eripärast. 
Täisautomatiseeritud ehk isejuhtivate sõidukite põhimõtteliseks erinevuseks 
nendega võrreldes ongi see, et inimesel pole üheski olukorras vaja neid juhtida ja 
seega pole ka vaja tähelepanelikuks jääda ega juhtimist üle võtta. Saksa lähe-
nemisviisi kasutuselevõtt Eestis paneks Eesti isejuhtivate sõidukite arendajad 
ebasoodsasse olukorda. 
Saksa seadusandja valik võtab isejuhtivatelt sõidukitelt ära nende peamised 
eelised ja müügiargumendid (mh nt inimlike eksimuste vähendamine, puuetega 
inimeste juurdepääsu suurendamine liiklusvahenditele). Ühtlasi põlistab see 
sõidukite praeguse disaini, mis lähtub juhi olemasolust. Saksa õiguses seadus-
tatud lahendus võib kaasa tuua uusi probleeme, mis on seotud sõidukilt juhtimise 
ülevõtmise tagajärgedega ja inimese-masina vahelise suhtluse arvesse võtmisega 
vastutuse tuvastamisel. Kui juht on juba kord lülitanud sisse isejuhtiva režiimi, 
võtab käsitsi juhtimisele üleminek ikkagi teatava aja, mis võib olla õnnetuse 
vältimiseks liiga pikk. Samas juht ikkagi vastutab ning on kohustatud jääma valv-
saks ja olema valmis silmapilkselt juhtimist üle võtma. Kui isejuhtivuse 1. kuni 
4. taseme ehk osalise isejuhtivuse puhul on Saksa seadusandja kehtestatud nõu-
ded mõistetavad, siis 5. taseme ehk täielikult isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul mitte, 
sest need ei arvesta täielikult isejuhtiva sõiduki olemusliku erisusega – kõik 
sõidukis viibivad isikud on reisijad. Ilma kõnealuste säteteta saaks täielikult 
automatiseeritud sõidukeid disainida selliseks, et neil puuduvad salongis juhi 
jaoks mõeldud juhtimisseadmed. 
Saksa lähenemisviisi põhjuseks võib pidada asjaolu, et Saksamaa on sarnaselt 
teistele Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikidele ratifitseerinud 1968. aasta Viini tee-
liikluse konventsiooni, mis – hoolimata täiendustest – ei võimalda juhita maan-
teesõidukeid kasutusele võtta. Seetõttu võib olla tegu ajutise lahendusega kuni 
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sõidukite täielik isejuhtivus tehnoloogiliselt saavutatakse ja konventsiooni 
muudetakse. 
Kui Eesti soovib liiklusseaduses täpsustada juhi kohustusi kõrge isejuhtivuse 
tasemega sõidurežiimi kasutamise korral, siis see võib olla iseenesest põhjendatud 
samm. Samas, täielikult isejuhtivate sõidukite olemusega ei haaku sõidukis viibiva 
isiku kohustus olla igal ajahetkel valmis juhtimist üle võtma. 
 
 
• Kuidas mõjutab riskivastutuse kohaldamise eeldusi ja kohustatud sub-
jektide ringi see, et kahju on põhjustatud isejuhtiva sõidukiga? 
Riskivastutus on süüst sõltumatu vastutus suurema ohu allikaga põhjustatud 
kahju eest. Nagu on märkinud H. Koziol, on see vastutus ohtlikkuse eest. Võla-
õigusseaduse riskivastutuse sätted on ehitatud üles selliselt, et §-s 1056 sisaldub 
riskivastutuse üldkoosseis ja §-des 1057–1060 riskivastutuse erikoosseisud. Nende 
erikoosseisude hulgas on muu hulgas nähtud ette ka mootorsõiduki otsese valdaja 
riskivastutus: VÕS § 1057 näeb ette, et mootorsõiduki otsene valdaja vastutab 
mootorsõiduki käitamisel tekkinud kahju eest. Tekib küsimus, keda saab lugeda 
isejuhtiva sõiduki otseseks valdajaks. 
Võlaõigusseaduse § 1056 lg 1 näeb ette suurema ohu allika valitseja riski-
vastutuse kahju põhjustamise eest eriti ohtlikule asjale või tegevusele iseloomu-
liku ohu tagajärjel. Sama paragrahvi lõike 2 kohaselt loetakse asja või tegevust 
suurema ohu allikaks, kui selle olemuse või selle juures kasutatud ainete või 
vahendite tõttu võib isegi asjatundjalt oodatava hoolsuse rakendamise korral 
tekkida suur kahju või võib kahju tekkida sageli. Kui asjale või tegevusele sarnase 
ohu allika puhul on seadusega juba ette nähtud vastutus, sõltumata allikat valit-
senud isiku süüst, eeldatakse, et asi või tegevus ongi suurema ohu allikas. Ise-
juhtivate sõidukite kontekstis saab küsida, keda võib käsitada isejuhtiva sõiduki 
kui suurema ohu allika valitsejana. Kokkuvõtvalt on küsimus eelkõige selles, 
keda saab riskivastutuse normide alusel võtta vastutusele isejuhtiva sõiduki käita-
misel tekkinud kahju eest. 
Autor leiab, et riskivastutuse rakendamise aspektist ei ole vahet, kas kahju on 
tekitatud tavalise sõidukiga või isejuhtiva sõidukiga. Isejuhtiv sõiduk on mootor-
sõiduk VÕS § 1057 mõttes ja suurema ohu allikas VÕS § 1056 lg 2 mõttes. Eri-
sused võivad tekkida kohustatud isikute osas ja need sõltuvad sellest, kas ise-
juhtivaid sõidukeid hakatakse omama nagu tavasõidukeid või hakkavad ette-
võtjad nendega üksnes transporditeenust osutama. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Riskivastutuse korral ei ole olulised 
kahju tekitaja tegu ega süü. Määrav on, kas kahjulik tagajärg on põhjustatud asjale 
või tegevusele iseloomuliku riski realiseerumisest. Seega ei ole mootorsõiduki 
käitaja kui suurema ohu allika valitseja vastutusele võtmisel tähtis, kas ta rikkus 
liikluses osaledes liikluseeskirja või mitte või kas ta tegi seda süüliselt. Ka Eesti 
Riigikohus on leidnud, et suurema ohu allikaga kahju põhjustamine tähendab 
suurema ohu allikale iseloomuliku riski, s.o suurema ohu allikale kui asjale või 
tegevusele iseloomuliku kõrgendatud ohu realiseerumise tagajärjel kahju 
tekkimist. 
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Isejuhtivat sõidukit tuleb pidada mootorsõidukiks VÕS § 1057 mõttes. Seega 
on riskivastutuse rakendumine võimalik ka isejuhtivate sõidukitega põhjustatud 
kahju korral. Võlaõigusseaduse §-i 1057 kõrval on isejuhtiva sõidukiga kahju 
tekitamisel võimalik rakendada lisaks ka VÕS §-s 1056 sätestatud riskivastutuse 
üldkoosseisu. 
Kohtutel on laialdane diskretsioon, millist asja või tegevust selle sätte järgi 
suurema ohu allikaks pidada. Isejuhtivaid sõidukeid võiks siiski üsna ilmselt 
pidada suurema ohu allikaiks. Omaette küsimus on, kas juhi puudumine ise-
juhtivas sõidukis siiski suurendab või hoopis vähendab selle ohtlikkust. Kui juht 
ei ole igal ajahetkel valmis sõiduki juhtimist n-ö üle võtma, et nt arvutiprogrammi 
vigu „parandada“, võiks juhi puudumist pidada ohtlikkust suurendavaks teguriks. 
Teisalt leiab põhisosa liiklusõnnetustest aset just inimlike eksimuste tõttu, mis-
tõttu võiks juhi puudumist pidada seetõttu ka hoopis ohtlikkust vähendavaks 
asjaoluks. Ei saa välistada, et isejuhtivate sõidukite ohutus jõuab millalgi tase-
mele, kus õnnetused on pea täielikult välistatud. Sel juhul poleks ehk põhjust 
isejuhtivaid sõidukeid ka enam suurema ohu allikateks pidada. Seega riskivastu-
tuse kohaldamise eelduste tasandil ei esine selliseid aspekte, mis ei võimaldaks 
isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul (sarnaselt traditsiooniliste sõidukitega) VÕS §-i 1057 
või ka §-i 1056 kohaldada. 
Riskivastutuse rakendamise kontekstis tekib küsimus, keda ikkagi saab vastu-
tusele võtta riskivastutuse sätete alusel. Nagu ülal märgitud, saab VÕS §-i 1057 
alusel võtta vastutusele üksnes mootorsõiduki otsest valdajat. Asjaõigusseaduse 
§ 33 lg 1 sätestab, et valdaja on isik, kelle tegeliku võimu all asi on. Sama parag-
rahvi lõige 2 sätestab, et isik, kes valdab asja rendi-, üüri-, hoiu-, pandi- või muu 
selletaolise suhte alusel, mis annab talle õiguse teise isiku asja ajutiselt vallata, 
on otsene, teine isik aga kaudne valdaja. Riigikohtu praktika järgi on VÕS §-i 1057 
järgi vastutav eelkõige isik, kellel on tegelik võim (olgu seaduslikul alusel või 
mitte) mootorsõiduki üle, ehk isik, kes sõidukit kontrollib, st otsustab, kuhu ja 
millal sõiduk liigub, kannab sõidukiga seotud kulusid ja majanduslikke riske ning 
saab selle kasutamisest kasutuseeliseid. Näiteks Saksa StVG § 7 kontekstis saab 
mootorsõiduki pidajaks (Fahrzeughalter) pidada füüsilist või juriidilist isikut, 
kes omab sõiduki suhtes käsutusõigust ja kes seda oma äranägemise järgi 
kasutab. Mootorsõiduki pidaja kannab sõidukiga seotud kulud ja saab vastu 
sõidukist tuleneva kasu. 
Vastus küsimusele, keda saab VÕS § 1057 alusel vastutusele võtta, sõltub seega 
olulisel määral sellest, kuidas isejuhtivaid sõidukeid reaalselt kasutama haka-
takse. Kui tulevikus peaks isejuhtivate sõidukite ostmine-müümine toimuma 
samal viisil nagu traditsiooniliste sõidukite puhul praegu, siis üldjuhul saab ise-
juhtiva sõiduki omandanud isik olema ka selle otseseks valdajaks. Samas on aga 
ka võimalik, et isejuhtivate sõidukitega hakkavad äriühingud osutama lihtsalt 
transporditeenust ja üksikisikud neid ei omanda. Selline teenus saab sarnaneda 
tavapärasele taksoteenusele. Juhul, kui sellise transporditeenuse osutamise ajal 
põhjustab isejuhtiv sõiduk liiklusõnnetuse, tekib küsimus, kes oli õnnetuse 
toimumise hetkel selle sõiduki otsene valdaja. Võiks väita, et kuna ka tradit-
sioonilise taksoteenuse klient ei muutu teenuse saamise ajal sõiduki otseseks 
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valdajaks, ei juhtu seda ka isejuhtiva sõiduki puhul. See tähendab, et teenust saav 
isik kahju põhjustamise eest VÕS §-i 1057 alusel ei vastuta. Vastutav on eelkõige 
transporditeenust osutav äriühing. Seejuures ei ole oluline, kas vastav äriühing 
on selle kahju põhjustanud sõiduki omanik, või valdab seda ta seda sõidukit nt 
üürilepingu alusel. Viimasel juhul on sõiduki omanik selle sõiduki kaudseks 
valdajaks, kelle suhtes VÕS § 1057 samuti ei kohaldu. 
Mootorsõiduki juht ei ole alati siiski käsitatav sõiduki otsese valdajana. Nimelt 
sätestab AÕS § 33 lg 3, et valdajaks ei ole isik, kes teostab tegelikku võimu asja 
üle teise isiku korralduste kohaselt tema majapidamises või ettevõttes. Selliseks 
nn valduse teenijaks on nt ettevõtja töötaja, kes täidab tööandja sõidukiga töö-
andja poolt antud ülesandeid. Põhimõtteliselt võib ka isejuhtiva sõiduki puhul 
olla nii, et töötaja täidab sellega teatud tööülesandeid. Sellisel juhul ei ole vastava 
töötaja suhtes kohaldatav ka VÕS § 1057. Samas võib valduse teenija vastutada 
siiski süül põhineva deliktilise vastutuse sätete järgi. See ei pruugi siiski osutuda 
praktikas realiseeritavaks, sest üldjuhul langeks töötaja vastutus ära tema süü 
puudumise tõttu. 
Nagu eespool märgitud, sisaldab VÕS lisaks ka nn riskivastutuse üldkoos-
seisu. Tegemist on paindliku lahendusega, mis võimaldab kohtutel operatiivselt 
„ajaga kaasas käia“, lugedes suurema ohu allikaks nt uusi tehnoloogiaid, mille 
ohutus ei ole veel piisavat tõendust leidnud. Riskivastutuse üldkooseisu alusel 
saab võtta vastutusele suurema ohu allika valitsejat. Seejuures tuleks märkida, et 
võlaõigusseaduse § 1056 lg-s 1 nimetatud suurema ohu allika valitseja mõiste ei 
kattu mootorsõiduki otsese valdaja mõistega VÕS § 1057 järgi. Seega ei ole välis-
tatud, et isejuhtivas sõidukis viibiv isik (nt töötaja), kes ei kvalifitseeru mootor-
sõiduki otseseks valdajaks VÕS § 1057 järgi, on samas siiski käsitatav suurema 
ohu allika valitsejana VÕS § 1056 lg 1 mõttes. Kuigi Eesti kohtupraktikas ei ole 
see seisukoht veel otsest kinnitust leidnud, annab selliseks aruteluks alust Riigi-
kohtu lahend, kus kohus leidis, et suurema ohu allika valitsejaks § 1056 lg 1 järgi 
võib pidada hobusega sõitvat isikut, kes samal ajal ei ole loomapidaja VÕS 
§ 1060 mõttes. Samamoodi ei peaks tingimata olema välistatud käsitada suurema 
ohu allika valitsejana sõiduki omanikku, kes ei ole selle otsene valdaja. Vastav 
küsimus võib tõusetuda nt otsese valdaja maksejõuetuse korral. Eeltoodud aru-
telust suurema ohu allika valitseja mõiste üle ei tohiks siiski teha järeldust, et 
isejuhtiva sõiduki valitsejaks VÕS §-i 1056 mõttes saaks pidada ka transpordi-
teenust saavat isikut. Ajutise teenuse saamine ei anna isikule mingit õigust ega 
võimalust isejuhtivat sõidukit valitseda. 
 
 
• Millistel juhtudel tuleks viga isejuhtiva sõiduki tarkvaras või kasu-
tatavates digitaalsetes teenustes lugeda isejuhtiva sõiduki puuduseks? 
Võlaõigusseaduse § 1063 lg 1 kohaselt loetakse tooteks iga vallasasja, isegi kui 
see on osaks teisest vallasasjast või on saanud kinnisasja osaks, samuti elektrit ja 
arvutitarkvara. Kui 30–40 aastat tagasi olid mittekehalise või teenuse kompo-
nendiga tooted keskmise tarbija jaoks veel võrdlemisi uus nähtus, siis tänapäeva 
tooted on üha enam läbipõimunud tarkvara ja teenustega. Tänu tarkvara, riistvara 
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ja teenuste kombineerimisele saab isejuhtivus üleüldse võimalikuks. Tarkvara 
asendab inimese otsustusmehhanisme, samas kui andurid asendavad tema meeli. 
Võlaõigusseaduse § 1063 lg 1 aluseks olevas direktiivi 85/374/EMÜ artiklis 2 
arvutitarkvara ja teenuseid sõnaselgelt ei nimetata. Ainus mittekehaline toode, 
millele direktiivi artikkel 2 viitab, on elekter. Seega VÕS § 1063 lg 1 laiendab 
direktiiviga võrreldes toote mõistet. Teenustele VÕS § 1063 lg 1 ega direktiivi 
85/374/EMÜ artikkel 2 ei viita. 
Viga isejuhtiva sõidukit tarkvaras või kasutatavas teenuses võib aga viia ise-
juhtiva sõidukiga kahju põhjustamiseni. Tarkvaravea tõttu võib isejuhtiv sõiduk 
valesti tõlgendada ümbritsevas keskkonnas toimuvat või reageerida sellele eba-
adekvaatselt ja seeläbi põhjustada liiklusõnnetuse. Tarkvara turvanõrkust ära 
kasutades võib kolmas isik isejuhtiva sõiduki „üle võtta“ ja sellega tahtlikult 
kahju tekitada. Isejuhtiva sõiduki tarkvara turvalisuse tagamine on olemuselt 
pidev protsess, mis kestab seni kuni sõidukit kasutatakse. 
Isejuhtiv sõiduk ei saa eeldatavasti hakkama ka muude oluliste digitaalsete 
teenusteta: ta peab muu hulgas suutma „suhelda“ teiste liiklejate ja liiklusmärki-
dega, olema kursis ilmastikutingimustega, ümbruskonnas orienteeruma, teadma 
oma asukohta ümbritseva suhtes ülisuure täpsusega. Kui mõni taoline oluline 
teenus ei toimi, ei pruugi sõiduk kohaselt funktsioneerida. Kui isejuhtiv sõiduk 
disainitakse selliselt, et selle ohutu funktsioneerimine sõltub teatavast teenusest 
(nt operaatorteenus, liikluskorraldusteenus, lokaalse positsioneerimise teenus 
vms), ent selles teenuses esineb tõrge või teenus annab isejuhtivale sõidukile 
eksitavat sisendit, võib sõiduk samuti valesti tõlgendada ümbritsevas keskkonnas 
toimuvat või reageerida sellele ebaadekvaatselt ja seeläbi kahju põhjustada. 
Autor leiab, et kui kahju põhjuseks on viga isejuhtiva sõiduki tarkvaras või 
kasutatavates digitaalsetes teenustes, tuleb seda lugeda isejuhtiva sõiduki kui 
toote puuduseks. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Puudusega toote legaaldefinitsioon 
on esitatud VÕS § 1063 lg-s 2. Üldjoontes on toode puudusega, kui see ei ole 
ohutu määral, mida isik on õigustatud ootama. Samas tuleb arvestada kõiki asja-
olusid, muu hulgas näiteks toote avalikkusele esitlemise viisi ja tingimusi, toote 
kasutusviisi, mida kannatanu võis mõistlikult eeldada, ning toote turule laskmise 
aega. Kõnealuses sättes esitatu puhul pole tegu ammendava loeteluga. Võla-
õigusseaduse vastavate sätete aluseks oleva direktiivi 85/374/EMÜ kuuendas 
põhjenduspunktis täpsustatakse, et õigustatud ootuse mõõdupuuks on seejuures 
üldsuse põhjendatud ootused. 
Ohutuse hindamisel peab Euroopa Liidu Kohtu selgituste kohaselt võtma 
arvesse muu hulgas toote otstarvet, objektiivseid omadusi ja selle kasutajarühma 
nõudeid, kellele toode on mõeldud. Arvestades, et isejuhtivas sõidukis reisija 
usaldab sõidukile oma elu ja tervise ning suurema ohu allikana kujutab isejuhtiv 
sõiduk objektiivselt võimalikku ohtu teiste liiklejate elule ja tervisele ning 
ümbritsevale varale, on üldsuse ootused isejuhtivate sõidukite suhtes iseäranis 
kõrged. Tootja vastutust tingiv ohutuse puudumine võibki seisneda erakordselt 
suures kahjus, mida toode isikule põhjustada võib. 
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Isejuhtivate sõidukite avalikkusele esitlemise viisi ja tingimuste, kasutusviisi 
ja turule laskmise teemal saab vaid spekuleerida. Küll aga on võimalik juba praegu 
arutleda isejuhtivate sõidukite otstarbe, objektiivsete omaduste ja võimalike 
kasutajarühmade nõuete üle. Teedel kasutamiseks mõeldud mootorsõidukite 
peamine otstarve on vedada kaupu ja inimesi. Tavasõidukite puhul on selleks vaja 
juhti, kes on läbinud vastava kategooria mootorsõiduki juhtimise koolituse ja kelle 
liiklusalaste teadmiste ja oskuste piisavuses on veendutud (juhiluba). Sellest 
hoolimata on inimlikud eksimused liiklusõnnetuste peamine põhjus. Isejuhti-
vatest sõidukitest loodetakse sellele probleemile lahendust. Seega nende pakutav 
peamine otstarve võiks seisneda kaupade ja inimeste ohutus automatiseeritud 
veos lähtekohast sihtkohta. 
Arvestades füüsikaseadusi, eelkõige sõiduki massi ja liikumiskiirust, kujutab 
ka isejuhtiv sõiduk endast teistele liiklejatele suurema ohu allikat. Kui tava-
sõidukit valitseb juht, siis isejuhtiva sõiduki puhul asendavad juhti arvukad sead-
med ja tarkvara. Võlaõigusseaduse § 1603 lõikes 1 loetakse tooteks sõnaselgelt 
ka tarkvara. Tarkvarale kui mittekehalise tootele on iseloomulik see, et see pole 
algsel kujul reeglina lõplik ja seda on võimalik ja enamasti lausa vajalik täiendada. 
Täiendamise vajalikkus tuleneb sellest, et täiesti veatut tarkvara ei ole võimalik 
valmistada. Samuti areneb tehnoloogia pidevalt, mistõttu algne lahendus võib 
hiljem osutuda mingil põhjusel mittesoovitavaks. Isejuhtiv sõiduk kui toode on 
mõeldud kasutamiseks eeldatavasti pikema perioodi jooksul. Isejuhtiva sõiduki 
tarkvaral on palju kriitilise tähtsusega funktsioone, mille toimimisest sõltub 
sõiduki ohutus. Muu hulgas on väga tähtis sõiduki tarkvara turvalisus, mille taga-
miseks on tarkvara vaja pidevalt täiustada. Tarkvarakomponendi töökorras oleku 
tagamine on seega olemuslikult protsess ehk teisisõnu on selle puhul tegu toote 
sisemise teenuse komponendiga. Kui isejuhtiv sõiduk disainitakse nii, et selle 
ohutu toimimine sõltub lisaks sisemisele teenuse komponendile ka teatud välise 
teenuse kättesaadavusest või toimimisest, tuleb ka selles teenuses esinevat viga 
käsitleda isejuhtiva sõiduki puudusena. Liiklejatel on õigus eeldada, et isejuhtiv 
sõiduk ei põhjusta kahju ka olukorras, kus selle jaoks oluline teenus lakkab toimi-
mast või tõrgub. 
 
 
• Kas ja millises ulatuses on põhjendatud nn arendusriski kaitseklausli 
alusel isejuhtivate sõidukite tootjate vabastamine vastutusest? 
Tootja vastutus puudusega isejuhtiva sõiduki eest ei ole kehtiva õiguse alusel 
absoluutne. Võlaõigusseaduse § 1064 lg 1 p 5 võimaldab vabastada tootja vastu-
tusest, kui ta tõendab, et puudust ei saanud avastada toote turule laskmise ajal 
tollaste teaduslike ja tehniliste teadmiste taseme järgi. Vastav säte on mõeldud 
soodustama innovatsiooni. See säte tuleneb direktiivi 85/374/EMÜ artikli 7 
punktist e. Kui Euroopa seadusandjal oli algne plaan kehtestada tootjavastutus 
riskivastutusena, siis lõpuks lisati direktiivi siiski tootja riskivastutust piirav 
arendusriski kaitse. Sarnaselt enamikule liikmesriikidele on Eesti direktiivi kõne-
aluse sätte riigisisesesse õigusse eranditeta üle võtnud. 
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Isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul on aga mõjutatud isikud (s.o liiklejad) võrreldes 
näiteks ravimite tarbijatega erinevas olukorras. Ka isejuhtivaid sõidukeid aren-
datakse muu hulgas sooviga säästa inimeste elu ja tervist. Kui aga näiteks vakt-
siini manustamine mõjutab otseselt vaid isikut, kellele ravimit või vaktsiini 
manustatakse, ja kaitseb kaudselt ka kolmandaid isikuid patsiendil väljakujuneva 
immuunsuse kaudu, siis isejuhtiv sõiduk on ja jääb oma füüsiliste omaduste ja 
füüsikaseaduste tõttu siiski suurema ohu allikaks, millel on võime kahjustada 
kolmandate isikute (liiklejate) elu, tervist ja vara. 
Arendusriski kaitseklausliga sooviti soodustada innovatsiooni tootjate riskide 
vähendamise teel seeläbi, et tootjad saavad kulukate kindlustuslepingute sõlmi-
mise asemel suunata vabanevaid vahendeid tootearendusse. Klausli vastased aga 
leidsid, et uute toodete väljatöötamisega seotud riskide asetamine kannatanute 
õlule ei ole õiglane. Samas leidub autotootjaid, kes on avalikult teatanud valmis-
olekust kahju korral vabatahtlikult vastutus võtta. 
Autor leiab, et võlaõigusseaduse § 1064 lg 1 p-s 5 sätestatud arendusriski 
kaitseklausel võimaldab põhimõtteliselt vastutuse õiglast jaotamist. Selle erandi 
ulatuslik kohaldamine isejuhtivate sõidukite puuduste korral pole aga mõistlik, 
sest nii kaotaks tootja vastutust reguleeriv õigus uuenduslike tehnoloogiate kon-
tekstis suuresti mõtte. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Täielikult puudusteta tarkvara ei ole 
võimalik teha ja võib oletada, et ei leidu ühtki tarkvaraarendajat, kes oleks nõus 
garanteerima, et tema tarkvara on puudusteta. Ka isejuhtiva sõiduki tarkvaras 
võib olla nõrkusi, mille kaudu pääseb nt kurjategija selle süsteemidele ligi ja saab 
põhjustada märksa mastaapsemat kahju kui üksiku tavasõiduki puhul. Tarkvara 
turvalisuse tagamine on katkematu protsess, mis nõuab pidevat täiendamist ning 
arendus- ja parendustegevust. Turvanõrkus ei pruugi seejuures ilmneda isejuhtiva 
sõiduki turule laskmise ajal, vaid aastaid hiljem. Seda võimalikku stsenaariumi 
silmas pidades võiks arendusriski kaitset ka isejuhtivate sõidukite kontekstis 
lugeda teatud ulatuses põhjendatuks. 
Samas ei saa eirata tõika, et ohud, mis lähtuvad toodetest, mis ei ole käsitleta-
vad suurema ohu allikana, ei ole samaväärsed ohtudega, mis ähvardavad isikuid 
(liiklejaid) suurema ohu allikate (sh isejuhtivate sõidukite) korral. Kui näiteks 
vaktsiini puhul ohustavad selle puudused ennekõike isikut, kellele vaktsiini 
manustatakse, siis puudustega isejuhtiv sõiduk on massi ja liikumiskiirust silmas 
pidades paratamatult teatavaks ohuks ümberkaudsetele liiklejatele – sh neile, kes 
ise sõidukit ei kasuta – ja ümberkaudsele varale. 
Tootja vastutusele võtmisel isejuhtivate sõidukite või nende osade puudustest 
tekkinud kahju korral on võtmeküsimuseks eelkõige see, kuidas rakendada VÕS 
§ 1064 lg 1 p-i 5. Teisisõnu on küsimus selles, kui ulatuslikuks kujunevad tootjate 
võimalused tõendada, et isejuhtiva sõiduki puudust ei saanud avastada tollaste 
teaduslike ja tehniliste teadmiste taseme järgi. Ei saa välistada võimalust, et 
isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul on kohtud varmamad kohaldama VÕS § 1064 lg 1  
p-st 5 tulenevat vastutuse välistust, et tehnoloogia arengut mitte pidurdada. 
Mõistlikuks ei saa aga pidada selle erandi liiga ulatuslikku kohaldamist ise-
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juhtivate sõidukite puuduste korral, sest vastasel korral kaotaks tootja vastutuse 
regulatsioon uuenduslike tehnoloogiate kontekstis suuresti oma mõtte. 
Olgu lisatud, et mitte kõik Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigid pole arendusriski 
klauslit oma õigusesse täies ulatuses ütle võtnud. Nagu eespool osutatud, on ka 
autotootjate seas neid, kes on väljendanud valmisolekut minna täielikult riski-
vastutuse teed ja loobuda arendusriski klauslile tuginemise võimalusest. 
Sarnaselt riskivastutusele on ka tootjavastutuse välistumise korral võimalik 
võtta tootja vastutusele deliktilise üldvastutuse alusel (VÕS § 1061 lg 5). Samas, 
kui tootjavastutuse regulatsioon ei rakendu nt VÕS § 1064 lg 1 p-i 5 tõttu, 
võimaldab see asjaolu tootjal hõlpsalt ka tõendada, et ta ei olnud kahju põhjusta-
mises süüdi ja vastutusest ikkagi vabaneda. 
 
 
• Kuidas hinnata isejuhtivate sõidukite käitamisriski suurust ja jagada 
vastutust isejuhtiva sõiduki osalusel toimunud vastastikuse kahju tekita-
mise (liiklusõnnetuse) korral arvestades, et isejuhtiva sõiduki puhul ei saa 
kahjuhüvitise vähendamisel juhi käitumist arvesse võtta? 
Liikluses tuleb igapäevaselt ette olukordi, kus mootorsõidukitega põhjustatakse 
vastastikku kahju. Eestis puudub eraldi õigusnorm sellises olukorras vastutuse 
jagamise kohta. Samas võimaldab kahjuhüvitist lõpptulemusena korrigeerida 
üldine kahjuhüvitise vähendamise norm VÕS § 139 lg 1, milles sätestatakse, et 
kui kahju tekkis osaliselt kahjustatud isikust tulenevatel asjaoludel või ohu taga-
järjel, mille eest kahjustatud isik vastutab, vähendatakse kahjuhüvitist ulatuses, 
milles need asjaolud või oht soodustasid kahju tekkimist. Võlaõigusseaduses 
lähtutakse niisiis põhimõttest, mille järgi vastutavad – eelkõige VÕS § 1057 
alusel – mootorsõidukitega vastastikku kahju tekitanud isikud üksteisele kahju 
põhjustamise eest täies ulatuses, kuid kummagi osapoole kahjuhüvitist saab 
täpsustada VÕS § 139 lg 1 alusel ehk kahjuhüvitist saab vähendada kannatanu 
osa tõttu kahju tekkimises. 
Võlaõigusseaduse § 139 järgi saab kahjuhüvitise vähendamisel arvestada nii 
mootorsõiduki käitamisriskist lähtuvaid kui ka sõidukijuhtide käitumist ise-
loomustavaid asjaolusid. Mootorsõiduki käitamisriski arvestamine on kantud 
ideest, et kui isik juba asub mootorsõidukiga liikluses liiklema ehk n-ö siseneb 
ohtlikku olukorda, on ainuüksi see piisavaks aluseks kahjuhüvitise teatud ula-
tuses vähendamisel. Käitamisriski raames saab eristada üldist käitamisriski ja 
erilist käitamisriski. Üldine käitamisrisk tuleneb muu hulgas näiteks sõiduki 
massist, mõõtudest, liikumiskiirusest, tehnilisest korrasolekust ja ohutusvarus-
tusest, samas kui eriline käitamisrisk lähtub manöövri objektiivsest iseloomust ja 
ohtlikkusest. Lisaks käitamisriskile on vastutuse jagamisel oluline hinnata ka 
õnnetuses osalenud isikute käitumist, eelkõige käibes vajaliku hoolsuse järgimata 
jätmist ja liiklusnõuete eiramist. Käitamisriski ja juhtide käitumise pinnalt 
pannaksegi kokkuvõttes paika see, millises ulatuses kummagi õnnetuses osaleja 
kahjuhüvitist VÕS § 139 lg 1 alusel vähendada tuleb. 
Isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul tekib esmalt küsimus, kuidas üldse hinnata nende 
käitamisriski suurust. Argumenteerida saab nii ühes kui ka teises suunas. Saab 
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väita, et isejuhtivate sõidukite käitamisrisk peaks olema võrreldes tavasõidu-
kitega suurem, kuna neid juhib üksnes arvutiprogramm ja inimesel sisuliselt 
puudub võimalus arvutiprogrammi vigu „parandada“. Teisalt võib aga ka väita, 
et isejuhtiva sõiduki käitamisriski tuleks lugeda hoopis väiksemaks, sest ise-
juhtivad sõidukid ei põhjusta kahju inimlike eksimuste tõttu ja hoiduvad kahju 
põhjustamisest niivõrd kuivõrd see on füüsikareeglite järgi võimalik. On selge, 
et isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul ei ole kahjuhüvitise vähendamisel võimalik vahe-
tult arvestada juhi käitumisega ehk sellega, kas juht rikkus liiklusnõudeid. See 
näib tekitavat peamise probleemi kahjuhüvitiste õiglasel jagamisel. 
Autor leiab, et vastutuse õiglane jagamine liiklusõnnetuse toimumisel eeldab 
seda, et ka isejuhtiva sõiduki osalusel toimunud õnnetuse korral arvestataks 
liiklusõnnetuse toimumise asjaolusid. Kuna „juhist“ ja tema süülisest käitumisest 
on isejuhtivate sõidukite puhul keeruline rääkida, tuleb nende puhul hinnata siiski 
seda, kas isejuhtiv sõiduk rikkus liiklusnõudeid ja mis ulatuses mõjutas see rikku-
mine liiklusõnnetuse toimumist. 
Autor põhjendab oma väidet järgmiselt. Riigikohus on leidnud, et kui selgub, 
et mõlemad juhid rikkusid liiklusseaduses sätestatud ohutu liiklemise nõudeid ja 
nende osalus liiklusõnnetuses oli – arvestades nii nende käitumist kui ka nende 
sõidukitest lähtuvaid käitamisriske – enam-vähem võrdne, on kohtul alust VÕS 
§ 139 lg 1 järgi vähendada kannatanule mõistetavat varalise kahju hüvitist eel-
duslikult 50%. Riigikohus on samuti asunud seisukohale, et kui ühe liiklusõnne-
tuses osaleja osalus õnnetuse põhjustamises oli suurem kui teisel, tuleb seda VÕS 
§ 139 lg 1 alusel hüvitise vähendamisel arvestada. Ühe osapoole võimalikku 
liiklusseaduse rikkumist saab teise osapoole kahjuhüvitise suuruse määramisel 
hinnata, sest sellest sõltub viimatinimetatu enese rikkumise olulisus. 
Olukorras, kus vastastikku on tekitanud kahju kaks isejuhtivat sõidukit, ei saa 
sõidukis viibinud isikute rikkumisi arvesse võtta. Seega oleks üheks lahenduseks 
see, et kuna isejuhtivate sõidukite käitamisrisk on eelduslikult võrdne ning juhtide 
käitumist arvestada ei saa, tuleks alati – sõltumata liiklusõnnetuse toimumise 
asjaoludest – vähendada kummagi osapoole hüvitist 50%. See aga ei tundu õiglane 
lahendus. Pigem võiks väita, et ka isejuhtivate sõidukitega vastastikuse kahju 
tekitamise korral on kahjuhüvitise jagunemise üle otsustamisel möödapääsmatu 
hinnata siiski liiklusõnnetuse toimumise asjaolusid. See tähendab, et juhi käitu-
mise asemel tuleb hinnata seda, kas isejuhtiv sõiduk järgis liiklusnõudeid. Kui 
õnnetuse põhjustas programmeerimis- või anduri viga ühes isejuhtivas sõidukis, 
mistõttu see näiteks ei andnud teed peateel liikuvale teisele sõidukile, oleks õig-
lane lahendus selline, mille järgi peateel liikunud sõiduki omanik saaks siiski 
kogu kahju või põhiosa kahjust hüvitatud. Seega väärib kaalumist lahendus, mille 
järgi kahjuhüvitise vähendamise kontekstis saab isejuhtiva sõiduki poolt liiklus-
reeglite järgimist hinnata analoogselt juhi käitumisega. 
Kui vastastikku põhjustavad kahju isejuhtiv sõiduk ja tavasõiduk, on kahju-
hüvitise jagamisel samuti võimalik kaaluda kaht alternatiivi. Ühe võimalusena 
võib – sarnaselt eelkirjeldatule – lisada isejuhtivale sõidukile kujuteldava juhi ja 
küsida, kas sel konkreetselt viisil kahju põhjustamine kujutanuks endast liiklus-
seaduse nõuete rikkumist ja kui raske see rikkumine olnuks võrreldes teise osa-
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poole rikkumisega. Näiteks kui isejuhtiv sõiduk on põhjustanud kahju viisil, mis 
tavasõiduki puhul kujutaks endast juhi rasket eksimust (nt sõidab keelava foori-
tulega ristmikule), tuleks vähendada isejuhtiva sõiduki omaniku kahjuhüvitist 
nullini ning kannatanule hüvitada kahju täies ulatuses. Kui liiklusnõudeid „rikku-
sid“ mõlemad sõidukid, tuleks hinnata kummagi rikkumise mõju ja tähtsust õnne-
tuse toimumisele. Teine võimalus on hinnata isejuhtivate sõidukite käitamisriski 
lihtsalt oluliselt suuremaks võrreldes tavapäraste mootorsõidukitega, kuid tuleb 
möönda, et üksikjuhul õiglase lõpplahenduse leidmine eeldab siiski õnnetuse 
asjaolude arvesse võtmist. 
Kokkuvõtvalt võib öelda, et kuigi vastutuse õiglane jagamine isejuhtiva sõidu-
kiga ja tavasõidukiga kahju vastastikusel põhjustamisel eeldab VÕS § 139 raken-
duspraktika teatavat kohandamist, ei ole see kohtupraktika kujundamisel eel-
datavasti ülemäära keeruline ülesanne. 
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